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ABSTRACT 
The work summarized in this thesis applies the “motivation-as-cognition”-paradigm 
(Kruglanski et al., 2002) as well as a life-span developmental perspective (e.g., Goulet & Baltes, 
1970) to the study of self-regulation during the pursuit of personal goals and reactions to failure. 
This work examines how goal focus (i.e. the cognitive representation of means vs. desired 
outcomes of goal pursuit) and age are associated with affective, cognitive and behavioral self-
regulation during goal pursuit and especially after experiencing failure. Adopting a multi-method 
approach, the following questions were investigated: Is a focus on the means of goal pursuit 
(process focus) generally more adaptive for goal-directed self-regulation and subjective well-being 
than a focus on the outcomes (outcome focus; Part I)? Are the two goal foci related to different 
reactions to failure (Part II)? How and why might goal focus change across the lifespan (Part III)? 
Are older adults more process-focused than younger adults who, in turn, are more outcome-
focused (Part IV)? Finally, are older adults better at self-regulating their behavior, affect and 
cognition during goal pursuit than younger adults, especially after experiencing failure (Part V)?  
Studies have supported the hypotheses that a process focus is more adaptive for affective, 
cognitive and behavioral self-regulation than an outcome focus. Adults also seemed to profit 
from a process focus when encountering failure (and success). In contrast to younger adults, 
older adults focused more strongly on the process of goal pursuit than on its outcomes. A 
process focus appeared to be more adaptive than an outcome focus irrespective of age. Older 
adults were more successful in self-regulating their behavior, affect, and thought during goal 
pursuit than younger adults, especially after failure. 
Finally, an overall discussion will address shortcomings of the present studies and 
theoretical implications for discrepancy theories of motivation and the study of self-regulation 
over the life span. Suggestions for future research directions will be proposed and possible 
practical implications shall be explored.
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INTRODUCTION 
Self-regulation is the capacity to alter one’s own responses, and it is essential for the 
successful pursuit of long-term goals (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). For example, someone 
who intends to lose weight will continuously face situations in which he or she should resist the 
temptation of tasty and high caloric food for the sake of his or her body shape. Similarly, a 
person who needs to start preparing for an exam must overcome the urge to rather watch TV or 
hang out with friends for the purpose of obtaining a future university degree. However, effective 
self-regulation is not only a means for the successful pursuit of goals; it also depends on the goal 
representations one has (Forgas, Baumeister, & Tice, 2009). For example, abstract regulatory 
objectives such as preparing well for an exam may best be pursued when people are able to 
translate them into concrete goals, namely, studying five hours every day (e.g., Locke & Latham, 
2002; McCrea, Liberman, Trope, & Sherman, 2008).  
Due to the interdependence of self-regulation and goal pursuit, the present research aims 
to treat both constructs as an integrated whole. In line with the proposition that motivated 
behavior can best be understood from a cognitive perspective (Kruglanski et al., 2002), this 
research project investigates how the cognitive representation of a goal affects self-regulation 
during goal pursuit. In particular, this thesis addresses the following questions: Is the 
representation of goals in terms of the means of goal pursuit (i.e., process focus) rather than in 
relation to the desired outcomes (i.e., outcome focus) of goal attainment advantageous for goal-
directed self-regulation? Is it significantly more advantageous after failure? Does goal focus 
evolve during the adult life span? What are the effects of age on self-regulation? Does the 
capacity to regulate oneself improve across the adult life span?  
Before embarking on an introduction pertaining to the details of these abovementioned 
questions, I find it more fruitful to thoroughly discuss the goal concept and how goals are 
constructed of both means and desired outcomes.  
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Means 1 Means 2 Means 3 
Outcome 2 Outcome 1 
Personal goals as knowledge structures 
Goals can be defined as knowledge structures that entail information about desired 
outcome states and the means of attaining them (Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
Cognitive representations of outcomes and means are associated by lateral interconnections 
between means, lateral interconnections between outcomes, as well as by vertical means-ends 
relations. Interconnections can be inhibitory between mutually exclusive means, e.g., eating 
healthy versus taking steroids to look better, and between mutually exclusive outcomes, e.g., 
achieving eating enjoyment versus weight loss. They can also be facilitative between means that 
serve the same outcome, e.g., exercising and dieting, or outcomes that facilitate each other, e.g, 
losing weight and improving one’s physical health.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A two-level system of means and outcomes (adapted from Kruglanski et al., 2002) 
 
The way that goal systems affect goal-directed behavior is dependent on the structural 
arrangement of means and outcomes (Kruglanski et al., 2002, see Figure 1). The principle of 
equifinality implies that a goal may be attained via multiple means and actions as illustrated by the 
proverb of “many roads lead to Rome” (Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski et al., 2002). Accordingly, 
a particular means that has not successfully attained an outcome may be substituted by an 
alternative means. As depicted in Figure 1, means 1 and 2 both serve outcome 1. For example, 
when pursuing the goal to lose weight, the means of dieting may be substituted by the alternative 
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means of exercising. In addition, the principle of multifinality suggests that one means can serve 
multiple outcomes (Kruglanski et al., 2002). In Figure 1, means 2 serves outcomes 1 and 2. For 
example, exercising may improve one’s body shape, as well as one’s physical health. As in the 
case of failing to improve one’s body shape with exercise, one might continue exercising whilst 
substituting the goal and choosing to persist with an exercise program for the sake of one’s 
physical health (Kruglanski & Jaffe, 1988). 
According to Kruglanski et al. (2002), the strength of an interconnection between two 
elements of a goal system is positively related to its uniqueness1. The more means are associated 
with an outcome (equifinality) and/or the more outcomes are associated with a particular means 
(multifinality), the weaker each of the single means-outcome interconnections becomes. As has 
been shown experimentally, the less substitutable one’s means for a certain outcome, the more 
easily it comes to mind after one is primed with the respective outcome (Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
In other words: the less means there are for attaining a particular outcome, the easier each of 
these means will be cognitively activated when contemplating how to pursue the outcome. 
Similarly, the more multifinal a means is, the less instrumental it is when considered with respect 
to each of the possible outcomes (Zhang, Fishbach, & Kruglanski, 2007). For example, a 
smartphone might be viewed as multifunctional since it can be used to write text messages, make 
calls, surf the Internet, and to take photos; however, when thinking about a useful instrument for 
taking photos, one is more likely to consider a digital camera first.  
                                                
1 Kruglanski et al. (2002) put forth that this effect is analogous to the “fan effect” in other knowledge structures as 
demonstrated by Anderson (1974, 1983). However, whereas Kruglanski et al. assume a direct association between 
the strength of an interconnection and its uniqueness, Anderson assumes a that the less unique an interconnection is, 
the more it has to compete with other interconnections for activation, whereas the strength of each interconnection 
itself should not be reduced. 
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The hierarchical organization of goals 
 Means and ends can also be described as being hierarchically related (Carver & Scheier, 
1981; Emmons, 1996; Little, 1989; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987). The means (or subgoals), e.g., 
dieting, are subordinate to their respective outcomes (or superordinate goals), e.g., losing weight. 
According to the definition of means, means must be deployed in order to achieve outcomes; 
there is a causal and sequential relationship implied in their hierarchical arrangement. Moreover, 
higher-level elements are more important than lower level elements (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; 
see also Newman & Taylor, 1992). However, means may only be defined as means in their 
relation to a higher-order outcome. The relation of means and outcomes is relative within one 
specific two-level arrangement because each outcome (e.g., weight loss) may itself be a means for 
achieving another higher-level outcome (e.g., attractiveness).  
Process and outcome goal focus 
The foundation of this thesis is based on the assumption that there exists a substantial 
inter- and intraindividual variation in how much people think about the lower and more concrete 
level of means of goal pursuit as compared to the higher and more abstract level of desired 
outcomes of their goals (i.e., goal focus, Sansone & Thoman, 2005; Pham & Taylor, 1999; 
Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997, 1999). Process focus is defined as the relatively higher cognitive 
accessibility of the means of goal pursuit. Outcome focus is defined as the relatively higher 
cognitive accessibility of the desired outcomes (Freund, Hennecke, & Riediger, 2010). This 
relative accessibility of means and ends can vary among people, goals, and different phases of 
goal pursuit (Freund, Hennecke, & Mustafic, under review). For example the goal “losing 
weight” can either be primarily represented in terms of its outcomes, e.g., as  “being attractive” 
and “being healthy”, or in terms of the concrete processes or means it entails, such as “dieting” 
and “exercising.”  
It is important to stress that goal focus may be defined in relative terms, as a relatively 
higher accessibility of either the means or the outcomes, because both means and outcomes 
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define a goal. Furthermore, it is an essential feature of the goal system that activation spreads 
top-down from the outcomes to the means, as well as bottom-up from the means to the 
outcomes. To explore this assumption, Shah and Kruglanski (2000; 2003) have employed a 
lexical decision task that used either desired outcome states as primes and their respective means 
as targets or vice versa. As indicated by shorter reaction times to the targets, outcomes that are 
currently desired prime their means and means prime their respective outcomes. In line with this 
reasoning, we point out that the complete representation of a goal entails both the accessibility 
of means and outcomes to some degree. Nevertheless, we state that there are differences in the 
relative accessibility of each goal level. 
Research pertaining to action identification (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989) currently 
supports the idea that there is within- and between-person variance as to whether people 
represent an action in terms of its higher-level outcomes or in relation to the lower-level 
processes or means it entails. In a questionnaire designed by Vallacher and Wegner (the 
“Behavior Identification Form”, 1989), participants had to select one out of two descriptions for 
25 behaviors (e.g., “making a list”), one representing a lower level identification (“writing things 
down”) and the other reflecting a higher level action identification (“getting organized”). Across 
the 25 items, 40 to 89 % of the sample chose the higher-level identity, attesting to a substantial 
variation among actions and between subjects. Nevertheless, Vallacher and Wegner (1989) 
concluded from the overall response tendencies in the questionnaire and their experimental 
research (Wegner, Vallacher, Kiersted, & Dizadji, 1986; Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & 
Arps, 1984) that people seem to display a general tendency to embrace the higher-level outcome-
related identity and to focus on the meaning, the larger effects or the implications of their 
behavior, rather than on its underlying processes (see also Escalas & Luce, 2004). 
The effects of process and outcome goal focus on self-regulation 
As previously reported, focusing on outcomes rather than on means appears to be the 
“default” mindset. Nevertheless the following question still remains: Which focus is actually 
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more instrumental for self-regulation during goal pursuit? The self-help literature maintains that 
focusing on and imagining the desired outcome is the key to successful goal attainment (e.g., 
Dyer, 2001). Peale (1982) gives the following instructions: 
“Hold the image of yourself succeeding, visualize it so vividly, that when the desired 
success comes, it seems to be merely echoing the reality that has already existed in your 
mind.” (p. 15) 
Such recommendations however tend not to be based on empirical research and lack 
process models that can explain the mechanisms by which thinking about a desired outcome 
could enhance a person’s likelihood of actually achieving it (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, & Amor, 
1998). In the absence of specific plans regarding how to pursue the goal it is questionable 
whether outcome thinking is much more than simple fantasy. Consequently, fantasy may not 
lead to instrumental goal-directed behavior (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). 
Indeed, empirical evidence pertaining to the adaptiveness of either outcome focus or 
process focus is rather mixed. Various studies suggest that a process focus is more beneficial 
than an outcome focus. For example, students who mentally simulate the process of studying for 
an exam appear to benefit from this mental simulation because they have been shown to study 
more hours and to obtain higher exam scores (Pham & Taylor, 1999). In contrast, students who 
mentally simulate the feeling of receiving a good grade on an exam do not perform well, in 
comparison to a control group without any simulation (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Research 
dedicated to implementation intentions suggests that deliberately thinking about the conditions 
under which means of goal pursuit can be implemented does promote successful goal attainment 
(e.g., Gollwitzer, 1993; Gollwitzer & Brandstätter, 1997). Moreover, when a task becomes 
difficult or failure is experienced, people do not only switch their initially predominant outcome 
focus to a process focus (Vallacher, Wegner, & Frederick, 1987; Wegner & Vallacher, 1983). 
When goal pursuit is difficult or failure is experienced, such focusing on the process also seems 
to be adaptive not only to the actual performance but also to the subjective satisfaction with 
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one’s performance, as well as to one’s affective state (Houser-Marko & Sheldon, 2008; Vallacher, 
Wegner, & Samoza, 1989; Wegner et al., 1984). In line with the proposition that the adaptiveness 
of goal focus depends on the task difficulty, a shift from process to outcome goals over time 
seems to be more beneficial when people acquire new skills (Zimmermann & Kitsantas, 1997, 
1999). Obviously, when learning to master a new task the means have to be acquired or mastered 
first before performance levels can become the focus of attention.  
There also exist alternative research studies, which provide support for the adaptiveness of 
outcome focus. Vallacher et al. (1989) have shown that, as long as a task is relatively easy, an 
outcome focus might lead to better results. Moreover, it has been argued that when people have 
previously exerted self-regulation, reflecting upon their behavior in terms of the means and 
resources they have invested, can lead them to invest less resources in subsequent self-regulatory 
tasks. Conversely, a focus on higher-level construals, can reduce the focus on resources that have 
already been invested, and lead individuals to focus on their self-regulatory goals or, in other 
words, on the outcomes they want to attain. Meanwhile, this can improve their self-regulation in 
subsequent tasks (Agrawal & Wan, 2009). Thompson, Hamilton, and Petrova (2009) have also 
argued that in consumer decision-making situations, process-oriented thinking may not payoff. 
Thompson et al. propose that process-oriented thinking may result in the means becoming more 
salient while end benefits may continue to remain important because thinking about ends occurs 
naturally (Escalas & Luce, 2004; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987; Wegner et al., 1986; Liu, 2008). In 
addition, asking people to think about the outcome tends to reinforce their natural way of 
thinking; however, asking them to consider the process leads to the addition of this component 
to their initial outcome focus. Overall, this results in a focus on both outcomes and means. 
Escalas and Luce as well as Thompson et al. posit that if consumers have both outcomes and 
means in mind, they are more likely to recognize substantive trade-offs between means (e.g., the 
ease of use of a camera) and end benefits (e.g., various functions of a camera). Consequently, this 
may lead consumers to experience more decision difficulty, that is, a greater willingness to 
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postpone making a choice, a lower commitment to the chosen option, as well as degraded task 
performance. However, whilst the authors consider this to be maladaptive – and from the 
perspective of a consumer psychologist this may be the case – it is not maladaptive to reconsider 
the trade-off between the desirability of a goal on the outcome level and its feasibility on the 
means level when deciding which personal goals a person would like to pursue (Emmons, 1996). 
In this case, decision difficulty might reflect the intensity by which a person considers means and 
outcome-related information. This should be observed in the quality of the decision; it may pay-
off when people select long-term goals to pursue. Whereas Thompson et al. (2009) argue that 
having both the process and the outcome in mind can be maladaptive, other researchers have 
argued that if a person bears the outcome and the process in mind during goal pursuit, then they 
may yield the best results (Pham & Taylor, 1999). Moreover, it is curious, why only a process-
focused manipulation should lead to a focus on both means and outcomes. As previously 
mentioned, research within the framework of goal-systems theory has demonstrated that 
activation spreads both bottom-up from the means to the outcomes, as well as top-down from 
the outcomes to the means (Kruglanski et al., 2002). Accordingly, contemplation of an outcome 
should to some degree also co-activate the related means (Shah & Kruglanski, 2000). 
In summary, research has produced mixed results regarding the relative adaptiveness of 
process and outcome focus. Seemingly, an outcome focus is adaptive in the following four 
conditions: First, if the task at hand is easy to master (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989); second, when 
the necessary skills have already been acquired (Zimmermann & Kitsantas, 1997, 1999); third, if 
decision difficulty is the dependent variable (Thompson et al., 2009); finally, if self-regulatory 
resources have already been depleted (Agrawal & Wan, 2009). In contrast, a process focus may 
be adaptive in the following three conditions: First, if tasks are difficult (Vallacher et al., 1989); 
second, if skills have to be acquired for solving a task (Zimmermann & Kitsantas, 1997, 1999); 
finally, if affective feelings after failure feedback are assessed (Houser-Marko & Sheldon, 2008). 
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The current work 
 Research examining the adaptive nature of process and outcome goal focus has yielded 
varying results. Thus, we aim to further investigate outcome and process goal focus. In 
experimental settings comprised of relatively easy tasks, prior research has shown that an 
outcome focus might be more adaptive. Alternatively, in the pursuit of everyday, difficult and 
long-term goals, which possess a higher risk of failure and, which are of higher personal 
relevance, a process focus might be a wiser choice. We investigate the effects of goal focus on 
different outcomes of self-regulation. We also test hypotheses concerning the mechanisms by 
which a process focus is more adaptive. In Part I and II of this thesis, we examine the 
adaptiveness of process and outcome focus for self-regulation whilst focusing on the 
consequences of process and outcome focus after the experience of failure.  
Part I: Changing eating behavior vs. losing weight: The role of goal focus for weight loss in overweight 
women. In Part I, we investigate the role of goal focus for self-regulation in the context of a 
weight loss goal. In order to capture the complex behavior that the pursuit of a long-term goal 
such as losing weight encompasses and to achieve high ecological validity, a short-term 
longitudinal field study was conducted. We decided to investigate self-regulation in the context 
of the specific goal to lose weight because of the following reasons: First, it allows for a clear 
distinction and assessment of how intensely an individual thinks about the means of losing 
weight and the desired outcome, weight loss. Second, losing weight by means of dieting is a very 
common and health-relevant goal. This goal is difficult to achieve because it requires changing 
one’s habits and regulating one’s behavior, affect and thoughts to resist the temptation of 
immediate gratification in favor of future outcomes (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000; 
Hofmann, Friese, & Roefs, 2009). We hypothesize that a focus on the immediate actions 
required to lose weight, such as, eating healthy food (process focus) is more adaptive than a 
focus on the short- and long-term consequences of weight loss, such as, an enhanced body shape 
(outcome focus). By focusing on the means of the diet the following should be fostered: Dieting 
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adherence and adaptive reactions to failure. The latter includes an increased compensation for 
lapses and a reduction in rumination about them. In contrast, focusing on the distant and yet 
desirable outcome of weight loss, lapses may tend to undermine a dieter’s motivation, foster 
overeating and increase rumination about lapses. Altogether, we hypothesize that a process focus 
is negatively related to deviations from the diet, disinhibition after a lapse and rumination whilst 
concurrently fostering subjective well-being and successful weight loss. 
Part II: The adaptiveness of goal focus for subjective well-being and mastering success and failure. In 
Part II, we elaborate the adaptiveness of process focus. We do this by reporting results on the 
role of goal focus in situations, in which people react to and identify failure (and success) during 
goal pursuit. As previously noted, research by Vallacher and Wegner (1989) has attested to the 
benefits of a process focus when people encounter difficulties during goal pursuit. Furthermore, 
Houser-Marko and Sheldon (2008) have shown that failure feedback impacts affect less 
negatively when it pertains to the process level, as opposed to the outcome level. However, not 
much is known about the underlying mechanisms. In order to shed light on the underlying 
mechanisms, we investigate how behavioral and affective reactions to failure, might be different 
in a process versus an outcome focus. We argue that a process focus is more beneficial after a 
setback as it fosters the substitution of means, rather than, the substitution of outcomes. In 
order to maintain subjective well-being, a process focus should also be more beneficial. This is 
the case because failing on the level of means to an end should not be viewed as as severe as 
failing on the level of the relatively more important ends. 
Study 1 is a correlational online questionnaire study. We assess goal focus by asking 
participants, in general, how much they think about the means vs. the outcomes of two personal 
goals. We predict that the more they consider the means versus the outcomes, the more they will 
tend to substitute means after failure than to substitute the desired outcome. This substitution  
implies disengagement from the target outcome in favor of another. Furthermore, we predict 
that a relatively stronger process focus is indeed beneficial for subjective well-being. Study 2, 
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which is a field study pertaining to dieting was designed in order to test the abovementioned 
hypotheses. Specific means- and outcome-related attributions of failure are used as predictors of 
deviations from the diet, disinhibition after lapses (as an indicator of outcome substitution), 
weekly weight loss, and affective well-being during the diet. Additionally, the role of means- and 
outcome-related attributions of success is explored: Do these attributions also produce an 
impact on goal pursuit? Does the conclusion that outcomes have been successfully attained 
undermine future motivation, as opposed to the scenario in which the means of goal pursuit 
have instead been evaluated as appropriately implemented? We discuss how process-related 
attributions of failure and success may contribute to the relative adaptiveness of process focus. 
In addition, the present thesis adopts a life-span developmental approach to the study of 
self-regulation. Prior research on goal focus or action identification has relied almost entirely on 
samples of younger adults. Accordingly, stating that people “naturally” show outcome-oriented 
thinking and embrace higher-level action identifications seems to be an overgeneralization. For 
example, the sample used in Vallacher and Wegner’s influential work on action identification 
(1989) consisted of n = 1100 undergraduates, n = 110 university faculty, staff and employees, n = 
59 research associates from a medical outpatient center and n = 125 juvenile detainees. Other 
samples consisted of only students (e.g., Escalas & Luce, 2004; Wegner et al., 1984; Wegner & 
Vallacher, 1986). In our opinion, such a sampling bias towards the study of younger adults, 
results in an overgeneralization regarding what the “default” mode of thinking about actions (or 
goals) might be. In contrast, there are many reasons to argue for a shift from outcome to process 
goal focus across the adult life span (Freund et al., under review). Part III and IV of this thesis 
investigates this in detail and reports evidence for a shift from outcome to process focus in old 
age.  
Part III: On gains and losses, means and ends: Goal orientation and goal focus across adulthood. Part 
III gives a comprehensive theoretical introduction to the hypothesized development of goal 
focus across adulthood. In Part III the scope of this investigation is broadened by including the 
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concept of goal focus into a larger developmental context. This in turn serves as the theoretical 
background of Part IV, whose function it to present our empirical results on goal focus across 
the life span.  
First, we stress the importance of personal goals across the adult life span. We present 
the action-theoretical specification of the model of selective optimization with compensation 
(SOC model) which proposes that successful life-management can be achieved by the 
orchestration of three processes, namely the selection of goals, the optimization of the selected 
goals, and the compensation of goal-relevant means (e.g., Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Freund & 
Baltes, 1998). Using the SOC model as a framework, we address the adaptiveness of a shifting 
goal orientation from promoting gains to preventing and counteracting losses across adulthood 
(Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006; Freund, 2006b). Next, we discuss our concept of goal focus; this 
involves delineating goal focus from related concepts, such as, mastery and performance 
orientation, and linking it to intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. An elaboration follows pertaining 
to how and why goal focus might evolve from outcome focus in young adulthood to process 
focus in later life. More specifically, we propose that restrictions in the availability of resources, a 
shortening of future life perspective and the increased importance of goals oriented towards 
achieving functional stability result in a process focus becoming more salient and adaptive in old 
age. Finally, we shall resume our argumentation for the general adaptiveness of a process focus 
after failure, since we view the ability to appropriately cope with failure as particularly important 
in old age. 
Part IV: Age-related differences in outcome and process goal focus. In Part IV we present multi-
method evidence for the hypothesized age-related shift from outcome to process focus. Study 1, 
which is a questionnaire study with younger and older adults demonstrates age-related 
differences in goal focus. Study 2 is a quasi-experiment that replicates age-related differences in 
goal focus and evidences differential emotional consequences of goal focus in younger and older 
adults. Finally, Study 3 is a short-term longitudinal field study in which research participants who 
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wanted to start and maintain a regular exercising regime indicated if their goal focus was either 
the means or desired outcomes. Other than portraying age-related differences in goal focus, 
Study 3 is linked with Parts I and II as it demonstrates the general adaptiveness of process focus 
regardless of age.  
Part V: Staying on and getting back on the wagon: Age-related improvement in self-regulation during a 
low-calorie diet. Part V broadens the scope of this dissertation, which up to this point has examined 
goal focus; we now consider why self-regulation in the service of goal pursuit might actually 
improve across the adult life span. Part V investigates age-related differences in self-regulation 
during goal pursuit with a particular emphasis being placed on behavioral and cognitive reactions 
to failure. To reiterate, the dieting study (see Parts I and II) serves as a backdrop to this 
investigation regarding our hypothesized age-related improvement of self-regulation. Our 
fundamental argument is that because of practice effects in self-regulation and an increased 
motivation to counteract and cope with losses, the self-regulation of behavior, emotion, and 
cognition improves across the adult life span. 
Finally, a comprehensive discussion of Parts I to V will be provided. The discussion 
intends to integrate the empirical evidence of all studies, deriving their theoretical and practical 
implications, and providing various suggestions for future research. This discussion will fixate on 
the mechanisms that drive the beneficial quality of process versus outcome focus, the 
determinants that restrict the adaptiveness of process versus outcome focus, the functionality of 
process versus outcome focus across the life span, the development of self-regulation across the 
life span, as well as its importance for developmental regulation.  
 Altogether, the thesis uses a variety of methods and investigates self-regulation in different 
settings in which people pursue personal goals. They will be introduced in more detail now. 
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PART I: CHANGING EATING BEHAVIOR VS. LOSING WEIGHT: THE ROLE OF 
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Abstract 
In a six-week longitudinal study with N = 126 overweight women participating in a 
weight-loss program, we investigated whether focusing on the process (dietary behaviors) rather 
than on the outcome of dieting (weight loss) leads to more successful goal pursuit and 
achievement. As expected, a more dominant process focus was related positively to weight loss 
and negatively to self-regulation failure (i.e., deviations from the diet, rumination, disinhibition 
after lapses). Confirming our hypotheses, self-regulation failure was negatively related to affective 
well-being but, contrary to our hypotheses, goal focus was unrelated to well-being. Focusing 
more on the process than on the outcome may facilitate the achievement of difficult health-
related goals and support self-regulation, but it does not contribute to affective well-being. 
Keywords: Self-regulation, goal focus, means, outcomes, eating behavior, dieting 
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 Introduction 
Changing one’s eating behavior is challenging. Eating behavior is highly habitualized and 
triggered very frequently, namely, each time a person experiences hunger or appetite or is 
confronted with food-related stimuli. Not surprisingly, then, it is difficult for people to adhere to 
their diet when trying to lose weight. The benefits of goal setting, planning, and formulating 
implementation intentions have been investigated in various domains of health-related behavior 
including dieting (e.g., Achtziger, Gollwitzer, & Sheeran, 2008). Nothing, however, is known 
about the role of goal focus in diet adherence, that is, whether people focus more on the means 
(i.e., the process) or the ends (i.e., the outcomes) when pursuing the goal of losing weight. The 
present study investigated the role of goal focus (i.e., focusing on the process vs. the outcome) 
for self-regulation and weight loss in overweight women participating in a diet program. 
The difficulty of changing eating behavior  
Obesity is becoming an increasingly pressing health issue worldwide (Puska, Nishida, & 
Porter, 2003). According to the WHO (2006), one of the main reasons for overweight and 
obesity is the consumption of high-calorie and fast food. Changing one’s eating behavior, 
however, is difficult for various reasons: First, eating behavior has a habitual nature. Habits are 
routine repetitions of behaviors cued by environmental stimuli rather than personal goals, 
intentions, or thoughts (Wood, Quinn, & Kashy, 2002). Habits, then, are under stimulus control 
and breaking automatic routines requires monitoring and self-regulation, both of which are 
effortful and demanding (Baumeister et al., 2000). Second, unlike other habits such as gambling, 
people have to eat and food-related cues that trigger eating habits cannot be avoided. Third, 
eating constitutes an immediate reward whereas weight loss and good health are more distant 
rewards. Effortful self-regulation is needed to resist the temptation of immediate gratification in 
favor of future outcomes (Baumeister et al., 2000; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). For these 
reasons many people have such a hard time to lose weight. We propose that whether people 
focus on the process or the outcome of their weight-loss goal might support self-regulation when 
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changing their eating behavior dieting and influence whether people succeed in losing weight . 
Goal focus  
Goals can be defined as cognitive representations of personally desired (or dreaded) 
states to be approached (or avoided) through certain means (Kruglanski, 1996). People can focus 
more on the outcome of goal pursuit (short- and long-term consequences) or the process of goal 
pursuit (means of goal attainment). Following Sansone and Thoman (2005), “outcome focus” is 
defined as the motivation to engage in an activity because it leads to a certain end. In other 
words, the outcome of an activity is the focus of attention. In contrast, “process focus” refers to 
a higher salience of the means of goal pursuit.  
Which goal focus is adaptive depends on the goal at hand. Zimmerman and Kitsantas 
(1997, 1999) found that, during task learning, a process focus helps people to acquire the 
necessary goal-relevant means. In contrast, an outcome focus seems to distract people from 
acquiring and practicing the goal-relevant means and to thereby hinder successful goal pursuit. 
An outcome focus may not be adaptive until different aspects of the goal-relevant means have 
been mastered and integrated into an action sequence so that they no longer require attention. 
Starting a new diet, then, should profit from a process focus. Accordingly, with respect to the 
goal to start exercising, Freund, Hennecke, and Riediger (2010) found that process focus was 
positively related to satisfaction with the goal, affective well-being, and greater persistence in goal 
pursuit. Regarding goal difficulty, Vallacher et al. (1989) showed that adopting a process focus 
resulted in better performance on difficult tasks and an outcome focus in better performance on 
easy tasks. As losing weight is a difficult task, a process focus should be more beneficial than an 
outcome focus.  
Heckhausen’s model of action phases and the related model of cognitive mind-sets 
accompanying the different motivational phases (Gollwitzer, 1990; Heckhausen & Gollwitzer, 
1987) propose that, during the actional phase of goal pursuit, a focus on the outcome on a rather 
abstract level of cognitive representation might be more dominant and adaptive. In contrast, we 
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assume that, especially after setbacks, it is most adaptive to re-evaluate the employed goal-
relevant means by going back to an implemental mind-set and thinking about other paths that 
might help one to overcome the obstacle. Focusing on the outcome might distract a person from 
ways to implement goal-relevant means and thereby even hinder goal achievement. Particularly 
when long-term goals that require goal-relevant actions over an extended period of time are 
pursued, focusing on the means rather than the negative discrepancy between the actual and 
desired outcome should help sustain motivation even in the face of obstacles and setbacks (Kuhl 
& Beckmann, 1994). Thus, when weight loss is slow, focusing on the outcome (i.e., the desired 
weight) is more likely to discourage dieters than focusing on preparing certain foods. 
Goal focus and the self-regulation of eating  
As mentioned above, losing weight implies changing one’s eating habits, which, in turn, 
requires a high degree of self-regulation (Stroebe, 2008). Focusing on the process rather than the 
outcome of the goal might help dieters self-regulate in three ways.  
First, adopting a process focus while dieting entails monitoring what one eats (rather than 
how much weight one has already lost), thereby making diet adherence more likely and deviations 
less likely.  
Second, focusing on the means rather than the outcome of the goal to lose weight might 
guard against “what the hell” cognitions after lapses and subsequent disinhibition in eating 
(Cochran & Tesser, 1996; Polivy & Herman, 1985). “What the hell” cognitions and disinhibition 
typically occur when dieters feel that, after having violated dietary restrictions, they can go ahead 
and eat even more because their calorie allowance for that day has been exceeded anyway. If 
people are highly outcome-focused, lapses are likely to be represented as a failure to move toward 
the desired outcome, which, in turn, might undermine people’s motivation to continue pursuing 
the difficult goal. Instead, if dieters focus on each meal as a step towards their goal, transgressing 
once might result in their adhering to the diet at the next meal instead of interpreting one lapse as 
a failure to achieve one’s goal for an entire day.  
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Third, a stronger process focus might also guard against rumination after diet setbacks. 
During a diet, weight loss does not occur daily and might fluctuate somewhat even if one adheres 
to the diet. Focusing on the outcome of dieting might make it more likely for dieters to compare 
the actual with the desired state and consequently more prone to rumination about stagnation or 
setbacks in weight loss. Rumination, that is, the tendency to think about the causes and 
consequences of problems rather than the means to solve them, is associated with less positive 
expectations of achieving one’s goal, less effective solutions to one’s problems (Lyubomirsky & 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995), and more negative, global self-evaluations that undermine perceived 
competence (Rimes & Watkins, 2005). This, in turn, should jeopardize the successful pursuit of a 
difficult goal such as dieting.  
In sum, the goal of losing weight should profit from a more dominant process focus. Our 
main hypothesis is that a stronger process than outcome focus contributes to weight loss in 
dieters. Moreover, we hypothesize that a stronger process focus is related to fewer failures in self-
regulation. Specifically, we assume that process focus is negatively related to deviations from the 
diet, disinhibition, and rumination. Moreover, we expect failures in self-regulation to be 
negatively related to weight loss and have a negative impact on dieters’ affective well-being. 
These hypotheses were addressed in a short-term longitudinal study of overweight women with a 
mutual goal: to lose weight.  
Goal-setting theory proposes that difficult goals might be achieved more easily when the 
goals are more concrete (e.g., Locke & Latham, 2002). As means are typically more concrete than 
outcomes (Carver & Scheier, 1995; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), we also tested the impact of 
subjective concreteness of the process and outcomes of the dieting goal. 
Methods 
Participants 
The study targeted overweight and obese women who wanted to lose weight and would 
agree to participate in a 6-week diet program. Participants were recruited through advertisements 
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in local newspapers. In short phone interviews prior to the study, women were asked to report 
their weight and height in order to ensure that they were actually overweight, which was defined 
as a body mass index (BMI; kg/m2) of over 25 following World Health Organization guidelines. 
The sample of women fulfilling this criterion consisted of N = 126 women between 19 and 77 
years of age (M = 47.2, SD = 15.9) with an initial BMI of 25 to 46 (M = 31.6, SD = 5.0). They 
reported having been overweight for 1 to 43 years (M = 13.8, SD = 9.3) and wanting to lose at 
least 4.4 lbs (M = 27.0, SD = 18.3) over the course of six weeks. 39% of the sample had finished 
high school (Gymnasium); 52% had finished an apprenticeship. 
Procedure 
The study consisted of seven measurement occasions over 7.5 weeks. T1 (two to five 
days before the diet began) and T7 (1 week after the diet ended) were group sessions held in our 
laboratory at which questionnaires were filled out, the diet explained (T1), and the participants’ 
weight and height measured. Participants were instructed to start the diet on the Monday 
following T1. All agreed to adhere to the diet for at least six weeks. In addition, every Saturday 
during the six-week dieting phase participants filled out weekly online questionnaires reporting 
their dieting behavior and affective well-being. The questionnaires were administered via the 
PHPSurveyor tool for online surveys (now: www.limesurvey.org). Participants received weekly 
reminder e-mails with a link to the questionnaire.  
T1 was held in groups of 2 to 25 women; participants filled out a questionnaire and then 
received instructions. In the instruction part, participants were introduced to the diet (“Brigitte 
Diet”) and, as an incentive to participate in the study, received a free copy of a book with a 
detailed explanation of the diet and recipes. The Brigitte Diet was chosen because an 
independent German consumers’ organization recommended it as a healthy balanced diet with a 
high probability of successful weight loss. Participants received 70 Swiss francs (approx. $60) for 
completing T1 to T7. 
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Weekly Measures 
Each week, participants filled out a web-based questionnaire. For the present set of 
analyses, we used the following measures (the means and SDs given are aggregated across all 
measurement occasions): 
Goal focus. Participants indicated on two newly developed items how much they focused 
on the process and the outcomes of dieting, respectively (“During the past week, how much did you 
think about what you have to do to eat low-calorie and low-fat food?” [process focus] “…, about what weighing 
less would be like?” [outcome focus]). Goal focus, defined as a stronger focus on the process or the 
outcome, was indexed by a relative score subtracting outcome focus from process focus ratings. 
Positive values indicate a process focus, negative values an outcome focus. Scores ranged from –
6 to 6 (M = .21, SD = 1.20). 
Concreteness of process versus outcome. Participants indicated how concrete they perceived the 
process and outcomes of dieting on two items each (process concreteness: “During the past week, 
how concrete was your idea about what it means to eat according to the diet?” outcome concreteness: “… the 
way you would look like after the diet?”). In keeping with the definition of goal focus, we again 
computed a relative score of concreteness by subtracting outcome concreteness from process 
concreteness ratings. Positive values indicate greater process concreteness, negative values greater 
outcome concreteness. Concreteness ranged from –3 to 6 (M = .56, SD = 1.45). Theoretically, 
goal focus and concreteness are related (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1995; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985), 
but not redundant (Freund et al., 2010). To test whether our measures of goal focus and 
concreteness were also empirically distinct, we computed the correlation between the two. 
Aggregated across measurement occasions, the correlation was r = .23 (p = .01), converging with 
expectations of a moderate association between the two constructs. 
Affective well-being. A 12-item short version of the multidimensional mood questionnaire 
(Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997) was used to assess weekly affective well-being. The 
scale measures affective states on the dimensions mood, arousal, and vigilance. For each 
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measurement occasion, we computed two separate aggregate scores encompassing the positive or 
the negative affect items, respectively (positive affect: all Cronbach’s alphas > .74; M = 4.22, SD 
= 1.17, negative affect: all Cronbach’s alphas > .86; M = 1.41, SD = 1.28). 
Self-regulation failure. We included three indicators of self-regulation failure: 
Deviations from the diet. Deviations were assessed using the single item “How much did you 
deviate from the dietary requirements during the past week?” (M = 2.28, SD = 1.73). 
Rumination after failure. Diet-related rumination after failure was assessed using a self-
developed 6-item questionnaire (following Kuhl, 1990, see Appendix A). We calculated an 
average score over the six items, with higher scores indicating a stronger tendency to ruminate 
about deviations from the diet requirements (e.g., “Whenever I violated the diet requirements, it took me 
a long time to accept it.” all Cronbach’s alphas > .68; M = 2.58, SD = 1.26). 
Disinhibition after failure. Disinhibition was assessed using the mean across six bipolar items 
that contrasted disinhibition with compensation for lapses (e.g., “Whenever I could not resist a 
temptation, I stopped dieting for that day.”, see Appendix B). Higher scores indicate a tendency to show 
disinhibited eating after dieting lapses; lower scores indicate compensation (all Cronbach’s alphas 
> .64; M = 2.66, SD = 1.29). 
Weight loss. Weight was measured before and after the diet by assistants using a scale in 
our laboratory. Participants lost M = 6.47 lbs (SD = 5.5; range: –5.17 and 20.9) over the course 
of the six-week diet. 
Statistical analyses 
Except for weight loss, constructs were assessed weekly. As measurement occasions 
(level 1) were nested within persons (level 2), multilevel regression analyses were applied (with 
SPSS.16). Restricted maximum likelihood parameter estimates were obtained by fitting multilevel 
regression models with first-order autoregressive residual covariance structures. The 
interpretation of the multilevel fixed effects is equivalent to that of parameter estimates in OLS 
regression. Multilevel models included only the estimation of fixed effects. All predictors were 
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grand-mean centered prior to analyses. To analyze the effects of goal focus and process versus 
outcome concreteness on weight loss and life satisfaction, ordinary linear regression analyses 
were conducted. 
Results 
Goal focus and weight loss  
The first step of a hierarchical regression analysis with goal focus and process versus 
outcome concreteness as predictors showed that a more dominant process focus was significantly 
related to weight loss (ß = .23, p = .03) whereas process versus outcome concreteness was not (ß 
= .10, p = .38; R2 for step 1 = .08, p = .03). Including the interaction between goal focus and 
concreteness in a second step (ß = –.09, p = .44) did not significantly improve the prediction of 
weight loss (ΔR2 = .01, ΔF = .60, p = .44), nor did it reduce the association between goal focus 
and weight loss. 
Goal focus and indicators of self-regulation failure  
Table 1 summarizes the results of multilevel analyses of the predictive power of goal 
focus with respect to indicators of self-regulation failure. A more dominant process focus was 
related negatively to deviations from the diet, (marginally) to disinhibition after dieting lapses, and 
to rumination. In contrast, concreteness was unrelated to all of these indicators of self-regulation 
failure. On an exploratory level, we also tested for possible interaction effects of goal focus and 
concreteness. None of the interaction effects were significant (all t < |1.33|, all p > .17). 
Goal focus and indicators of affective well-being 
Goal focus did not predict positive or negative affect significantly (see Table 2). Including 
the interaction of goal focus and concreteness in an additional set of analyses did not yield 
significant results (all t < |0.30|, all p > .75). 
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Table 1: Selected results from multilevel regression models: Estimates of fixed effects predicting deviations from diet, 
disinhibition, and rumination (N = 126, max. six assessments) 
 Deviations Disinhibition Rumination 
Parameter Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx 
df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx 
df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx 
df) 
p 
Intercept 2.26 
(.10) 
22.12 
(161) 
< .001 2.68 
(.08) 
34.56 
(157) 
< .001 2.62 
(.09) 
29.75 
(135) 
< .001 
Goal focusa –.12 
(.06) 
–2.18 
(576) 
.03 –.07 
(.04) 
–1.72 
(568) 
.09 –.10 
(.03) 
–3.25 
(506) 
.001 
Process vs. 
outcome 
concreteness 
–.03 
(.05) 
–.60 
(574) 
 
.55 –.02 
(.04) 
–.60 
(583) 
 
.552 –.03 
(.03) 
–1.00 
(568) 
.32 
Note. Bold values represent significant parameter estimates that are in line with the hypotheses. The full models 
included two levels, namely, assessments nested within persons. Level 1 comprised assessments: Dependent Variable 
= ß0j + rij. Level 2 comprised persons: ß0j = γ00 + γ01Goal focus + γ02Process vs. outcome concretenessij + u0j. 
a Higher values indicate a more dominant process focus. 
 
Self-regulation failure  
Do the indicators of self-regulation failure contribute to weight loss? As expected, all 
three self-regulation failure constructs evinced significant negative correlations with weight loss: r 
= –.50, p < .001 for deviations from the diet; r = –.37, p < .001 for disinhibition after lapses; r = 
–.35, p = .001 for rumination. A linear regression analysis was used to estimate the relative impact 
of each of three indicators of self-regulation failure (all centered, aggregated across measurement 
points) on actual weight loss. Only deviations from the diet emerged as a significant predictor of 
weight loss (ß = –.41, p < .001; rumination ß = –.16, p = .18.; disinhibition ß = –.05, p = .72; 
overall model: R2 = .28, F(3, 86) = 11.12, p < .001).  
We then explored whether the relationship between goal focus and weight loss was 
mediated by self-regulation failure following Baron and Kenny (1986). The first step, the 
significant association between goal focus and weight loss, was established (see above). In the 
second step, we conducted correlations between goal focus and the aggregated self-regulation 
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Table 2: Selected results from multilevel regression models: Estimates of fixed effects predicting positive and negative 
affect (N = 126, max. six assessments) 
 Positive affect b Negative affect c 
Parameter Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p 
Intercept 4.19 
(.06) 
71.03 
(170) 
< .001 1.43 
(.07) 
21.79 
(165) 
< .001 
Goal focus a  .02 
(.04) 
.64 
(592) 
.52 –.02 
(.04) 
–.48 
(592) 
.63 
Process vs. outcome concreteness .02  
(.03) 
.66 
(506) 
.51 –.02 
(.04) 
–.352 
(507) 
.73 
Note. The full models included two levels, namely, assessments nested within persons. Level 1 comprised 
assessments: Dependent Variable = ß0j + rij. Level 2 comprised persons: ß0j = γ00 + γ01Goal focus + γ02Process vs. 
outcome concretenessij + u0j. 
a Higher values indicate a more dominant process focus. 
b Results after controlling for baseline positive affect (Estimate = .35, SE = .05, t(170) = 71.03, p < .001). 
c Results after controlling for baseline negative affect (Estimate = .29, SE = .05, t(162) = 5.68, p < .001). 
 
failure variables. Here, only the relationship between goal focus and disinhibition was significant 
(r = .19, p = .04). Finally, we conducted a regression analysis entering goal focus in the first step 
and disinhibition in the second. Results do not suggest mediation as the prediction of weight loss 
by a more dominant process than outcome focus (ß = .26, p = .01) was not affected by the 
inclusion of disinhibition in the prediction (ß = .22, p = .03). Together, goal focus and 
disinhibition predicted 18% of the variance in actual weight loss (F(2, 87) = 9.66, p < .001; 
disinhibition: ß = –.34, p = .001). 
To test the predicted associations between the three indicators of self-regulation failure 
and affective well-being, another set of multilevel regression analyses were conducted (see Table 
3). As expected, deviating from the diet, disinhibition, and rumination after lapses were all 
significantly associated with lower positive affect and higher negative affect. When entered 
simultaneously, disinhibition and rumination, but not deviations from the diet, predicted positive 
and negative affect. 
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Table 3: Selected results from multilevel regression models: Estimates of fixed effects predicting positive and negative 
affect (N = 126, max. six assessments) 
 Positive affecta Negative affectb 
Parameter Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p 
Intercept 4.20 
(.06) 
75.35 
(174) 
< .001 1.43 
(.06) 
22.48 
(172) 
< .000 
Deviations –.03 
(.03) 
–.96 
(583) 
.337 .03 
(.03) 
.99 
(586) 
.322 
Disinhibition –.09 
(.04) 
–2.12 
(590) 
.034 .08 
(.04) 
1.71 
(591) 
.089 
Rumination –.14 
(.04) 
–3.11 
(467) 
.002 .10 
(.05) 
4.87 
(172) 
.038 
Note. Bold values represent significant parameter estimates that are in line with the hypotheses. The full model 
included two levels, namely assessments nested within persons. Level 1 comprised assessments: Dependent Variable 
= ß0j + rij. Level 2 comprised persons: ß0j = γ00 + γ01Deviationsij+ γ02Disinhibitionij + γ03Ruminationij + u0j. 
a Results after controlling for baseline positive affect (Estimate = .29, SE = .05, t(177) = 5.69, p < .001). 
b Results after controlling for baseline negative affect (Estimate = .25, SE = .05, t(172) = 4.87, p < .001). 
 
Discussion 
Anyone who has ever tried to change a habit, such as eating behavior, knows how 
difficult it is. The present study suggests that focusing on the process instead of the desired 
outcome of behavior change might contribute to the successful pursuit of difficult goals. More 
specifically, focusing on the process of dieting (the eating behavior) instead of its outcome (the 
weight loss) was related to actual weight loss. Moreover, process focus was negatively related to 
indicators of self-regulation failure, arguably one of the key factors for maintaining a behavioral 
change over time (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). Importantly, the adaptiveness of a more 
dominant process focus for self-regulation during the diet and actual weight loss cannot be 
attributed to greater concreteness of the process focus. Having a more concrete representation of 
the process, as compared to the outcome, of dieting was not related to weight loss or to 
indicators of self-regulation. Moreover, controlling for concreteness did not affect any of the 
results.  
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This study also shows that self-regulation failure influences positive and negative affect 
much more than goal focus does. In fact, contrary to our hypotheses, goal focus was unrelated to 
measures of affective well-being, so it might be more strongly related to motivation than to 
affect. Goal focus was only indirectly associated with affective well-being through self-regulation. 
Failing to regulate one’s behaviors and thoughts (such as deviating from one’s diet, engaging in 
disinhibited eating after a lapse, ruminating about transgressions) is experienced directly and is 
thus more likely to affect one’s well-being than the salience of the means or the outcome of a 
goal. Using a different operationalization of goal focus as the outcome- or means-related motive 
to exercise regularly, however, Freund et al. (2010) found that process focus was related to higher 
levels of affective well-being. The cognitive operationalization of goal focus as the salience of 
means and outcomes in the representation of the goal to lose weight in the present study might 
have missed out on the more emotional aspects of goal focus. Future studies need to investigate 
which aspects of goal focus drive self-regulation and which are related to affective well-being. 
Limitations  
In the present study, goal focus was assessed rather than experimentally induced. Thus, 
we did not test whether people who adopt a stronger process focus differ in other variables that 
influence self-regulation and weight loss. Although we ruled out goal concreteness as a plausible 
third variable, there are other possible candidates such as time perspective. When thinking about 
near-future events, people might also represent their goals in terms of the means rather than the 
outcome (Trope & Liberman, 2003). In fact, we assume that a shorter time perspective is related 
to a stronger process focus (Freund et al., 2010). The present study did not include a measure of 
time perspective and cannot disentangle the effects of the two.  
Another limitation concerns the sample, which consisted of overweight women who all 
shared the goal of losing weight. Further studies should test whether results generalize to other 
samples as well as other target behaviors requiring self-regulation. Note, however, that Freund et 
al. (2010) showed that adopting a process focus also helps one to start exercising regularly. 
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Moreover, studies by Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1997, 1999) support the notion that a process 
focus is advantageous when learning how to throw darts or writing revisions. 
Conclusion  
The present study contributes to growing evidence that self-regulation is one of the 
central psychological constructs for understanding complex behaviors that need to be monitored 
over longer periods of time (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Stroebe, 2008). To our knowledge, 
this is the first study to show that representing the targeted goal primarily in terms of the process 
or the outcome, respectively, is a significant predictor of self-regulation.  
This result has important implications for clinical and other applications targeting 
behavioral change. Besides increasing goal concreteness, providing information about the means 
of goal pursuit, and helping people form implementation intentions (e.g., Achtziger et al., 2008; 
Gollwitzer, 1990), it seems advisable to focus people’s attention on the means instead of the 
outcome of their goal in order to support their self-regulation.
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Abstract 
Two studies showed that goal focus (i.e., focusing on the process as opposed to the 
outcome of goal pursuit) is related to subjective well-being and behavioral and affective reactions 
to failure. As expected, Study 1 showed in a sample of N = 129 participants that a more 
dominant process focus was positively associated with affective well-being and the substitution of 
means after failure. In Study 2, N = 126 women pursuing the goal to lose weight, filled out 
weekly questionnaires on their goal focus, subjective well-being, and reactions to dieting failures. 
Again in support of our hypotheses, multilevel analyses revealed that primarily attributing dieting 
failure as well as success to the means (i.e., adopting a process focus) had positive affective 
consequences and was associated with less disinhibited eating and more actual weight loss. The 
general adaptiveness of focusing on the process or the outcome while pursuing personal goals is 
discussed. 
Keywords: Goal focus, attributions, failure, weight loss, dieting 
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Introduction 
The saying “The path is the goal” places higher value on the means of goal pursuit than the 
desired outcome. In contrast, “The end justifies the means” prioritizes the outcomes over the 
means. What are the consequences of focusing on the means versus the outcome of goal pursuit 
for affective well-being and goal achievement? Two studies investigated this question. Study 1 
tested the hypothesis that adopting a primarily process focus has generally positive affective 
consequences and, when one experiences failure during goal pursuit, fosters one’s intention to 
substitute the means of goal pursuit but stick to the same outcome. The aim of Study 2 was to 
replicate and extend Study 1 by also including the affective and behavioral consequences of 
attributing success to the process versus the outcomes of goal pursuit.  
Goal focus 
Goals can be defined as subjectively desirable states that the individual intends to attain 
through action (Kruglanski, 1996). Research on personal goals has demonstrated that goals can 
differ on various dimensions including content, difficulty, concreteness, or orientation towards 
gains or losses (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Freund & Ebner, 2005; Little, 1989; Locke & 
Latham, 2002; Wiese & Freund, 2005). One aspect of goals that has largely been neglected is goal 
focus. Goal focus refers to the fact that goals can be represented primarily in terms of the means 
or the outcomes (Sansone & Thoman, 2005; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989; Zimmerman & 
Kitsantas, 1997, 1999). As noted by Kruglanski (1996), the cognitive representation of goals 
comprises the relation of means (process) and ends (outcome; see also Kruglanski et al., 2002). 
The relative salience of means and ends, however, can differ for different goals and different 
people (Freund et al., 2010). Our definition of goal focus is based on the relative salience, that is, 
the salience of the means of goal pursuit (process focus) compared to the salience of the desired 
end states (outcome focus; Freund et al., 2010).  
To date, only few studies have investigated the adaptiveness of the process and outcome 
focus. Taken together, this research suggests that a process focus might be more adaptive. For 
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instance, Freund et al., (2010) found that focusing on the means rather than the outcome of goal 
pursuit was positively related to subjective well-being, to positive subjective evaluations of goal 
progress, attainability, involvement, and satisfaction, as well as to higher persistence in goal 
pursuit in exercise beginners. Vallacher et al. (1989) showed that a focus on the means resulted in 
better performance if the given task was difficult, whereas a focus on the outcome resulted in 
better performance if the task was easy. In a field experiment, Pham and Taylor (1999) 
demonstrated that students performed better on their exams after visualizing themselves 
studying, a process-related mental simulation, than after visualizing themselves getting a high 
grade, an outcome-related mental simulation. They did best, however, after combining the two. 
Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1997, 1999) showed that, during the acquisition of complex skills like 
throwing darts or revising self-written texts, process goals (here, trying to do certain steps of a 
given technique correctly) result in better performance than outcome goals (here, trying to 
achieve good results).  
What are the mechanisms underlying the adaptiveness of process focus? One of the 
reasons why process focus is related to better affective well-being and persistence in goal pursuit 
might be that focusing on the process towards rather than the achievement of a certain outcome 
offers more potential for positive feedback (Freund et al., 2010). As research on the “hedonic 
treadmill” shows (for a review, see Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999), achieving desired outcomes 
typically increases happiness only for relatively short periods of time. Because the process of goal 
pursuit is temporally more extended than the actual attainment of a goal, focusing on the 
outcome throughout goal pursuit draws one’s attention to the negative discrepancy between the 
actual and the desired state, which might lead to negative affect, especially if goal progress is slow 
or when one experiences setbacks or failures (Carver & Scheier, 1981). Furthermore, focusing on 
how to pursue a goal instead of why one pursues it, might also be the basis for exhibiting action 
planning of when, where and how to act in service of the goal at hand (Gollwitzer, 1999; 
Sniehotta, Scholz, & Schwarzer, 2005), action control, including the monitoring of one's behavior 
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(Sniehotta et al., 2005), or planning how to overcome possible obstacles during goal pursuit 
(Sniehotta, Schwarzer, Scholz, & Schüz, 2005). 
Goal-focus-related attributions of failure 
Unfortunately, people do not always succeed when pursuing their goals but often 
experience setbacks and failures: Some dieters lose less weight than expected, students might fail 
an exam, and scientists sometimes conduct studies that do not lead to the predicted results. Such 
failures and setbacks in goal pursuit are major threats to future persistence and subjective well-
being (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Pomerantz, Saxon, & Oishi, 2000). Consequently, much attention 
has been given to identifying the psychological factors that might positively influence behavioral, 
cognitive, and affective reactions to failure. For example, a substantial number of studies have 
demonstrated the role of causal attributions in explaining how people experience and react to 
failure (e.g., Abramson, Seligman, & Taesdale, 1978; Weiner, 1985). We propose that goal-focus-
related attributions might also have an impact on people’s ability to cope with setbacks and 
failure in goal pursuit. We will elaborate on this aspect in more detail below. 
When people pursue goals, feedback about goal progress is essential for deciding whether 
corrections are necessary or if the person should continue to use the same means (Locke & 
Latham, 1990) or if the goal should be abandoned altogether. According to Carver and Scheier 
(1990), feedback about the velocity with which the discrepancy between the actual and the 
desired state is reduced is essential in this regard. Such feedback might sometimes refer explicitly 
to the process or the outcome (Earley, Northcraft, Lee, & Lituchy, 1990), but might more often 
be ambiguous as to whether it implicates the means or the outcome. Lack of progress could be 
due to inadequate means or to having chosen a goal that cannot be achieved with the given 
means. For instance, if I do not succeed in becoming the world’s highest ranked tennis player, it 
could be due to an inadequate training regime or to the fact that I am simply not talented enough 
– whatever the training regime – to achieve this goal. Thus, not advancing in the ranking, the lack 
of success could be located either on the level of means or on the level of the outcome.  
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 What determines whether failures are located on the level of the means or the outcome? 
We posit that one of the determinants is the initial goal focus. Focusing on the means during goal 
pursuit should render the means cognitively more accessible, whereas focusing on the outcome 
should be associated with greater cognitive accessibility of the outcome. As highly accessible 
constructs influence information processing (e.g., Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Förster, Liberman, & 
Higgins, 2005; Higgins, 1996), information about (the lack of) progress in goal pursuit should be 
processed in terms of the means or the outcome, respectively, depending upon the initial goal 
focus. Localization of failure, then, is expected to correspond to the goal focus a person adopted 
during goal pursuit. Success (and failure) should be identified as “The means did not work” in a 
process focus (process-related attribution) and as “The goal is not attainable” in an outcome focus 
(outcome-related attribution).  
Behavioral consequences 
 In general, we hypothesize that process-related attributions lead to behavioral reactions 
that revolve around the process, whereas outcome-related attributions lead to behavioral 
reactions that revolve around the outcome. Focusing on the means and attributing failure to the 
means should increase the likelihood of a substitution of means, whereas focusing on the outcome 
and attributing failure to the desired outcome should increase the likelihood of a substitution of the 
outcome (i.e., a goal switch). The rationale for these hypotheses is straightforward: If the means are 
cognitively accessible and the reason for failure is attributed to the means, one might assume that 
other means might be more successful in bringing about the desired outcome. If, however, the 
outcome is cognitively accessible and the target outcome is believed to be unattainable, simply 
switching to other means would not be considered sufficient, so the abandonment of an 
unattainable in favor of a more attainable outcome is more likely.  
Affective consequences 
As argued above, we assume that, in general, outcome focus is likely to be detrimental to 
subjective well-being. The reason for this assumption is that an outcome focus implies focusing 
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on the negative discrepancy between the actual and the desired state, stressing what one has not 
(yet) achieved (Freund et al., 2010). In this sense, an outcome focus makes salient the deficiency 
of the current state vis-à-vis the desired outcome. This should result in a higher likelihood of 
experiencing negative affect than when one focuses on the process of goal pursuit. Focusing on 
the process during goal pursuit can offer numerous opportunities for positive rewards as each 
step forward is viewed as progress. This hypothesis is consistent with Emmons (1992) who 
demonstrated that high-level strivers who pursue abstract goals experience more depression than 
low-level strivers who pursue concrete goals.  
Moreover, we hypothesize that when evaluating one’s progress towards a goal, attributing 
failure to the means is less threatening and will elicit less negative emotions than attributing 
failure to the outcome. This hypothesis is empirically supported by research by Houser-Marko 
and Sheldon (2008). Their study showed that failure feedback has stronger negative effects on 
mood and expectancy when it pertains to the outcome (which they termed “primary goal level”) 
as compared to the process (which they termed “sub-goal level”). This can be explained by 
referring to the hierarchical organization of goals and their subordinate means (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 1982, 1990; Vallacher & Wegner, 1987): The higher a goal is placed in a personal goal 
hierarchy, the more important it is (Austin & Vancouver, 1996). Thus, by definition, an outcome 
should carry more personal importance than its means and, accordingly, a threat to the outcome 
should be more severe than one to the means. 
In addition to these direct effects of goal focus and negative feedback on affect, an 
indirect effect might occur as a consequence of the behavioral outcomes of goal focus. 
Specifically, behavioral reactions should partly mediate the effects of goal focus and goal-focus-
related attributions on well-being. Disengaging from the target outcome (i.e., outcome 
substitution) should have higher costs for subjective well-being than disengaging from a more 
subordinate means in favor of another (i.e., means substitution).  
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The current research 
Study 1 was an internet-based self-report study that investigated whether goal focus is 
associated with behavioral reactions to failure (means substitution vs. outcome substitution) and 
subjective well-being. More specifically, Study 1 investigated the following hypotheses: (H1) A 
stronger process focus (i.e., stronger process than outcome focus) should be positively related to 
(a) affective well-being and (b) the intention to substitute means instead of outcomes after failure. 
(H2) The intention to substitute means should partly mediate the positive relationship between 
process focus and well-being. 
Study 2, a 6-week longitudinal study, applied the central hypotheses more specifically to 
attributions of failure while one is pursuing the goal to lose weight by dieting. This study 
explored the role of success attributions and examined the effects of process- and outcome-
related attributions on affective well-being and behavioral reactions to failure. Weight loss was 
assessed on a weekly basis as an indicator of actual success in goal pursuit. We will elaborate on 
Study 2 below. 
Study 1 
Study 1 investigated whether a stronger focus on the process than on the outcome of a 
goal is positively related to a higher level of affective well-being and the intention to substitute 
means (as compared to outcomes) when one encounters failure. It also tests the assumption that 
the substitution of means partly mediates the positive relationship between process focus and 
affective well-being. This should be the case because disengaging from means is typically easier 
than disengaging from outcomes (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989). 
Method 
Participants. Participants were recruited via advertisement on Swiss, German, and Austrian 
websites. The questionnaire was presented using the PHPSurveyor tool for online surveys (now: 
www.limesurvey.org). N = 129 participants (20-80 years, M = 36.2, SD = 16.0, 74% female) filled 
out the online questionnaire. 69% had completed the highest school track in their home country. 
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As a token of our appreciation for their participation, we raffled off 10 movie theater gift 
certificates (worth about $15 each) among the participants. 
Measures. Unless otherwise noted, items were rated on 7-point scales ranging from 0  
(not at all) to 6 (very much). 
Goal focus. To operationalize the relative salience of the process as compared to the 
outcome of goal pursuit, participants were asked to name two personal goals they wanted to 
pursue in the near future. All goal-related measures were averaged over the two goals. To indicate 
outcome focus, participants rated how much they thought about and how concrete their idea was of 
“what it will be like to attain that goal” (M = 4.16, SD = 1.00). To indicate process focus, they rated how 
much they thought about and how concrete their idea was of “what they can do to pursue the goal” (M 
= 4.53, SD = .87). A difference score subtracting participants’ scores in outcome focus from 
their score in process focus served as an index for the relative process focus (range: –1.75-3.25, M 
= .37, SD = .88). 
 Self-reported behavioral reactions to failure. We developed a 5-item questionnaire to assess how 
people react to failure in the pursuit of their personal goals. The five items (see Appendix C) had 
a forced-choice format, consisting of two statements about possible responses to failure in the 
pursuit of a goal, one reflecting the strategy of outcome substitution, the other reflecting the 
strategy of means substitution. Each item contrasted the two strategies as alternative responses to 
failure. Responses signaling outcome substitution were taken from the SOC questionnaire by 
Baltes, Baltes, Freund, and Lang (1999; for more detailed information on the assessment of loss-
based selection, see also Freund & Baltes, 2002). The relative number of means substitution 
choices served as the dependent variable (M = .83, SD = .22, Cronbach’s alpha = .78).  
Subjective well-being. The affective component of subjective well-being was assessed with the 
12-item short version of the Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997). A single 
aggregate score for positive affect over the previous six months was computed (M = 3.66, SD = 
1.05, Cronbach’s alpha = .91). The Satisfaction With Life Scale by Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and 
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Griffin (1985) measured the cognitive-evaluative component of well-being (M = 3.93, SD = 1.19, 
Cronbach’s alpha = .87). 
Goal importance. To control whether goal importance might interact with goal focus in the 
prediction of subjective well-being or self-reported behavioral reactions to failure, participants 
also indicated how important the two goals were to them. We calculated an average goal 
importance score across the two goals (M = 5.20, SD = .84). As including the interaction of 
relative process focus by goal importance into the regression analyses did not contribute to either 
the prediction of behavioral reactions to failure or subjective well-being and did not change the 
pattern of results, we report results from regression analyses without the inclusion of goal 
importance.  
Results 
Goal focus and subjective well-being. Supporting hypothesis H1(a), regression analyses revealed 
that relative process focus significantly predicted positive affect (ß = .32, p < .001, R2 = .10) and 
life satisfaction (ß = .17, p = .05, R2 = .03).  
Goal focus and behavioral reactions to failure. Supporting hypothesis H1(b), relative process 
focus significantly predicted the participants’ intention to substitute means rather than outcomes 
after failure (ß = .27, p = .002, R2 = .07). 
Mediation of the effects of goal focus on subjective well-being by means substitution after failure. It was 
hypothesized (H2) that the effect of process focus on affect and life satisfaction is partly 
mediated by the behavioral reaction. We were able to test this as both preconditions specified by 
Baron and Kenny (1986) were met: There was a significant relationship between predictor 
(relative process focus) and criteria (positive affect, life satisfaction) as well as between predictor 
and potential mediator (means substitution). Another reason why we were able to test for a 
mediation effect was because the intention to substitute means, the mediator, was significantly 
correlated with the criteria positive affect (r = .23, p = .007) and life satisfaction (r = .24, p = 
.007). To test for mediation of the effects of process and outcome focus on positive affect and 
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life satisfaction by means substitution, we included means substitution in a second step in the 
regression analyses as a further predictor. For positive affect as a criterion, the regression weights 
of relative process focus were very similar to those obtained in the previous analysis without the 
predicted mediator (ß = .28, p = .002, R2 in step 2 = .13). Accordingly, the results do not suggest 
the presence of a mediation effect. For life satisfaction, the regression weight of relative process 
focus became smaller (ß = .12, p = .19, R2 in step 2 = .07). However, the Sobel test did not quite 
reach statistical significance (z = 1.74, p = .08) (Baron & Kenny’s procedure, 1986; the Sobel test 
was conducted on the website http://www.people.ku.edu/~preacher/sobel/sobel.htm). Means 
substitution, then, showed only a trend to carry the effects of process focus on life satisfaction. 
Hence, the effect of process focus on both indicators of affective well-being was largely 
independent of the effect of means substitution on affective well-being. 
Brief discussion 
Study 1 tested whether goal focus is related to subjective well-being and to self-reported 
behavioral reactions to failure. Replicating previous research (e.g., Freund et al., 2010), a relative 
focus on the process was positively related to positive affect and life satisfaction. As a 
consequence, we can assume a generally positive relation between process focus and subjective 
well-being. Although having important goals is typically related to subjective well-being as these 
goals provide direction and meaning to people’s lives (e.g., Emmons, 1989; Little, 1989), focusing 
on the desired outcome does not seem to increase positive affect or life satisfaction. In contrast, 
we found focusing on the means of goal pursuit to be related to higher subjective well-being.  
As expected, a relative process focus was also associated with substituting the means 
related to a goal rather than switching to an entirely different goal (outcome substitution). 
Accordingly, focusing on the means might not lead to higher commitment to a specific way of 
pursuing one’s goals but instead seems to generally direct attention to the level of means. Such a 
general tendency to identify a goal on the level of means rather than outcome might increase the 
likelihood of attributing failure experiences to the level of means as well.  
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Contrary to our hypothesis, however, there was no support for a mediation of the effects 
of goal focus on well-being through means substitution. Thus, the positive relationship between 
process focus and well-being, the positive relation between process focus and means substitution, 
as well as the positive relation between means substitution and well-being were found to be 
independent of each other.  
The main methodological shortcomings of Study 1 are that it is cross-sectional and based 
exclusively on self-report. To address these shortcomings, we conducted an additional study. 
Study 2 is a short-term longitudinal study with women who participated in a weight loss program. 
During the dieting phase, on a weekly basis, participants were asked to attribute their dieting 
success or failure to process- or outcome-related variables and to report their current weight.  
Study 2 
Study 2 had two aims. First, we wanted to replicate the findings of Study 1. In addition, 
we wanted to test a more specific hypothesis, namely, that goal focus-related attributions have an 
effect on affective well-being and behavior. Whereas, in Study 1, participants only thought about 
their goal and how they would behave in the event of failure, in Study 2, we assessed actual 
evaluations of success and failure on the level of means and outcomes, respectively, during goal 
pursuit. In order to increase comparability across participants, the target goal was held constant, 
that being to lose weight. Participants were overweight and obese women. We chose the goal to 
lose weight for various reasons. First, overweight and obesity have severe social, psychological, 
and health consequences (for a review, see Stroebe, 2008), making the search for psychological 
factors that could help solve the problem an urgent task. Second, overweight women are typically 
highly motivated to lose weight. Third, it is possible to objectively assess progress towards 
attainment of the goal to lose weight. Fourth, losing weight permanently seems to be a very 
difficult goal and its pursuit is often hampered by setbacks (Mann et al., 2007). This makes it an 
interesting domain when investigating reactions to setbacks and failures. One of the main 
setbacks during dieting is failing to adhere to the caloric restrictions by eating more food than 
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prescribed by the diet or by eating other foods. Whereas some dieters react to such failures with 
disinhibited eating, others attempt to compensate for the failure by exercising or restricting future 
caloric intake. Disinhibition can be seen as indicating the substitution of one outcome with 
another, for example, substituting the goal to lose weight with an alternative competing goal like 
that of experiencing eating enjoyment, which is often observed in restrained eaters (Stroebe, 
Mensink, Aarts, Schut, & Kruglanski, 2008; Stroebe, Papies, & Aarts, 2008). In contrast, 
compensatory efforts such as exercising or reducing future caloric intake can be seen as an 
indicator of means substitution.  
We predicted that goal focus-related attributions would be related to whether dieters react 
with disinhibition (outcome substitution) or compensation (means substitution) when 
encountering setbacks in their dieting. More specifically, when dieters focus more on the means 
(i.e., how to lose weight), we expect them to switch to other diet-related means to compensate for 
a transgression. In contrast, when dieters who generally focus more on the outcome of their 
eating behavior (i.e., weight loss or enjoyment of food) fail, we expect them to switch to another 
goal (e.g., from losing 40 pounds to enjoyment of food or to losing only 20 pounds) and show 
disinhibited eating. Disinhibition is thought to result from “what the hell” cognitions after failing 
to resist a temptation while dieting (Polivy & Herman, 1985). Consistent with our hypothesis that 
disinhibition might be more likely when focusing on the outcomes rather than the means, 
Cochran and Tesser (1996) also argued that these “what the hell” cognitions result from 
identifying behaviors on higher, more abstract levels. 
Moreover, a recent study by Burnette (2010) showed that dieters who think their body 
weight is fixed (entity theorists) rather than malleable (incremental theorists) report less 
persistence in dieting after a setback and are less successful in losing weight. As is known from 
other domains, such as academics, entity theorists tend to focus on assessing their ability 
(performance goals) rather than on mastering the task (learning goals), whereas the opposite is 
true for incremental theorists, which makes them better at overcoming setbacks. In line with 
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Burnette (2010), strong process-related attributions of failure while dieting should also foster 
learning goals after failure, namely, focusing on mastering the means of the diet after setbacks, 
whereas outcome-related attributions should foster performance goals after failure, namely, 
focusing on how well the outcome of weight loss has already been attained.  
In sum, then, we hypothesize that attribution of failure to the process rather than the 
outcome should be related to higher affective well-being, less disinhibition (i.e., more 
compensation), and more successful weight loss.  
Furthermore, Study 2 also explores the role of success attributions. We expected the 
process-related attribution of success to be followed by more successful weight reduction and 
less disinhibition. In the case of successful goal pursuit, identifying the means as appropriate 
might be more adaptive as it should increase the likelihood of maintaining these means. The 
research reported above (Freund et al., 2010; Pham & Taylor, 1999) also suggests that a process 
focus might be more adaptive as it results in higher persistence. In contrast, identifying success 
on the level of the outcome might lead to decreased effort as the outcome is likely to be 
perceived as being easy to achieve (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Martin, Ward, Achee, & Wyer, 1993). 
Moreover, achieving a target outcome perceived as being easy to achieve might also lead to a 
focus on the competing goal, for example, eating enjoyment (Fishbach, 2009; Förster et al., 
2005). As Fishbach and Dhar (2003) demonstrated, experiencing progress towards goal 
attainment can lead to decreased motivation and goal-inconsistent actions. In their study, dieters 
were more likely to choose a chocolate bar as a reward after a feeling of closeness to the 
attainment of their weight loss goal had been induced. Following this line of argumentation, 
locating success on the level of desired outcomes of dieting could lead to a decrease in effort 
towards the target goal of weight loss and might foster leniency and even lead to disinhibition. As 
the questionnaire used in the present study (for details see Hennecke & Freund, in press) links 
disinhibition to the prior experience of a lapse, and not to the experience of success, we can only 
treat our results on how disinhibition is affected by success attributions as exploratory. The 
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assessment of weight loss, however, should be sensitive towards such goal-inconsistent behavior 
that results from measuring success on the outcome level and a decrease in motivation. 
With regard to affect, we expect outcome attributions of success to be more beneficial 
than process attributions. As outcomes are higher in the goal hierarchy and more important, 
identifying their attainment, as opposed to the means, as successful should also result in better 
mood (see also Houser-Marko & Sheldon, 2008).  
In summary, we hypothesized that stronger attributions of failure to the process (as 
compared to the outcome) (H3) should be positively related to (a) affective well-being during 
goal pursuit and to (b) means substitution (here, compensation instead of disinhibition), and to 
(c) successful weight loss. Furthermore, we explored the role of attributions of success to the 
means. They might be related to (a) lower affective well-being during goal pursuit, (b) less 
disinhibition (i.e., more compensation), and (c) more successful weight loss.  
Method 
Participants. The study targeted overweight and obese women who all shared the goal of 
losing weight. Participants were recruited through advertisements in local newspapers. In short 
phone interviews prior to the study, women were asked to report their weight and height in order 
to make sure that they were overweight. Subsequently, 128 women with a Body Mass Index (= 
kg/m2; height and weight self-reported) of at least 25, the criterion for overweight as defined by 
the World Health Organization (n.d.), were invited to participate in the study. Two participants 
were excluded because their BMI was either below 25 or more than two standard deviations 
above the sample mean. The final sample consisted of N = 126 women (19-77 years, M = 47.2, 
SD = 15.9). Women’s initial weight was between 57 and 129 kg (M = 84.9, SD = 13.8) and their 
BMI ranged from 25 to 46 kg/m2 (M = 31.6, SD = 5.0). They reported being overweight for one 
to 43 years (M = 13.8, SD = 9.3) and intending to lose at least 2 kg. Forty-nine (39%) of them 
held at least a university entrance qualification degree. 
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Procedure. Before the diet, participants were invited to the laboratory for assessment of 
their weight and height.2 They were asked to start dieting on the first Monday after the 
instruction session, which took place on Fridays and Saturdays. In the instruction session, groups 
of 2 to 25 women were introduced to the diet3 (“Brigitte Diaet,” Gerlach, Ort-Gottwald, & 
Petersen, 2007) and received the book that explained the diet in detail. Participants agreed to 
adhere to the diet for six weeks. The Brigitte diet was chosen because an independent German 
consumer organization (Stiftung Warentest, 2005) recommended it as a healthy, balanced diet 
with a high probability of successful weight loss and subsequent maintenance.  
During the six weeks of dieting, participants filled out online questionnaires every 
Saturday. The questionnaires were administered via the PHPSurveyor tool for online surveys 
(now: www.limesurvey.org). As a reminder, participants received e-mails with a link to the 
questionnaire. One week after the official end of the diet (i.e., about 7.5 weeks after the 
instruction session), participants were again weighed in order to have an objective measure of 
weight loss. Participation was reimbursed with 70 Swiss francs (about $60). 
                                                
2 Participants’ goal focus was also manipulated by their elaborating on either the means (process focus) 
or the outcome of dieting (or neither, in the case of the control group). During the six weeks of dieting, goal focus 
was continually manipulated via 36 diaries directing attention to either the outcomes (e.g., weight loss, figure 
enhancement: outcome focus) or the process of dieting (e.g., food preparation, eating behavior: process focus). 
Women in the control group received no diary. A manipulation check asking about how much participants were 
thinking about what it would be like to be slimmer (outcome focus) and about how to eat low-caloric and low-fat foods (process 
focus) revealed that the goal focus manipulation was not successful (MANOVA results for outcome focus: F(2,119) 
= 2.21, p = .12; for process focus: F(2,119) = .39, p = .68). Thus, only results from correlative analyses can be 
reported. 
3 The “Brigitte” diet is based on a balanced daily intake of whole foods (1200 kcal, 40 g fat), with fresh fruit 
and vegetables playing a major role. It is portioned out into five small meals each day: breakfast, a mid-morning 
snack, lunch, an afternoon snack, and dinner. Dieters can plan their day’s meals to include selections from 
combinations of recipes. The recipe book also encourages exercise and contains tips on how to best approach sport. 
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Weekly Measures.  
Weight loss. Participants indicated their current weight so that we could compute the 
difference between the previous week’s and the current weight as an indicator of weekly weight 
loss.  
Attribution of failure and success to the process and the outcome. Participants were to indicate how 
much they considered their previous week’s diet a success or failure with regard to four dieting 
processes (“the way you persisted,” “the way you have been dieting,” “the way you resisted temptations,” “your 
change in eating behavior”) and four desired outcomes of dieting (“weight reduction,” “appearance,” 
“health,” “well-being”). The scale ranged from –3 (big failure) to +3 (big success). To obtain separate 
scales for success and failure, for the failure scale the values above 0 were recoded to 0 and the 
negative values were recoded to positive ones, while for the success scale the values below 0 were 
recoded to 0 (Cronbach’s alphas for all measurement occasions for process attributions of 
success > .89; for process attributions of failure > .78, for outcome attributions of success > .75, 
for outcome attributions of failure > .69).  
To obtain an indicator of the relative salience of means versus outcomes when making 
attributions, we computed a difference score by subtracting the individual values on the outcome 
attributions scale from the individual scores on the process attributions scale. As a result, two 
scores per measurement occasion were obtained: one for the relative attributions of failure on the 
process level (which we will refer to as process attribution of failure), one for the relative attributions 
of success on the process level (which we will refer to as process attribution of success). Deriving 
separate indicators for success attributions and for failure attributions enabled us to test their 
differential role in affective and behavioral reactions to setbacks. As these transformations 
resulted in positively skewed distributions, we conducted additional analyses after log-
transforming them (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003). As these analyses did not change the 
pattern of results, we report only results from analyses with untransformed variables. 
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Subjective well-being. The 12-item short version of the Multidimensional Mood 
Questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997) was used to measure affective well-being weekly. As in Study 
1, a single aggregate score was created for positive affect at each measurement occasion 
(Cronbach’s alphas for all measurement occasions > .88).  
 Disinhibition after failure. Disinhibition was considered a consequence of switching the 
outcome to eating enjoyment instead of weight loss. Disinhibition after initial diet lapses was 
assessed with a six-item questionnaire (Hennecke & Freund, in press; Cronbach’s alphas for all 
measurement occasions > .64). Higher scores on the scale indicated a tendency to show 
disinhibited eating after diet lapses, whereas lower scores indicated compensation that was 
considered to indicate a means switch. 
Statistical analyses. To account for the nested structure of the data (i.e., six measurement 
points at level 1 nested within N = 126 persons at level 2), multilevel regression analyses were 
applied (linear mixed model procedure with SPSS.16). Restricted maximum likelihood parameter 
estimates (fixed intercept and slopes) were obtained by fitting multilevel regression models with 
first-order autoregressive residual covariance structures. Due to our hypotheses, multilevel 
models included only fixed effects of predictors (level 1) on affect, disinhibition and weight loss. 
We did not expect meaningful short-term changes over the six weeks of dieting. Hence, we did 
not estimate the effects of time on these outcomes. The interpretation of the multilevel fixed 
effects shown is equivalent to that of parameter estimates in ordinary least squares regression.  
Results 
Attribution of success and failure on the process (vs. outcome) level as predictor of weekly affect, 
disinhibition, and weight loss. All results are displayed in Table 4.  
Weekly affect. To account for individual differences in positive affect prior to starting the 
diet, we controlled for baseline positive affect. As hypothesized, the attribution of failure to the 
process (vs. the outcome) predicted weekly positive affect. The more participants attributed their 
dieting failure to the process, the more positive their affect. In other words, the higher the  
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Table 4: Study 2: Selected results from multilevel regression models: Fixed effects of process-related attributions of 
failure and success on positive affect, disinhibition, and weight loss  
 Positive Affecta Disinhibition 
(vs. compensation) 
Weekly weight loss 
Model Parameter Estimate SE p Estimate SE p Estimate SE p 
Intercept 2.85 .06 < .001 2.67 .08 < .001 .66 .05 < .001 
Process 
attribution of 
failure (PAF) 
.18 .08 < .05 .07 .09 .45 –.04 .07 .68 
Process 
attribution of 
success (PAS) 
–.02 .07 .80 –.28 .07 < .001 .26 .07 < .001 
PAF × PAS .34 .07 < .001 –.03 .07 .89 .26 .09 < .01 
Note: The predictors “PAF” and “PAS” were grand-mean-centered before the analyses. The full models included two 
levels, namely, assessments nested within persons. Level 1 comprised assessments: Dependent Variable = ß0j + rij. 
Level 2 comprised persons: ß0j = γ00 + γ01PAFij+ γ02PASij + γ03PAFij × PASij + u0j.  
a Regression weights after controlling for positive affect at baseline (Estimate = .38, SE = .05, p < .001). 
 
outcome orientation in the case of failure, the more negative the participants’ affect. Interestingly, 
this main effect was qualified by an interaction between the attribution of failure and the 
attribution of success to the process (vs. outcome). A region-of-significance analysis (Preacher, 
Curran, & Bauer, 2003, 2006) revealed that the attribution of failure to the process and positive 
affect were only significantly related if at the same time attributions of success to the process 
were above the sample average (for p < .05 and the grand-mean-centered predictor: lower bound 
of region of significance: –1.14; upper bound: –0.07, simple slopes are significant outside this 
region). This means that the beneficial effect of process attributions of failure only “kicked in” if 
attributions of success primarily referred to the process as well. As Figure 2 shows, positive affect 
was highest when both failure and success were attributed to the process and lowest when 
success, but not failure, was attributed to the process. There was no main effect of the attribution 
of success to the process (vs. outcome) level on affect.  
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Figure 2: Effect of interaction between attribution of success and failure to process on positive 
affect. “High” and “low” groups refer to one SD above or below the sample mean 
 
Disinhibition. We hypothesized that the attribution of failure to the process of dieting (vs. 
the outcome) is associated with less disinhibited eating after an initial failure to adhere to the diet. 
Results of a mixed model analysis revealed no main effect of whether dieters attributed their 
failure to the process or the outcome level. However, results indicate a significant main effect of 
process attributions of success. Thus, our hypotheses were only partly confirmed. Whereas 
failure identification did not affect subsequent disinhibition, the results suggest that attributing 
dieting success to the means results in less disinhibition. As expected, dieters stick to their means 
if they are perceived as successful. 
Weight loss. The main effect of failure attributions on weight loss was not significant, but 
the interaction between attributions of failure and of success to the process significantly 
influenced weight loss. As a region-of-significance analysis indicated, the effect of attribution of 
success to the process was significant only if attribution of failure to the process was above 
average (for p < .05 and the grand-mean-centered predictor: lower bound of region of 
significance: –2.67, upper bound: –.29). In other words, the attribution of success to the process 
low attribution of 
success to the process 
high attribution of 
success to the process 
Positive affect 
high attribution of failure to 
the process 
low attribution of failure to 
the process 
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was only beneficial for weight loss if it was accompanied by a medium to high level of attribution 
of failure to the process. As can be seen in Figure 3, when attribution of failure to the process 
was low, the extent of attribution of success to the process had no effect on weight loss. As was 
true for weekly positive affect, weight loss was highest when attributions of both failure and 
success to the process were high. In contrast, a low level of attribution of success to the process 
in combination with a high level of attribution of failure to the process was most maladaptive for 
losing weight.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Effect of interaction between attribution of success and failure to process on weekly weight loss. “High” 
and “low” groups refer to one SD above or below the sample mean 
 
Brief discussion 
Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1 by showing that goal focus influences affect and 
behavior. Confirming our hypotheses, attributing failure to the level of means was positively 
related to affect. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, success attributions had no effect on 
affect. Attesting to the general adaptiveness of a process focus, it was most beneficial to attribute 
both, failure and success, to the means. As indicated by a significant interaction, identifying the 
means as successful but the attainment of the outcome as failed was followed by the lowest 
high attribution of 
success to the process 
low attribution of 
success to the process 
high attribution of failure 
to the process 
low attribution of failure 
to the process 
Weekly weight loss 
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positive affect. This seems plausible given that participants must find it frustrating when they 
believe they are doing their very best to reduce their weight by sticking to the diet but are not 
losing a sufficient amount of weight. 
With regard to disinhibition and weight loss, the following conclusions can be drawn. In 
general, attributions of success but not failure to the process predicted less disinhibited eating 
and more weekly weight loss. As expected, considering target outcomes to be attained might lead 
to decreased effort towards these outcomes (Fishbach & Dhar, 2003). The mere tendency to 
evaluate one’s dieting success in terms of outcome rather than means might lead to a maladaptive 
coping with setbacks (Burnette, 2010). Weight loss was highest when the attribution of both 
failure and success to the process were high. More specifically, not identifying the means as 
appropriate when successful (low attribution of success to the process) while attributing failure to 
the wrong means (high attribution of failure to the process) was associated with less weight 
reduction. In general, the data show that attributions of failure and success have different 
consequences. Interestingly, they interact in complex ways when predicting affect and weight 
loss. 
Discussion 
 Two studies demonstrated the role of goal focus in reactions to failure (and success) 
during the pursuit of personal goals. Study 1 supported the hypothesis that primarily thinking 
about the means (relative process focus) is beneficial to well-being and fosters changing the 
means (means substitution) instead of changing the outcome (outcome substitution) in the event 
of failure. Behavioral reactions to failure, then, are based on whether the means or the outcome is 
considered problematic (or appropriate) during goal pursuit.  
Unexpectedly, the relation between goal focus and affect was not mediated by means 
substitution. Rather, goal focus and behavior seem to influence affect independently of each 
other. Regardless of behavioral consequences, merely thinking about means or outcomes appears 
to influence people’s affective states. This is in line with the finding by Freund et al. (2010) that 
Part II 
 51 
the induction of an outcome focus (here, listing the desired outcomes of going on a vacation) 
was followed by less positive affect than adopting a process focus (here, listing the means for 
going on a vacation). As Freund et al. (2010) argue, focusing on the desired outcomes implies 
having in mind what one does not have, directing attention to the negative discrepancy between 
the actual and the desired state. Although this discrepancy motivates goal-directed behavior, 
focusing on it seems likely to impede positive affect. In the event of failure, this effect might be 
stronger as the discrepancy between the actual and the desired state is even more salient. The 
result is in accordance with Houser-Marko and Sheldon (2008) who have shown the problematic 
effects of framing failure feedback in terms of the primary goal. Furthermore, a comprehensive 
review by Watkins (2008) indicates that repetitively thinking about the outcomes or consequences 
of one’s behavior is less constructive than repetitively thinking about processes and contextual 
details with regard to a wide variety of outcomes.  
We would like to add that, although means substitution might be very important for 
goal pursuit in the face of obstacles and setbacks, and was positively related to affective well-
being, under some circumstances, the disengagement from a goal in favor of another, more 
attainable one, is more functional (see Wrosch, Miller, Scheier, & Brun de Pontet, 2007; Wrosch, 
Scheier, Miller, Schulz, & Carver, 2003). 
 Study 2 used a goal of high personal importance that is typically difficult to achieve and 
hence lends itself to the study of reactions to failure – the goal to lose weight. As expected, 
attributing dieting failure to the means of dieting was beneficial for positive affect. Furthermore, 
attributing both success and failure to the processes increases positive affect even stronger, 
whereas attributing success but not failure to the processes decreases positive affect, which is in 
line with our hypothesis. Contrary to our hypothesis, success attributions that refer to the 
outcome did not have a positive main effect on affect. In fact, it seems that attributing the 
success of dieting to the outcome seemed to be maladaptive as such attributions increased 
disinhibition and impeded weight loss. Indeed, as two further analyses revealed, both 
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disinhibition (Estimate = –.17, p < .001) and weekly weight loss (Estimate = .05, p < .05) had the 
expected effects on positive affect.  
 It seems more beneficial, then, to identify the means as the cause for success rather than 
focus on the desired outcomes. The attribution of success to the process indicates that the 
chosen path is successful and that one should stick to it. As a consequence, transgressions are 
reduced and compensation is identified as the appropriate strategy. In contrast, thinking of 
success primarily in terms of the outcomes such as well-being or appearance seems to be 
problematic. People who recognize success primarily on the outcome level might feel satisfied 
momentarily because they have attained something desirable (Carver & Scheier, 1990). However, 
this might reduce their motivation to continue goal pursuit, draw attention to competing goals 
such as eating enjoyment, and foster a tendency to “take it easy” with regard to the target goal for 
the day, or even reward themselves for these successes by eating more or high-caloric food 
(Fishbach, 2009; Fishbach & Dhar, 2003). However, as mentioned above, the results on how 
success attributions affect disinhibition should be interpreted with caution as the disinhibition 
questionnaire was not designed to assess how people behave after a successful diet. Nevertheless, 
it appears that experiencing a high level of outcome attainment might also facilitate “what-the-
hell” cognitions after lapses, reduce compensatory efforts after lapses, and instead lead to 
disinhibition. In the long run, this cascade compromises successful weight reduction. We 
consider the results on weight loss as more reliable in this regard. 
One unresolved inconsistency in the findings of Study 2 is that failure but not success 
attributions were related to affect. Success but not failure attributions, however, predicted the 
more behavioral outcomes of dieting (disinhibition and weight loss). This pattern of results is 
reminiscent of the dissociation of goal conflict and facilitation, on the one hand, and affect and 
goal-relevant behaviors, on the other. Whereas conflict is related to affect, facilitation predicts 
goal-relevant behaviors (Riediger & Freund, 2004). Negative motivational states (i.e., conflict, 
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failure attributions) seem to be more predictive of affect, whereas positive motivational states 
(i.e.. facilitation, success attributions) are more predictive of behavioral indicators.  
Causal directions  
The strongest limitation of both studies is that they do not entail experimental 
manipulations of goal focus or goal-focus-related attributions, thus not allowing a test of causal 
relations. However, we see no reason to assume that positive affect should lead to a stronger 
process focus or process-related attributions. In contrast, the opposite effect has been found. As 
found by Ketelaar and Clore (unpublished, cited by Clore et al., 2001), participants in positive 
moods characterized their behavior of making ratings in an experiment as relevant to abstract 
outcomes like “earning credit for introductory psychology,” whereas participants in negative 
moods characterized their behavior as relevant for more subordinate and concrete goals or 
processes like “completing forms.” Wegner and Vallacher (1986) have also shown that success 
feedback fosters behavioral descriptions referring to higher level and abstract goals, as opposed 
to failure feedback, which fosters behavioral descriptions referring to lower level, more concrete 
goals. Moreover, in Study 2 we were also able to control for baseline positive affect, thus 
modeling changes in affect over the period of dieting.  
Could behavioral reactions have a causal effect on goal focus and its related 
attributions? It is possible that substituting means directs attention to the means or might even 
cause justifications of behavioral decisions (e.g., “I changed the means because the previous 
means were not successful”). It stands to reason, however, that it is more likely that behavior 
influences cognition than vice versa. It seems more plausible that people who have identified 
their means as being unsuccessful adopt new means.  
Similarly, it seems unlikely that successful goal pursuit (e.g., weight loss, a low level of 
disinhibition) should lead to a stronger process focus. Again, we refer to Vallacher and Wegner 
(1987, 1989) who reported that when a behavior can be successfully executed or a goal 
successfully pursued, a focus on abstract outcomes is the default mindset. A focus on the lower 
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level of means is only triggered when it is difficult to execute a particular behavior or when 
behavior execution is followed by failure feedback (Wegner & Vallacher, 1986).  
Future directions 
The current research demonstrates that, generally, a process focus is more adaptive 
than an outcome focus. There might be interesting individual differences moderating the 
relationship between goal focus and subjective well-being. One such moderator might be 
chronological age. Evidence exists that younger adults are more outcome-focused than older 
adults (Freund et al., 2010). As younger adults have to make important life decisions, focusing on 
the outcome might provide more relevant information about the different options than focusing 
on the means of pursuing these goals.  
Another moderating factor for the adaptiveness of goal focus might be the 
motivational phase. As goal pursuit encompasses different action phases (Heckhausen, 1989), 
being able to flexibly switch between goal foci and related attributions depending on the current 
phase might be more adaptive than being simply process-focused. According to Heckhausen’s 
model of action phases, goal-directed behavior starts with a predecisional phase in which 
different outcomes are compared. In this phase, outcome-related cognitions and attributions 
might be more adaptive than in other phases. In contrast, in a postdecisional phase when the 
means for goal pursuit have to be chosen and implemented, process-related attributions might be 
more adaptive (Freund et al., under review; Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer & Bayer, 1999). There is 
some evidence for phase-specific adaptiveness of goal focus in studies on skill learning by 
Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1997, 1999). 
Conclusion  
Two studies provide initial evidence for the role of goal focus in guiding behavioral and 
affective reactions to failure. When failure is encountered, being process-focused and attributing 
failure to the wrong means is more beneficial for future motivation and subjective well-being 
than being outcome-focused. When goal pursuit is successful, process-related identifications also 
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foster further success as indicated by greater weight loss during a diet. Complementing research 
by Vallacher and Wegner (1987, 1989) who showed that people tend to focus on abstract 
outcomes when goal pursuit is successful, the current studies show that this is not necessarily 
most beneficial. Rather than deliberating about why we are doing something when succeeding or 
failing in pursuing our goals, we might be better off focusing on what we are doing. As Thomas 
A. Edison said: “I have not failed. I've just found 10,000 ways that won't work.” 
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Abstract 
Personal goals guide behavior towards a desired outcome, motivate behavior over time 
and across situations, provide direction and meaning, and contribute to the acquisition of skills 
and subjective well-being. The adaptiveness of goals, however, might vary with dimensions such 
as their orientation towards the achievement of gains, maintenance of functioning, or the 
avoidance of losses. We argue that goal orientation is most adaptive when it corresponds to the 
availability of resources and the ubiquity of losses. In line with this argument, younger adults 
show a predominant orientation towards, whereas goal orientation shifts towards maintenance 
and avoidance of loss across adulthood. This shift in goal orientation seems adaptive both 
regarding subjective well-being as well as engagement in goal pursuit. A second goal dimension 
that has been largely overlooked in the literature is the cognitive representation of goal pursuit 
primarily in terms of its means (i.e., process focus) or its ends (i.e., outcome focus). This chapter 
investigates the antecedents and consequences of goal focus. In particular, it highlights the 
importance of factors related to chronological age (i.e., the availability of resources, future time 
perspective, goal orientation, motivational phase) for the preference for and adaptiveness of an 
outcome or process focus. Finally, we posit that a process focus leads to more adaptive 
behavioral and affective reactions when people encounter failure during goal pursuit. 
Keywords: Adult development, goal orientation, goal focus, means, ends, resources, time 
perspective, failure 
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Introduction 
Imagine a young woman in her mid 20s and her grandmother, an older woman in her late 
60s. Now think about the personal goals they might pursue. Most likely, the younger woman will 
pursue goals related to finding a life partner, to finishing her education and to establish a 
professional career. The goals of the older woman are more likely to center around the domains 
of health, cognitive functioning, independence, and the well being of her loved ones (Freund & 
Riediger, 2006). Beyond the differences in content, however, two other age-related differences in 
the goals of a younger and an older adult might be evident. First, the orientation of goals is likely 
to shift from gains in young adulthood to maintenance in middle adulthood and the prevention 
of losses in older age (e.g., Freund & Ebner, 2005). For example, a young woman might aim at 
improving her fitness level, whereas her grandmother might be more likely to try to maintain her 
physical fitness in the face of aging. Second, younger adults might focus more on the outcome of 
goal pursuit whereas older adults might focus more on the process (Freund et al., 2010). For 
example, the young woman might focus on the desired outcome of exercising regularly such as 
her body shape and her overall fitness. In contrast, her grandmother might think primarily about 
how she can to exercise regularly in a manner that makes her feel good already during exercise. In 
this chapter we aim at integrating these two dimensions of personal goals and discuss their 
change across adulthood. First, however, we want to highlight the importance of personal goals 
throughout the lifespan.  
The importance of goals for adult development 
Laypeople as well as motivation researchers seem to agree that setting and pursuing goals 
has positive consequences. Goals give life meaning, direction, and contribute to happiness and 
subjective well-being (e.g., Emmons, 1996; Klinger, 1977; Little, 1989). Goals have been defined 
as cognitive representations of personally desired (or dreaded) states to be approached (or 
avoided), such as becoming a nurse (or not becoming like one’s parents) through action. More 
specifically, they encompass means of goal pursuit and desired outcomes of it (e.g., Kruglanski, 
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1996). The activation of goals affects the encoding, storage, and retrieval of information, and 
guides attention as well as behavior (e.g., Wyer & Srull, 1986). As goals are comprised of means 
and ends, goals might channel and organize information in terms of means and ends (e.g., Woike, 
Lavezzary, & Barsky, 2001). Each time a goal is activated, the associated means and ends (as well 
as their emotional correlates such as enjoyment or fear) are also activated. Consequently, the 
activation of goals enhances the likelihood of engaging in goal-relevant behaviors (i.e., means), 
which can occur even automatically (e.g., Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Bargh & Gollwitzer, 1996). 
Goals, then, direct attention and information processing and motivate behavior. Thereby, goals 
organize behavior over time and across situations, and provide a sense of direction and purpose 
in life (Freund, 2007). Moreover, research suggests that goal pursuit enhances performance (e.g., 
Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Emmons, 1989, 1996; Freund, 2007). Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the goal concept seems particularly well suited for understanding how people develop 
successfully over time.  
However, as Ryan and colleagues put it: Not all goals are created equal (Ryan, Sheldon, 
Kesser, & Deci, 1996). Goals differ in their content, concreteness, difficulty, time frame, and 
their orientation towards gains and losses (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Freund & Ebner, 
2005; Little, 1989; Locke & Latham, 2002; Wiese & Freund, 2005). Such goal dimensions 
influence the adaptiveness of goals. Various goal dimensions have been distinguished, such as 
approach – avoidance (e.g., Elliott & Friedman, 2007), promotion – prevention (e.g., Higgins, 
1997), intrinsic – extrinsic (e.g., Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; Krapp, 2005), and mastery – 
performance (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988). This chapter centers around two goal dimensions 
that we believe to change systematically across adulthood: First, the orientation of personal goals 
towards gains, maintenance, or the prevention of losses (e.g., Freund & Ebner, 2005). Second, 
whether a person focuses on the outcome of goal pursuit (short-term and long-term consequences) 
or on the process of goal pursuit (means of goal attainment) (e.g., Freund et al., 2010; Sansone & 
Thoman, 2005; Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997). 
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The importance of personal goals for adult development has been acknowledged by 
different action-theoretical approaches (e.g., Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990; Heckhausen & 
Schulz, 1995; Freund & Baltes, 2000). In particular, the model of selection, optimization, and 
compensation (SOC-model, Baltes & Baltes, 1990) has stressed the importance of setting, 
pursuing and maintaining personal goals for successful development.  
Successful development through personal goals 
One of the central propositions of lifespan psychology is the multidirectionality of 
development. That is, development comprises not only trajectories of growth but also trajectories 
of decline (Baltes, 1987; Labouvie-Vief, 1981). Successful development has often been defined as 
the maximization of gains and the simultaneous minimization of losses (see Freund & Riediger, 
2003, for a review of definitions of successful development). According to the SOC-model 
(Baltes & Baltes, 1990), an optimal ratio of gains to losses can be achieved by the orchestrated 
use of three processes of developmental regulation, namely selection, optimization, and 
compensation. As elaborated in more detail elsewhere (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 2000; Freund, Li, & 
Baltes, 1999; Freund, 2006a), the action-theoretical specification of the SOC-model posits that 
developing and committing to a hierarchy of personal goals (i.e., elective selection) and engaging in 
goal-directed actions and means (i.e., optimization) are essential for achieving higher levels of 
functioning (i.e., maximizing gains). In order to maintain a given level of functioning in the face 
of inevitable losses in resources people encounter throughout their lives, people need compensate 
for their losses (e.g., by substituting goal-relevant means that are no longer available). When the 
costs for optimization or compensation outweigh the expected gains, according to the SOC-
model it is more adaptive to reconstruct one’s goal-hierarchy by focusing on the most important 
goals, developing new goals, or adapting goal standards (i.e., loss-based selection). Thus, the SOC-
model conceptualizes processes promoting gains (elective selection, optimization) but also 
processes to counteract losses (compensation, loss-based selection).  
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Empirical evidence supports the adaptiveness of self-reported selection, optimization, 
and compensation throughout adolescence (Gestsdottir & Lerner, 2007), adulthood and into very 
old age (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 1998; 2002; Wiese, Freund, & Baltes, 2000; 2001; Ziegelmann & 
Lippke, 2007). The use of SOC strategies seems to be particularly helpful for persons with fewer 
resources (Jopp & Smith, 2006; Lang, Rieckmann, & Baltes, 2002; Young, Baltes, & Pratt, 2007).  
Goal selection: Managing multiple goals 
A series of studies by Riediger and colleagues (Riediger & Freund, 2004, 2006, 2008; 
Riediger, Freund, & Baltes, 2005) demonstrated the role of the selection of goals for successful goal 
pursuit. More specifically, results by Riediger and colleagues stress the importance of considering 
the interrelations of personal goals. Conflict between goals might occur because resources are 
insufficient to support both goals at the same time of through incompatible strategies. For 
instance, wanting to enjoy food and trying to lose weight imply incompatible eating behaviors, 
leading to goal conflict. Goals can facilitate each other by sharing the same strategies. For 
example, the two goals to lose weight and to lead a healthy life style are both served by the same 
strategy of working out regularly. Goal conflict and facilitation have are two largely independent 
goal dimensions and show differential associations with affective experience and goal-relevant 
behavior. Goal conflict seems to impair affective well-being, facilitation is associated with goal 
pursuit in everyday life and subsequent goal attainment (Riediger et al., 2005). Interestingly, older 
adults appear to gain in motivational competence regarding the selection of goals. They report 
more goal facilitation and less conflict among their goals than younger adults (Riediger et al., 
2005). Importantly, this result was not simply due to a reduction in the number of goals but to 
focusing on personally important, superordinate goals. Focusing one’s goals on central and 
similar life-domains contributed to higher facilitation among goals, which, in turn, lead to 
stronger goal engagement and achievement (Riediger & Freund, 2006). Age-related increases in 
motivational selectivity, then, are one way of managing the increasing limitation of resources in 
adulthood. Another way of dealing with conflicts due to goals competing for the same limited 
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resources is prioritizing.  Wiese and Freund (2001) showed that young adults who experience 
conflicts between work- and family-related goals report fewer strains and higher subjective well-
being when they prioritize one goal (and temporally postpone the other). Taken together, this 
research supports the importance of selection as a key process for successfully managing multiple 
goals.  
Optimization and compensation: A tale of the shifting goal orientation across adulthood 
 As mentioned above, one of the central tenets of life-span developmental psychology 
holds that development encompasses both gains and losses throughout the life span. Examples 
for ubiquitous losses in later adulthood are health-related and cognitive decline or the loss of 
social partners and social status through retirement (Baltes & Smith, 2003). In contrast, affective 
well-being (e.g., Röcke, Li, & Smith, 2009), motivational competence (e.g., Riediger & Freund, 
2008) or self-regulation (Hennecke & Freund, in press) appear to increase across adulthood and 
into old age. The ratio of gains to losses, however, changes across the life span, encompassing 
decreasing gains and increasing losses throughout adulthood and into old age (e.g., Baltes, 1997; 
Baltes, Lindenberger, & Staudinger, 1998; Heckhausen, Dixon, & Baltes, 1989). Addressing this 
changing ratio of gains to losses, the SOC-model holds that goals directed at the optimization of 
gains might be more important at younger ages whereas goals directed at the maintenance and 
avoidance of losses might gain in importance with increasing age.  
Arguing from an evolutionary standpoint as well as from a developmental perspective, it 
is advantageous to possess as many resources as possible (Freund & Riediger, 2001). Resources 
are essential for reproductive success and survival. They signal success, relative social standing, 
and good genetic material to potential mates. They enhance attractiveness and successful 
reproduction and provide for the upbringing of offspring (Buss, 1999). Gaining resources 
appears to be a primary motivation in young adulthood, a phase in life when most people have 
not yet had opportunities to accumulate many resources that are advantageous for their 
reproductive success. Moreover, social expectations and developmental tasks for young adults are 
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geared towards gains (e.g., gaining education or professional skills, founding a family, building a 
home, establishing a career). Young adults have large potentials for functional gains and still need 
to realize these potentials. As Raynor (1982) puts it, younger adults are still in the process of 
“becoming.” In other words, before younger adults can start protecting and conserving 
resources, they need to acquire skills and resources and build upon their status. In contrast, with 
increasing age, one is increasingly likely to have reached one’s personal asymptote of 
performance in many areas of life, making the achievement of new gains less and less likely. 
Moreover, throughout their lives older adults have accumulated resources including skills, 
material belongings, as well as social relations that need to be protected against losses.  Given the 
ubiquity of losses in older adulthood and the corresponding social expectations (Heckhausen et 
al., 1989), older adults are likely to be chronically aware of threatening losses.  
In late adulthood, then, preserving resources and counteracting losses may become the 
primary motivation outweighing tendencies to accumulate new resources (Freund & Ebner, 2005; 
Staudinger, Marsiske, & Baltes, 1995). Consistent with this hypothesis, J. Heckhausen (1999) 
found that younger adults reported more goals in domains associated with striving for gains and 
fewer goals in domains reflecting the avoidance of losses than middle-aged or old adults. 
Similarly, Ebner et al. (2006) showed that, compared to older adults, younger adults rated their 
personal goals as having a stronger focus on gains. Conversely, older adults reported a higher 
focus on maintenance and prevention of loss in their personal goals than younger adults. 
Moreover, in two further studies using a forced-choice paradigm for tasks pertaining to physical 
fitness and cognitive functioning, younger adults were more likely to adopt goals focusing on 
achieving new gains compared to older adults who preferred goals focusing on the maintenance 
of their level of functioning. Attesting to the role of resources for goal-orientation, Ebner et al. 
(2006) showed that younger adults shifted to a preference for maintenance goals when resources 
were perceived as being limited.  
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The shift in goal orientation across adulthood seems adaptive. Whereas younger adults 
seem to suffer from a goal orientation towards maintenance and avoidance of loss, older adults’ 
subjective well-being was positively related to a maintenance orientation. Using behavioral 
indicators of goal pursuit, Freund (2006a) showed that younger adults pursue a given goal more 
persistently when it is oriented towards achieving gains (optimization goal), whereas older adults 
are more persistent when pursuing the goal to counteract losses (compensation goal). In addition, 
when confronted with a resource loss, compensatory activities are related to positive affect in 
older adults (Duke, Leventhal, Brownlee, & Leventhal, 2002).  
In sum, then, goal orientation towards gains and losses appears to change with the 
shifting ratio of gains to losses across adulthood. Moreover, this shift in goal orientation seems 
adaptive both regarding subjective well-being as well as actual goal pursuit.  
Goal focus: Process or outcome 
The previous sections focused on goal selection and the shift in goal orientation towards 
gains and losses across adulthood. In the following, we want to address how the cognitive 
representation of goal pursuit primarily in terms of its means (process focus) or its outcome 
(outcome focus) might affect goal-relevant behavior as well as affect, and how it might change 
with age.  
Let us open this section with an example of process and outcome focus. Two people 
pursuing the goal of completing a 20-km hike in the Alps within five hours may focus on very 
different aspects of this goal: One of them might focus primarily on the consequences of 
successfully reaching the destination within the allotted time, while the other might focus more 
on pacing herself by monitoring her pulse rate and breathing. What factors determine whether a 
person focuses more on the outcome or the process when pursuing goals? Are there differences 
in adaptiveness of a stronger focus on the outcome or the process of goal pursuit? We posit that 
factors related to chronological age, namely the availability of (physical and cognitive) resources, 
future time perspective, and a goal orientation towards achieving gains or maintenance of 
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functioning contribute to a preference for and adaptiveness of either an outcome or a process 
focus during goal pursuit. In addition, taking a closer look at the dynamics of goal setting and 
pursuit, we posit that the motivational phase and the closeness to a deadline determine whether 
people focus on the process or the outcome of goal pursuit. Finally, we discuss the role of goal 
focus when goal pursuit is hampered by setbacks or failure.  
The concept of outcome and process focus is related – but not identical – to the concepts 
of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation as well as performance and mastery orientation. In 
accordance with Sansone and Thoman (2005), we define outcome focus as the motivation to engage 
in an activity because it is a means to a certain end. We define process focus as the cognitive salience 
of aspects of the goal that are related to the means, though, whereas Sansone and Thoman define 
it as the (expected) experience of interest in an activity. It is likely that people only persist in a 
certain activity for longer periods of time, however, if they experience it as being somehow 
rewarding, be it due to their interest in it, their positive affect, or its instrumentality for achieving 
a desired outcome. Focusing on the outcome or the process of goal pursuit is like beaming a 
flashlight on either the means or the end of goal pursuit, thus highlighting aspects of goal pursuit 
either related to the process (e.g., Do I have the means necessary to achieve this goal?) or the 
outcome (e.g., When will I achieve the goal?).  
Differentiating goal focus from related constructs 
Linking outcome and process focus to extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. Extrinsic motivation is 
characterized by a focus on the consequences of goal achievement (e.g., external rewards for 
achieving a certain goal), whereas intrinsic motivation is typically defined as a focus on the task at 
hand (e.g., enjoyment of or interest in the goal-relevant activity). Compared to extrinsic 
motivation, intrinsic motivation is associated with voluntary involvement, more interest, and 
higher persistence in a task (e.g., Deci et al., 1999; Krapp, 2005; Lepper, 1981). Intrinsic 
motivation implies that a person focuses on the satisfaction derived from the activity rather than 
on the external consequences of goal achievement. For instance, when one’s goal is to paint a 
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picture, either the amount of money the picture will bring in at the next exhibition (i.e., extrinsic 
motivation) or the enjoyment of and interest in the activity of painting (i.e., intrinsic motivation) 
could be in the foreground. Engaging in goal pursuit for tangible, external rewards has been 
shown to undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999).  
At first glance, the definition of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation greatly resembles 
process and outcome focus. Intrinsic motivation entails a focus on the process, extrinsic 
motivation a focus on the consequences of attaining a certain outcome. The opposite is not true, 
however, as the concept of goal focus is mute regarding the underlying reasons for engaging in 
goal pursuit. For instance, a person might focus on the outcome of goal pursuit (e.g., a beautiful 
painting) for a goal that was set autonomously and will bear no further consequences such as 
praise or tangible rewards. Extrinsic motivation implies a concern about the consequences of 
attaining an outcome (e.g., receiving a monetary reward from parents for achieving a good grade), 
not about the outcome itself. Regarding process focus, a person might focus on the process of 
goal pursuit (e.g., painting) because she is positively reinforced for doing so (e.g., through 
teachers’ praise for her talent and perseverance). Process focus, then, is not necessarily associated 
with intrinsic motivation.  
Linking outcome and process focus to performance and mastery goal orientation. Another goal 
dimension related to goal focus is performance and mastery goal orientation. Dweck (e.g., Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988) defines performance goal orientation as a focus on how well one is doing 
(particularly as compared to others), whereas mastery goal orientation represents a focus on 
learning and mastering a skill. Dweck traces these two types of goal orientation back to beliefs 
about skills as fixed (i.e., an entity) or malleable (i.e., incremental), respectively. In the first case 
(entity theory), performance is seen as an indicator of the underlying ability and provides 
feedback about an unchanging trait. In the latter case (incremental theory), feedback is a means 
of improving one’s skill level. A number of studies in educational settings have shown that 
setting mastery goals promotes interest in and enjoyment of goal pursuit, but that performance 
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goals are typically associated with a higher level of performance (e.g., Harackiewicz, Barron, 
Trauer, Carter, & Elliot, 2000; for a review, see Dweck & Molden, 2005). In the area of 
organizational behavior, however, mastery goals (in this context often labeled “learning” goals) 
have been shown to be positively linked to the successful acquisition of new skills, feedback 
seeking, and performance (e.g., VandeWalle, 2001; VandeWalle, Brown, Cron, & Slocum, 1999).  
Seijts and Latham (2005) posit that the adaptiveness of goal focus depends on the goal at 
hand. If the means and strategies of goal pursuit are not (yet) known or mastered, learning goals 
should enhance performance because attention is focused on the means of goal pursuit while 
focusing on performance might actually distract and hinder successful goal pursuit. In a similar 
vein, and using the terminology of process and outcome focus, Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1997, 
1999) point out that, when learning to master a new task, people are more likely to adopt a 
process focus, defined by these authors as a focus on the acquisition of (strategic) skills (i.e., 
mastering the various elements and steps of a complex skill such as writing or dart throwing) or, 
in other words, on the means for achieving a given outcome. Outcome focus, in contrast, 
presupposes mastery of the different elements of which a complex skill is comprised and denotes 
a focus on the actual outcome (i.e., performance level). In line with Seijts and Latham (2005), 
Zimmerman and Kitsantas found that a focus on the acquisition of skills and means (i.e., process 
focus) is beneficial when learning a new skill whereas outcome focus enhances performance 
when the means need to be implemented as an integrated whole in the service of goal attainment 
(Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997, 1999). This result can be taken as first evidence for the 
hypothesis that goal focus and its adaptiveness depend on skill level.  
Before we elaborate on the role of age for goal focus, let us summarize the main 
differences between process and outcome focus. 
Main differences between process and outcome focus 
Table 5 summarizes the main differences between process and outcome goal focus, 
which will be elaborated below. 
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Table 5: Differences between process and outcome goal focus 
Process goal focus Outcome goal focus 
Action/means End state 
Subordinate goals (concrete) Superordinate goals (abstract) 
Contextualized Decontextualized 
Provides vague or no standard of 
comparison  
Provides clear standard 
Provides guidelines for action Provides direction, meaning 
 
First, let us point out that the differences highlighted in Table 5 are relative not absolute. 
Typically, however, actions and the means of goal pursuit are more concrete than outcomes 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998). Similarly, actions take place in specific situational contexts (e.g., 
studying for the SAT), whereas outcomes are more decontextualized (e.g., achieving a certain 
SAT score). Another feature distinguishing outcome and process focus is the clarity of standards 
of comparison between actual and desired states. Outcome focus is more likely than process 
focus to provide a clear standard of comparison because outcomes typically entail criteria 
regarding when they are reached (e.g., arriving at a destination within five hours). By comparison, 
it is much more difficult to define the standards of comparison for the means of goal pursuit 
without referring to the outcome (e.g., enjoying a hike is less clearly defined than reaching the 
destination in a given amount of time). Finally, researchers agree that higher-order, abstract goal 
representations (i.e., outcome focus) provide direction and meaning in life, whereas lower-order, 
concrete goal representations (i.e., process focus) provide guidelines for action (e.g., Emmons, 
1996; Klinger, 1977; Little, 1989). As Little (1989) pointed out, however, people do not want to 
know why they are doing something but also what they should be doing. It seems, then, that 
neither of the two is in and of itself more adaptive. Instead, as discussed below, the effects of 
goal focus are hypothesized to depend on factors related to chronological age.  
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 Age and goal focus 
As for the development of skills during adulthood, one could argue that skill level is 
associated with age. In many domains of life, young adults are still in the process of acquiring the 
means and skills relevant for goal pursuit, such as skills needed in the professional/work domain 
or in the area of establishing a long-term partnership and family. This might force young adults 
to focus more closely on the acquisition of skills or the process of goal pursuit (Zimmermann & 
Kitsantas, 1997, 1999). Middle-aged and older adults are more likely to have acquired most of the 
skills necessary to pursue their goals in both the work as well as the social domain and, thus, 
could be seen as being more likely to focus on the outcome of goal pursuit. Moreover, as Kanfer 
and Ackerman (2004) point out, skills can also be defined in terms of the balance between 
investment of resources and payoff. In the context of work-related motivational development 
during adulthood, they argue that the payoff for resource investment decreases with age, leading 
younger adults to be more focused on resource investment and older adults on the outcome. 
Below, we will argue however, that other factors related to chronological age – the availability of 
resources, future time perspective, goal orientation towards gains or maintenance / avoidance of 
loss  – suggest that, overall, the primary goal focus is expected to shift from the outcome to the 
process of goal pursuit across adulthood.  
Some goals might lend themselves more to a process focus than others. For instance, 
goals related to an enduring characteristic (e.g., to be a friendly person) or maintaining some state 
(e.g., to stay healthy) require working constantly on the goal and might therefore be more suitable 
for a process focus than goals specifying an endpoint (e.g., to pass an exam). Therefore, 
maintenance goals may be more likely to be associated with a process focus, whereas goals 
involving the achievement of new outcomes (i.e., growth) should be more likely to invoke an 
outcome focus. As has been shown by Ebner et al. (2006), availability of resources is one of the 
factors determining whether growth or maintenance goals are adopted. When resources are 
perceived as being limited, people might feel that achieving new outcomes (growth) is less likely 
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Outcome focus 
Orientation of 
goal focus 
Process focus 
Adulthood 
Young   Middle-Aged  Older 
and desirable than focusing on the task at hand, namely, the process of goal pursuit. Similarly, as 
suggested by construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), goals that are temporally distant 
are more likely to be represented in an abstract way and in terms of ends, whereas shorter 
temporal distance of goals should lead to a more concrete representation of the means (“do” 
goals, according to Carver & Scheier, 1998). Taken together, preference for a certain goal focus 
might vary by variables such as time perspective (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999) and 
availability of resources (e.g., Freund & Ebner, 2005). Both time perspective and available 
resources have been shown to be negatively related to chronological age (e.g., Baltes & Smith, 
2003; Lang & Carstensen, 2002). Therefore, one could expect an increase in process focus and a 
decrease in outcome focus during adulthood (see Figure 4).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Hypothesized trajectories of process and outcome focus across adulthood 
 
As pointed out above, the developmental tasks of young adults entail the achievement of 
growth goals, which have an inherent outcome-oriented aspect due to the tangible nature of task 
achievement consequences (viz., a diploma, a job, a mate, a child). Thus, young adults may 
develop a more outcome-oriented approach to task achievement and outcomes are likely to become 
highly salient during young adulthood. Later on, however, adults – especially older adults – goal 
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orientation shifts towards maintaining one’s level of functioning and avoiding losses (Ebner et al., 
2006; Freund, 2006b). Orientation towards maintenance / avoidance of losses implies a constant 
monitoring of one’s actual performance vis-à-vis a progressively declining level of functioning. 
Thus, orientation towards maintenance and loss-avoidance has an inherent process-oriented aspect. 
Accordingly, older adults may develop a more process-oriented approach to goal achievement. In 
addition, achieving new outcomes typically takes time. However, when one’s future becomes 
more and more limited, growth goals with their inherently more distant outcomes might be 
viewed as less applicable to one’s own life than maintenance goals with their inherently more 
immediate nature (as necessitated by constant monitoring). Thus, given that future time 
perspective decreases with age (Lang & Carstensen, 2002), one might expect older adults to be 
more process-focused. 
Resources and goal focus. The importance of achieving gains and accumulating new resources 
in young adulthood (see above) is likely to result in a focus on achieving certain outcomes. 
Middle-aged adults might hold an equally strong process and outcome focus because, on the one 
hand, they are starting to experience a shift in resources toward decline and are, in many areas, at 
their peak in performance, making achievement of new outcomes less likely. This should lead to 
a stronger focus on the process of goal pursuit. On the other hand, middle-aged adults typically 
still experience their resources such as (life-)time and vigor as plentiful, and might therefore still 
aspire to reach certain outcomes because gains are still possible (Baltes et al., 1998; Freund & 
Ebner, 2005; Staudinger et al., 1995). This pattern clearly changes in old age, when resources 
decline (Baltes & Smith, 2003) and achieving new outcomes becomes less likely and goal 
orientation shifts towards maintenance and loss-avoidance. As maintenance goals lend 
themselves more to process focus than do growth goals, older adults should also be more likely 
than younger or middle-aged adults to adopt a process focus.  
This hypothesis is also consistent with Kanfer’s resource model (e.g., Kanfer, 1987; 
Kanfer & Ackerman, 2004), which proposes that motivation (defined here as effort) depends on 
Part III 
 72 
the perceived effort-performance function (i.e., the expected level of performance upon investing 
a certain amount of effort into a task at hand), the performance-utility function (i.e., the 
consequences of attaining a certain level of performance), and the effort-utility function (i.e., the 
payoff for investing effort into a task at hand). When resources decrease (e.g., as does fluid 
intelligence during adulthood), the expected payoff for investing effort declines, so older adults 
are expected to invest less effort into tasks involving resources on the decline. When resources 
are plentiful or even increasing (e.g., crystallized intelligence during adulthood), the expected 
payoff for investing effort increases, so effort will be invested into tasks involving resources that 
are increasing. Applied to the work domain, Kanfer and Ackerman (2004) propose that “among 
older workers, work motivation will be less determined by level of performance achievement and, 
rather, more determined by judgments of how much effort is required for requisite performance . 
. . and the utility of allocating that effort” (p. 451). This proposition is consistent with the view 
that older adults’ goal focus shifts from being primarily concerned with achieving a specific 
outcome (here, performance level) and more with the process of goal achievement (i.e., 
investment of effort). 
Time perspective and goal focus. Attempting to achieve certain outcomes requires adopting a 
future time perspective. Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) even view outcome focus and the ability to 
postpone immediate gratification in order to attain a goal at some later point in time as part of 
their concept of future time perspective. In contrast, present orientation is characterized by a 
more hedonic approach to life with a focus on more immediate gratification and less concern for 
consequences that lie in the farther future. Therefore, one could argue that an extended future 
time perspective is more likely to be associated with outcome focus, whereas shorter future time 
expansion might be associated with a focus on the process of goal pursuit that is taking place in 
the present. Investing into the future only makes sense when there is a future in which to reap 
the fruits of one’s efforts. Consistent with this view, in their studies testing socioemotional 
selectivity theory (SST), Carstensen and her colleagues (e.g., Carstensen et al., 1999) consistently 
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show that a limited future time perspective is related to focusing on emotionally meaningful 
social goals. In contrast, a longer future time perspective is associated with information seeking, 
which can be seen as an investment in the future. As Fung and Carstensen (2004) put it, “When 
the future is perceived as open-ended, future-oriented goals weigh most heavily and individuals 
pursue goals that optimize long-range outcomes” (p. 68), and “when time is perceived as limited, 
emotionally meaningful goals (…) are pursued because such goals have more immediate payoffs” 
(p. 68). 
In her studies, Carstensen shows that, contrary to younger adults, older people are more 
likely to restrict their social contacts to close social partners and emotionally meaningful social 
interactions. It is not old age per se, SST argues, but the shorter future time perspective of older 
people that is responsible for this shift in social goals. In fact, Lang and Carstensen (2002) show 
that age is negatively related to future time perspective. Moreover, when experimentally 
restricting younger adults’ time perspective, they orient themselves more towards meaningful 
interactions with close social partners rather than investing into the future by selecting partners 
that might provide useful information (for a summary, see Carstensen et al., 1999). Research on 
SST suggests that an extended future time perspective is likely to be associated with a focus on 
the outcomes of goal pursuit whereas a limited time perspective brings about a focus on the 
present and, therefore, a more immediate payoff. With a limited future time perspective, people 
should be more concerned with the more immediate process of goal pursuit rather than the more 
distant outcome thereof. 
Change vs. stability orientation and goal focus. In this section, we take a different perspective on 
gain and maintenance / avoidance of loss goal orientation by shifting the emphasis of this 
distinction away from gains and losses towards stability and change. From a developmental 
viewpoint, striving for the achievement of new gains implies an orientation towards change (e.g., 
“I want to become better in Spanish”), whereas striving for maintenance / avoidance of loss 
implies an orientation towards stability (e.g.., “I want to maintain my Spanish at the current level 
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and not get worse”). Different to the distinction of gain vs. maintenance/loss-avoidance 
orientation, change as well as stability goal orientation might be approach as well as avoidance-
motivated. In other words, change and stability goals can be either approach or avoidance 
oriented (see Table 6). When approaching a change goal, people are oriented towards a future 
state (e.g., “I want to become better”) whereas approaching a stability goal implies the wish to 
maintain an actual state (e.g., “I want to stay good”). Similarly, avoiding change is directed at an 
actual state (e.g., “I do not want to change”), whereas avoiding stability comprises a future state 
(e.g., “I do not want to become different”). 
 
Table 6: Focus on future vs. actual state as a function of motivational system (approach vs. avoidance) and goal 
orientation (change vs. stability) 
 Goal Orientation 
Motivational System Change Stability 
Approach Future State Actual State 
Avoidance Actual State Future State 
 
Goal orientation towards stability or change is theoretically related to goal focus and 
thereby contributes to the hypothesized age-related differences in process and outcome focus. As 
we will elaborate below, we posit that a change goal orientation might be associated with a 
stronger outcome focus and stability goal orientation might be related to a stronger process 
focus. 
One of the main reasons why change and stability goal orientation might contribute to 
goal focus is that they imply a different discrepancy between the actual and the desired state. The 
very definition of a change goal is that it entails a significant discrepancy between the actual and 
the desired state. In contrast, there is no discrepancy between the actual and the desired state in a 
stability goal – the desired state is to maintain this lack of a discrepancy. Feedback-loop models 
of goals (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) suggest that, as long as a 
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discrepancy reduction between the actual and desired state is intended and the outcome is not 
reached, a “tension state” towards the outcome exists, i.e., the cognitive accessibility of outcome-
related information might be higher before than after goal fulfillment (see Förster, Liberman, & 
Friedman, 2007). In a change goal orientation the individual reduces discrepancy towards the 
outcome (“negative feedback loop”, Miller et al., 1960) and should therefore render the outcome 
more accessible than a person pursuing a stability goal orientation, where the outcome is reached.  
Another line of argument for the association of change vs. stability orientation and 
process vs. outcome goal focus stems from the recently suggested temporal value asymmetry 
assumptions (Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2008). Accordingly, people value future events more 
than equivalent events in the equidistant past. Future outcomes in change goal orientation should 
therefore have a higher value than outcomes already reached in stability goal orientation. 
Consequently, change goal orientation should lead to a stronger focus on the outcome than 
stability goal orientation. Taken together, then, the larger discrepancy of the actual and desired 
state in a change goal should lead to a stronger outcome focus when compared to a stability goal. 
Conversely, stability goals should be associated with a process focus because there is no 
discrepancy between the desired and the actual state. 
Furthermore, change and stability goal orientation might lead to different goal foci due to 
(1) how resource demanding the pursuit of a goal is, and (2) the frequency of means usage for 
change and stability goals over time. 
Ad (1): Resource demands. Means might vary in different regards, as making one of them 
more desirable, e.g., for being less resource demanding than the other. Investing highly resource 
demanding means might be acceptable if they help achieving a certain goal fast and the 
investment of the means does not have to be repeated often. This is more likely to be the case in 
a change as compared to a stability goal that typically requires investment of resources as long as 
the goal itself exists (e.g., maintaining a certain diet in order to keep one’s weight stable). 
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Consequently, as means have to be selected more carefully when pursuing a stability goal, the 
focus should also be on means rather than the outcome of goal pursuit.  
Ad (2): Frequency of means usage. Successful stabilization of achieved outcomes is often 
achieved by repeating already established goal-relevant behavior that helped attaining the now to-
be-maintained state. Maintaining a certain state typically requires engaging in goal-relevant 
behaviors as long as people hold the respective goal. Stability goals (e.g., “I want to maintain my 
weight”) are typically not achieved at one specific point in time and therefore do not render 
themselves to one-shot goal pursuit. Stability goals, then, are more likely to be pursued for longer 
periods of time than change goals that typically specify a certain end point when the goal is 
achieved (e.g., “I want to lose 5 pounds”). Therefore, as goal pursuit stretches over a longer 
period of time, people are also like to use the means for goal pursuit more often than when they 
pursue change goals that are more likely to specify certain end points. Frequency here refers to 
the absolute number of times means are applied (not to the interval between using the means 
during a fixed time period). According to semantic memory theories (Collins & Loftus, 1975) or 
spreading activation models (Bower, 1981) the more recently or frequently a concept (such as a 
goal orientation) has been used in the past, the more often it is activated, and the more 
cognitively accessible it is. Therefore, if people use means more often in a stability as compared 
to a change goal orientation, therefore, means should also be more cognitively accessible. 
Adaptiveness of goal focus for change and stability goal orientation 
There might be an adaptive correspondence between mental representations of either 
means or outcomes and change or stability goal orientation. As the pursuit of change and stability 
goals pose different challenges to goal pursuit, process and outcome focus might be differentially 
adaptive. In particular, we posit that the challenge of a change goal lies in successfully reducing 
the discrepancy between the actual and desired state within a certain time (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 
1998), which should require more intense and immediate effort mobilization, whereas the 
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challenge of pursuing a stability goal lies in maintaining it potentially endlessly, which should 
demand adaptive adjustment of means. 
 Let us first address the challenge of pursuing a change goal, namely to reduce efficiently 
the discrepancy between the actual and desired state. We maintain that an outcome focus might 
provide motivational resources helpful when people experience goal pursuit as effortful and 
demanding. As decision theories propose, outcomes are generally evaluated compared to the 
costs of attaining them, i.e., the effort invested in the pursuit of a goal (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). Given the same costs, the higher (i.e., the more abstract) an outcome is set, the 
more it is perceived to be worth investing energy in it. Furthermore, Fujita, Trope, Liberman, and 
Levin-Sagi (2006) demonstrated that focusing on higher-order goals (i.e., outcomes) increases 
people’s motivation and mobilizes efforts for outcome attainment: A focus on outcomes leads to 
a preference for delayed outcomes compared to immediate ones, greater physical endurance, 
more self-control and less positive evaluations of temptations that undermine self-control. Fujita 
and Han (2009) showed that changes in the evaluation of temptations depend on whether a goal 
is represented in more concrete or more abstract terms. This, in turn, might explain that an 
outcome focus can foster self-control when facing temptations. Additionally, Manderlink and 
Harackiewicz (1984) theorize that a focus on outcomes increases intrinsic motivation. Therefore, 
an outcome focus should be more likely than a process focus to mobilize motivational resources 
for optimal outcome attainment. Furthermore, the approach towards the desired outcome and 
the reduction of the actual-desired state discrepancy is evaluated and experienced as more 
positive the nearer one gets to the outcome (Carver & Scheier, 1982). In contrast, focusing on a 
discrepancy where none exists, as in the case of a stability goal, does not provide any further 
information regarding goal pursuit or potential for experiencing positive emotions. 
Turning to stability goals, the main challenge is the length of goal pursuit. For instance, 
keeping one’s weight is not reached at a certain point in time but instead requires constant 
adherence to a certain eating or exercising regimen. Because of the long-term aspect of stability 
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goal orientation, the means must have the potential to be used for as long as the goal is held. This 
is not necessarily true for change goals where, once a goal is reached, it is either abandoned (e.g., 
I want to pass this exam) or translated into a stability goal (e.g., “I want to lose 10 pounds,” once 
achieved, might turn into “I want to keep my weight down”). Because of the longer time frame 
of a stability goal, people have to pay more attention to how resource-demanding their means 
are. Taken together, this suggests that, when pursuing a change goal, an outcome focus might be 
more adaptive, whereas the pursuit of a stability goal should profit more from a process focus.  
As was elaborated above, older adults report a stronger orientation towards the 
maintenance of functioning, whereas younger adults are more oriented towards achieving new 
gains. Taking a stability vs. change perspective, older adults should be more stability oriented, 
younger adults more change oriented. If, as we posit, stability orientation is related to a stronger 
process focus and change orientation to a stronger outcome focus, once again, we would once 
more predict that younger adults should focus more on the outcome of goal pursuit, whereas 
older adults should focus more on the process. 
Does process and outcome goal focus change with age? A short-term longitudinal study by Freund 
et al. (2010, Study 3) provides first evidence for an age-related shift in primary goal focus. In this 
study, younger and older exercise beginners’ process and outcome focus were assessed using an 
exercise motivation scale. Outcome focus comprised such items as wanting to lose weight, 
becoming more physically attractive or improving one’s appearance in general. Process focus was 
operationalized as wanting to have fun, socializing with friends, or making new acquaintances. As 
expected, younger adults focused more on the outcome of their exercise goal, whereas older 
adults focused more on the process thereof. Moreover, outcome and process focus were 
differentially associated with goal-relevant exercise outcomes. Adults with a stronger process 
focus tended to experience a decrease in the distance to their goal over time and rated it as more 
attainable and important; they also reported higher goal involvement and satisfaction as 
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compared to adults with an outcome focus. One of the shortcomings of this study is that 
outcome and process focus were assessed indirectly via the motivation to exercise.  
In a second study, we presented four goals (e.g., to quit smoking) to younger and older 
adults. Each goal was described by five process-related statements (e.g., throw away cigarettes) 
and five outcome-related statements (e.g., improve health). Participants were asked to select five 
out of these ten statements per goal. As hypothesized, younger but not older adults showed a 
significant preference for outcome-related descriptors, indicating their stronger outcome 
orientation. A third study investigated age-related differences in and affective consequences of 
goal focus. Both, younger and older adults, were to chose between two “thinking exercises”, one 
of them focusing on the desired outcomes of personal goals (i.e., outcome-related exercise), the 
other one focusing on means to pursue these personal goals (i.e., process-related exercise). 
Participants who selected the process-related exercise then had to list two successive means by 
which one could pursue the goal of having a good vacation. Participants who selected the 
outcome-related exercise had to list two successive desired outcomes of having a good vacation 
(see also Freitas, Gollwitzer, & Trope, 2004). Again, younger adults showed a preference for the 
outcome-focused exercise, whereas older adults showed no preference for either type. Affect 
measures were administered after conducting the exercises. A significant age by goal focus 
interaction indicated that older adults showed higher positive affect after the process-related 
exercise. Interestingly, younger adults showed more intense negative affect after conducting the 
outcome-focused exercise, which they had chosen more often. Even though younger adults 
appear to prefer an outcome focus, then, they experience more negative affect when adopting an 
outcome rather than a process focus.  
Motivational phase and goal focus 
Integrating goal focus into the model of action phases by H. Heckhausen (1989) and the 
related model of cognitive mind-sets accompanying the different motivational phases 
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(Gollwitzer, 1990; Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990), we hypothesize that goal focus 
changes according to motivational phase.  
In brief, H. Heckhausen distinguishes four consecutive phases in the motivational 
process14: In the first, pre-decisional phase, people deliberate about pros and cons of different goals, 
their short- and long-term consequences, as well as their subjective attainability. Once a decision 
is made, people no longer engage in comparing different options (e.g., Gollwitzer et al., 1990). In 
the pre-actional phase, they focus on formulating binding intentions and concrete action plans that 
are realized in the actional phase. In the final post-actional phase goal achievement is evaluated. 
Note that the sequence of motivational phases is idealized. Throughout the motivational process, 
people might step back, re-evaluate their goal (i.e., re-entering the pre-decisional phase), the 
means they employ (i.e., re-entering the pre-actional phase), maybe leading to changes in goal 
standards or the chosen means. The action phase model by H. Heckhausen proposes (and 
empirical studies provide evidence) that the proposed sequence is the most likely and 
prototypical one. Figure 2 summarizes the hypothesized goal focus during the goal process in the 
action phase model by H. Heckhausen (1989), augmented by the deadline model by J. 
Heckhausen (1999).  
If a goal is not externally set (e.g., by teachers, parents, boss), people have to come to a 
decision if they want to adopt a certain goal or not. During this phase, the pre-decisional phase, we 
propose that people are likely to adopt an outcome focus. This is because during this phase, they 
deliberate about the advantages and disadvantages of one or more temporally distant outcomes. 
Weighing consequences of different options is likely to direct attention to abstract, global 
features of the goal rather than the concrete goal process. At this stage, people think about 
whether they want or like to attain something in general before engaging in laying out a roadmap 
                                                
4 Note that, unlike H. Heckhausen (1989), we use the term “motivational phase” to refer to all phases from setting 
to attaining (or abandoning) a goal. 
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as to how to reach the goal. This is not to say, that considerations about whether one believes to 
have, in principle, good chances of achieving the goal, do not play a role. They clearly do, as  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Hypothesized goal focus across motivational phases 
 
research on goal setting shows (for an overview of this literature, see H. Heckhausen, 1989). As 
the literature in the context of bounded rationality and the use of heuristics for making decisions 
suggests, however, people do not typically have elaborate lists in mind integrating the various 
goal-relevant means, weighted by subjective likelihood of attaining each step (Gigerenzer, Todd, 
& the ABC research group, 1999; see also H. Heckhausen, 1989). Even if all the necessary 
information were available, such an approach would overburden cognitive capacities and might 
not even lead to better decisions (Gigerenzer et al., 1999). Therefore, focusing on the outcome 
and the value attached to the consequences of a potential goal before making a decision seems 
more likely and more adaptive than taking a detailed stock of the necessary means attached to the 
different outcomes also into account. In fact, H. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer (1987) showed that 
people focus more on the values of the outcome than on strategies of goal pursuit during the 
pre-decisional phase. 
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If a goal is not self-selected but instead externally imposed (and accepted as a goal by the 
individual), the pre-decisional phase is not relevant and people move directly to the pre-actional 
phase which describes the phase after having committed to a goal and before actually engaging in 
goal-relevant actions. In the pre-actional phase, people plan the implementation of intentions as 
to how, when, and where to start goal-relevant actions and means. If the means of goal pursuit 
are well established and highly routinized, it is likely that people will immediately proceed to 
implementing goal-relevant actions, sometimes even in an automatic way, as Bargh and 
Gollwitzer (1994) posit in their automotive theory of goal pursuit. If, however, the means are not 
yet known and routinized, the focus is likely to lie on finding out the best way to pursue the goal 
(see also Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997; 1999). In line with this, H. Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 
(1987) demonstrated that the post-decisional phase is associated with elaboration of plans and 
strategies of how to implement goal pursuit. Findings on the implementational mind-set are highly 
compatible with the assumption of a predominant process focus during this motivational phase. 
Moreover, in a number of studies, Gollwitzer and his colleagues (for an overview see Gollwitzer 
& Sheeran, 2006) showed repeatedly and consistently that clear and strong implementation 
intentions contribute to goal achievement. Implementation intentions specify goal-related means 
and actions, situations in which to apply those means, and also the right timing of acting on a 
given goal. Moreover, implementation intentions have important cognitive effects (i.e., 
implemental mind-set): They focus attention on goal-relevant information and ward off 
distractions (including questioning the value of the selected goal), they heighten the accessibility 
of situational cues allowing goal-related actions (thereby enhancing the likelihood of seizing the 
right moment and opportunity), and lead to being particularly optimistic about achieving the goal. 
All of these characteristics of planning enhance the likelihood of actually initiating and 
completing intended goal-related actions or applying goal-related means (Gollwitzer & 
Brandstätter, 1997). Taken together, the literature suggests that during the pre-actional phase, 
people focus on the actual process of goal pursuit rather than the outcome.  
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In the actional phase, the primary task is to invest goal-relevant means and engage in goal-
relevant actions in the interest of goal achievement. H. Heckhausen and colleagues claim that a 
focus on the outcome on a rather abstract level of cognitive representation might be 
predominant and adaptive during this phase. In contrast, we posit that focusing on the outcome 
might distract from good opportunities to implement goal-relevant plans and might thereby 
actually hinder goal achievement. Particularly when long-term goals are pursued that require 
maintenance of goal-relevant actions over an extended period of time, focusing on the activities 
related to goal pursuit (rather than the negative discrepancy to a desired outcome) should help 
maintaining motivation even in the face of hindrances or setbacks (see Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). 
This should be the case because, if the very process of goal pursuit is in the foreground, the 
distance to the outcome becomes less salient. For instance, when the goal is to lose weight and 
the goal-relevant means is exercising regularly, a lack of weight loss over a certain period of time 
is less likely to discourage from exercising if the focus is on jogging every morning. If an 
outcome orientation prevails, the person might give up exercising if no weight reduction is seen 
within a certain period of time. This might also be why many weight loss programs advise not to 
get on the scale too often.  
The hypothesis of a predominant focus on goal pursuit during the actional phase is also 
in line with research on automatic goal pursuit. According to the automotive model by Bargh and 
Gollwitzer (1994), the repeated activation of a goal in a certain situation leads to an association of 
the respective goal and situational cues. Such situational features can then automatically trigger 
goal-relevant actions without being consciously aware of the respective goal (Bargh, & Ferguson, 
2000). This suggests that, during the actional phase, there is not even conscious awareness of the 
outcome in order to pursue a goal. It might even happen that – temporarily or permanently – the 
process itself takes over as the goal and the outcome is either regarded as relatively unimportant 
or even abandoned as irrelevant (e.g., jogging every morning for 45 minutes becomes a goal and 
techniques are acquired to improve running performance, whereas losing weight might be seen as 
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nice side-effect of jogging but no longer as the goal). As these examples show, means and ends 
can change their status during the motivational process (Kruglanski, 1996). Means sometimes 
become outcomes. Attention then shifts to the subordinate means to achieve the new goal 
(formerly known as means). 
A different situation arises when a (self-set or imposed) deadline is approaching (J. 
Heckhausen, 1999). In this case the outcome will again become more salient. A deadline (e.g., 
losing 3 pounds until the night of the high school prom a week from now) revives the 
importance of the outcome and decreases the importance of the valence of the process. In such 
cases, the most effective (and not necessarily the most enjoyable) way of attaining one’s goal 
needs to be identified and implemented so as to reach it in time. Closely monitoring the distance 
to an outcome becomes adaptive and adjusting means of goal pursuit accordingly is required 
(e.g., Schmitz & Wiese, 1999).  
If the means for achieving a goal are not positively valued, even if the outcome is, people 
are tempted to procrastinate and not engage in goal-relevant activities. In this case, a deadline and 
the perceived negative consequences of missing it (i.e., not achieving the outcome) serves as an 
incentive to get to work. The valence of the more abstract outcome representation (i.e., the 
positive valence of achieving the outcome, or the negative valence of failure) is helpful for 
overriding the negative valence of the concrete goal-relevant means. In fact, research suggests 
that deadlines increase performance and goal attainment and, moreover, that people even self-
impose binding deadlines to counteract procrastination (e.g., Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). Thus, 
people might use deadlines to induce a shift from process to outcome focus, thereby motivating 
themselves to strive for the positively valued goal instead of focusing on negative aspects of goal 
pursuit. Note, that not only achievement-related goals can have such deadlines but they can be 
applied to other life domains as well. An example of a (external) developmental deadline in the 
family domain is menopause for reproduction in women.  
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Adopting an outcome goal when a deadline is looming might, on the one hand, help to 
mobilize increased efforts of goal pursuit and attain a goal within a certain time frame. On the 
other hand, however, outcome focus might also hinder flexible adjustment of means and 
emphasize the importance of investing maximum effort over efficient use of goal pursuit 
strategies (Schmitz & Wiese, 1999). Hence, if a deadline is introduced too early in the 
motivational process, i.e., when the most adaptive means or strategies of pursuing the goal are 
not yet established, goal attainment might come at a relatively high cost or people might not live 
up to their optimal performance level (see also Ariely & Wertenbroch, 2002). In cases where no 
deadline is set people are expected not to undergo a shift from process to outcome focus during 
goal pursuit. The same holds true for goals consisting of a state to be reached and maintained 
(e.g., “I want to be happy.”) rather than an endpoint (e.g., “I want to get married.”). State goals 
do not have clear endpoints but instead stretch over an extended period of time. As continued 
engagement in goal pursuit is needed for such goals, they should be generally more conducive to 
process focus. This contrasts with goals that specify a specific outcome that can be reached at a 
certain point in time. Upon reaching such goals – or after deciding to give it up (e.g., because a 
deadline has passed) – people enter the post-actional phase, in which they evaluate the means and 
the degree to which they reached the outcome. If the goal will have to be reached again (e.g., 
taking an exam in school), it is likely that people are motivated to evaluate the quality of the 
means in order to be able to optimize goal pursuit in the next round (i.e., maintain a focus on 
processes for some time). With increasing temporal distance, however, people will focus 
primarily on the outcome (Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
Taken together, goal focus is proposed to change relative salience depending on 
motivational phase. During the pre-decisional and, again, when urgency in attaining the goal is 
experienced, outcome focus should be predominant. During the pre-actional and non-urgent 
actional phase, process focus is expected to be more salient.  
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Consequences of goal focus after failure 
After having discussed antecedents of goal focus related to age, resources, time 
perspective, goal orientation and motivational phase, we now turn to the consequences of goal focus 
when people have to cope with failure. There are many typical situations in which goal pursuit is 
hampered by setbacks or failure: Dieters are frustrated when their weight goes up instead of 
down, students fail to pass their exams, and sportsmen do not win a competition. As setbacks 
and failures are a major threat to future persistence and subjective well-being (Carver & Scheier, 
1990; Pomerantz et al., 2000), psychological research has long been interested in how people 
cope with them: Under which conditions is a person persistent and substitutes their means of 
goal pursuit? When will someone give up his/her goal and decide to head for other desirable 
outcomes instead? One prominent determinant of affective and behavioral consequences to 
failure is attribution to, e.g., internal or external, stable or instable, global or unspecific causes 
(Abramson et al., 1978). We argue that goal focus is another important determinant of affective 
and behavioral reactions to failure as it might influence whether the inappropriateness of the 
means or the difficulty of attaining the outcome are in the foreground of failure attributions. 
Attributions to the means vs. the outcome. Feedback is essential to evaluate progress towards a 
desired outcome (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981, 1982). Such feedback can contain components 
that are related to the means and to the outcome (Earley et al., 1990). Not attaining the desired 
outcome (e.g., losing weight) can be attributed to either the wrong means (e.g., “exercising does 
not contribute to weight loss”) or to the outcome (e.g., “losing weight is impossible as it is 
genetically fixed”; see also Burnette, 2010). Whether failure is attributed to the means or the 
outcome should partly depend on goal focus. Thinking about means (process focus) should be 
associated with the cognitive accessibility of these means, whereas thinking about outcomes 
(outcome focus) should be associated with the cognitive accessibility of these outcomes. 
Conversely, as highly accessible goals or constructs influence information processing (e.g., Bargh, 
Gollwitzer, Lee-Chai, Barndollar, & Trötschel, 2001; Bargh & Pratto, 1986; Förster et al., 2005; 
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Higgins, Bargh, & Lombardi, 1985), a person who primarily focuses on means will be more likely 
to attribute setbacks to the inappropriateness of the means (e.g., “This diet does not work for 
me”), whereas a person who primarily focuses on the outcome will be more likely to attribute 
failure to the difficulty of achieving the outcome (“It is difficult to reduce my weight”). In other 
words: Beaming a flashlight on the means of goal pursuit will more likely also highlight the 
blocked path, whereas beaming it on the desired outcomes will highlight the blocked outcome. 
Failure, then, should be attributed to the means in a process focus and to the outcome in an 
outcome focus.  
Behavioral consequences of goal focus after failure. Attributions of failure to the means or the 
outcome should have different effects on subsequent behavior. After experiencing a failure, there 
are different behavioral options: Means that are thwarted or resulted in failure can often be 
substituted by others (equifinality; Kruglanski, 1996; Kruglanski et al. 2002). Conversely, often 
different outcomes can be attained via the same means (multifinality; Kruglanski & Jaffe, 1988; 
Kruglanski et al., 2002). In a process focus, when the means of goal pursuit are identified as 
problematic and inappropriate, means substitution (i.e., compensation; see Freund & Baltes, 
2000, 2002) is the self-evident behavioral reaction. In contrast, in an outcome focus and when 
the desired outcome is perceived as blocked, it is more straightforward to switch to another 
desirable outcome, i.e., disengage from the goal at hand and select a new one (i.e., loss-based 
selection; Freund & Baltes, 2000, 2002).  
In line with this rationale, some researchers have also argued that so-called “what the 
hell” cognitions result from identifying behaviors on higher, more abstract levels (Cochran & 
Tesser, 1996). “What the hell” cognitions typically occur in dieters. After having failed to resist a 
temptation (e.g., a piece of cake), they interrupt their dieting for a day or even completely 
disengage from their weight loss goal. As a consequence, they show disinhibited eating (e.g., 
more pieces of cake; Polivy & Herman, 1985). This breakdown of self-regulation might be caused 
by the attribution of their failure to the desired outcome (“I am not successful in reducing my 
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weight”). Perceiving their goal as blocked, they disengage from it and switch to the tangible goal 
of eating enjoyment (for a similar argumentation see also Stroebe et al., 2008). In fact, we have 
shown that dieters who focus on a more abstract and outcome-related level of their goal (weight 
reduction, improving one’s appearance) show more disinhibited eating after failure than dieters 
who focus on a more concrete process-related level (the way they diet, resist temptations; 
Hennecke & Freund, in revision). In addition, a recent study by Burnette (2010) has shown that 
dieters who might tend to attribute failure to the outcome of dieting, as they believe body weight 
to be fixed (entity theorists) rather than malleable by the use of appropriate means (incremental 
theorists) report less persistence following setbacks. Moreover, findings of our own self-report 
study (Hennecke & Freund, in revision) also supported the predicted link between goal focus and 
means substitution vs. loss-based selection after failure in other goal domains. Participants were 
asked to name two personal goals and indicate how much they think about the means of goal 
pursuit (process focus) and about the desired outcomes (outcome focus). As expected, process 
focus was strongly positively related to means substitution as opposed to loss-based selection. 
Outcome focus was slightly negatively related to means substitution; hence, it had a positive 
impact on the loss-based selection of new outcomes after failure. 
Affective consequences of goal focus after failure. What are the affective consequences of process 
and outcome focus when people encounter failure? According to Carver and Scheier (e.g., 1981), 
feelings arise as a consequence of an automatic feedback process. The feedback process 
continually checks how well one’s actions reduce the discrepancy between the actual and a 
desired state. If goal progress is below a criterion that refers to an acceptable rate of discrepancy 
reduction, negative affect arises. If goal progress exceeds the criterion, positive affect arises. If it 
is identical with the criterion, no affect arises (Carver, 2004). Failure of goal pursuit can be 
defined as a progress rate below this criterion or even stagnation. Accordingly, failure generally 
elicits negative affect (see also Hsee & Abelson, 1991). We propose that, especially when goals 
are difficult to attain and goal pursuit is hampered by setbacks, focusing on and valuing primarily 
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the outcome has negative consequences as it makes the discrepancy between the actual and the 
desired state more salient.  
A second explanation for the detrimental effects of outcome focus on affective well-
being is based on the hierarchic organization of goals and goal-directed behavior (e.g., Carver & 
Scheier, 1982, 1990; Emmons, 1996; Vallacher & Wegner, 1985). Means are often referred to as 
subgoals that serve the attainment of more abstract, superordinate goals, the respective 
outcomes. As goals that are placed higher in a personal goal hierarchy are more important and 
central to the self (Austin & Vancouver, 1996; Boden, 1973), outcomes, by definition, should be 
more important than their respective subgoals or means. Martin and Tesser (1989) also assume 
that the higher a goal in the hierarchy, the more likely it is that a threat to this goal will elicit 
rumination, a tendency to carry negative thoughts and feelings after being exposed to unpleasant 
events. Taken together, as a means is subordinate to its desired outcome, a threat to a means 
should be less severe than a threat to an outcome. Houser-Marko and Sheldon (2008) have 
supported this hypothesis when showing that failure feedback has stronger negative effects on 
mood when it alludes to the process (in their terms: primary goal level) as compared to the 
outcome (in their terms: sub-goal level). Moreover, Emmons (1992) demonstrated that people 
who focus on concrete goals show less depressive symptoms than people whose goals are rather 
abstract. Our own research supports our assumptions as well: We have found that dieters who 
attribute their failure on the level of means show higher positive affect than dieters who attribute 
their failure to the level of outcomes (Hennecke & Freund, in revision).  
In addition to these direct effects of goal focus on affect, an indirect effect might result 
from the behavioral outcomes of each focus. When goals are higher in the goal hierarchy than 
their subordinate means, disengaging from a goal to switch to another (loss-based selection) 
should impede affective well-being stronger than disengaging from a means and switching to 
another (means substitution). In fact, we have found that means substitution (as opposed to loss-
based selection) is positively related to affective well-being (Hennecke & Freund, in revision). 
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In sum, then, a process focus might be generally more adaptive after failure because it 
should lead to attributions of failure to the means rather than to the desired outcome. This, in 
turn, should foster the substituting of means rather than the loss-based selection of a new 
outcome. Finally, focusing on means has positive effects on affective reactions to failure, whereas 
focusing on the outcome should make the discrepancy between the actual and the desired state 
even more salient. 
Conclusion 
Goals have wonderful qualities: They motivate behavior, help us organize behavior into 
action sequences over time and situations, and thus provide our lives with direction and meaning. 
Although we wholeheartedly agree with this assessment, we would like to distinguish at least two 
goal dimensions that modulate the adaptiveness of goals. Depending on the availability of 
resources, it might be better to orient one’s goals towards gains, maintenance, or the avoidance of 
loss. Goal orientation, in turn, might affect goal focus on the process or the outcome of goal 
pursuit. We argued that a gain (change) orientation is likely to be related to an outcome focus, 
whereas maintenance (stability) orientation is likely to be related to a process focus. Moreover, 
we elaborated that the motivational phase might influence the goal focus (during the 
predecisional phase and close to a deadline, an outcome focus is more likely to occur, whereas 
during the actional phase a process focus should prevail). Importantly, regarding the 
consequences of goal focus, we argued that process focus might lead to higher persistence and 
and less negative affect when encountering difficulties during goal pursuit. Research on goal 
focus is just at the beginning of empirically testing these hypotheses. Initial results, however, are 
largely supportive of the ideas presented here. Future research will have to prove the incremental 
validity of goal focus over other constructs such as intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
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Abstract 
Three studies report initial findings on age-related differences in goal focus. Study 1 
compared younger (n = 23, 19-25 years) to older (n = 20, 57-78 years) adults regarding their 
preference for representations of goals in terms of the means (process focus) or the associated 
outcomes (outcome focus). As expected, older adults chose process descriptors of goals more 
frequently than younger adults. Study 2 investigated the emotional consequences of goal focus. 
Whereas younger adults (n = 49, 18-25 years) reported higher negative affect when they focused 
on the outcomes of a goal, older adults (n = 40, 60-88 years) reported higher positive affect when 
they focused on the process. Study 3, a 4-month longitudinal study, applied the distinction 
between process and outcome focus to the context of a personal goal in everyday life (starting to 
exercise). Older adults (n = 46, 55-78 years) reported having a stronger process focus than 
younger adults (n = 55, 19-25 years). Again, older adults were more likely to adopt a process than 
an outcome focus. For both age groups, process focus predicted positive goal-related 
development and affective well-being. In contrast, outcome focus was either not or negatively 
related to these outcomes.  
Keywords: Goal focus, process, outcome, age differences, motivation 
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Introduction 
Laypeople and motivation researchers agree that setting and pursuing goals has positive 
consequences. Goals give life meaning, direction, and contribute to happiness and well-being 
(e.g., Emmons, 1996; Klinger, 1977; Little, 1989). As Albert Einstein said, “If you want to live a 
happy life, tie it to a goal.” This view emphasizes the importance of linking one’s life and actions 
to the achievement of certain outcomes. However, it stands in contrast to an equally popular view 
emphasizing the process of goal pursuit. As a Buddhist proverb says, “The path is the goal.” The 
research reported here revolves around this distinction between the process and outcome focus 
of personal goals. It addresses two central research questions: (a) what factors determine whether 
people focus more on the outcome of a goal or on the process of pursuing a goal? And (b) are 
process and outcome focus equally beneficial with respect to goal achievement?  
Goals have been defined as cognitive representations of personally desired (or dreaded) 
states to be approached or avoided (e.g., Kruglanski, 1996), such as becoming a nurse or not 
becoming like one’s parents. Goals direct attention, motivate and organize behavior over time 
and across situations, and provide a sense of direction and purpose in life (Freund, 2006a). 
Moreover, research suggests that goal pursuit enhances performance (e.g., Austin & Vancouver, 
1996; Emmons, 1996; Freund, 2006a).  
Not all goals, however, are created equal (Ryan et al., 1996). They may differ in content, 
concreteness, difficulty, time frame, gain and loss orientation, and so forth (e.g., Little, 1989; 
Locke & Latham, 2002; Wiese & Freund, 2005). There is abundant empirical evidence that such 
characteristics affect the adaptiveness of goals (e.g., Freund, 2006b; Freund & Ebner, 2005; Little, 
1989; Locke & Latham, 2002; Riediger & Freund, 2004; Wiese & Freund, 2005). Comparatively 
little, however, is known about age-related differences in the characteristics and functions of 
personal goals. This is surprising given the increasing interest in the active role that adults play in 
shaping their development (e.g., Baltes et al., 2006; Brandtstädter, 1998; Freund et al., 1999; 
Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981) and recent evidence suggesting that personal goals may be 
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among the phenomena that show positive development throughout adulthood (Bauer & 
McAdams, 2004; Riediger, Freund, & Baltes, 2005; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001). In the present 
research, we took a developmental perspective to investigate adult age-related differences in 
outcome and process goal focus.  
In Gestalt psychological terms, goal focus refers to those aspects of a goal that form a 
‘‘figure’’ because they are more salient. Various dimensions of goal focus have been 
distinguished, such as gain–loss (e.g., Freund & Ebner, 2005), intrinsic–extrinsic (e.g., Deci et al., 
1999; Krapp, 2005), and mastery–performance (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988). The present 
research centered on the distinction between outcome and process goal focus (e.g., Sansone & 
Thoman, 2005). Outcome focus refers to the cognitive representation of a goal primarily in terms 
of the outcome of goal pursuit, that is, the short- or long-term consequences of goal pursuit. 
Process focus refers to the cognitive representation of a goal primarily in terms of the process of 
goal pursuit, that is the means of and one’s investment in goal attainment. For instance, one 
might represent the goal to start exercising regularly primarily in terms of its consequences (i.e., 
the outcome) such as weight loss or improvement in health – or primarily in terms of aspects of 
the goal-pursuit process, for example, the specific type of exercise (e.g., aerobics or jogging) or 
with whom one wants to exercise. Most goals are likely represented to some degree in terms of 
both, means and ends, process and outcome, but people may differ with respect to goal focus 
preference. The questions we address in this paper concern whether there are systematic 
individual differences in preference for outcome and process focus and whether goal focus is 
related to measures of goal engagement, goal achievement, and, more generally, adaptiveness in 
terms of affective wellbeing.  
Below, we will specify the concept of process/outcome goal focus by distinguishing it 
from two related constructs, namely extrinsic/intrinsic motivation and performance/mastery 
orientation. Following that, we will discuss the theoretical background of our central predictions 
concerning age-related differences in, and the adaptiveness of, process and outcome focus. We 
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will then introduce a specific goal context for one of the studies, namely, starting to exercise 
regularly. 
Linking outcome and process focus to the concept of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation 
Extrinsic motivation has been defined by a focus on the external consequences of goal 
achievement (e.g., external rewards for achieving a certain goal), whereas intrinsic motivation has 
been characterized by a focus on the task at hand (e.g., enjoyment of or interest in the goal 
relevant activity). As compared to extrinsic motivation, intrinsic motivation is associated with 
voluntary involvement, more interest, and higher persistence in a task (e.g., Deci et al., 1999; 
Krapp, 2005; Lepper, 1981). Intrinsic motivation implies that a person focuses on the satisfaction 
derived from an activity rather than on the external consequences of goal achievement. For 
instance, when one’s goal is to paint a picture, either the amount of money the picture will bring 
in at the next exhibition (i.e., extrinsic motivation) or the enjoyment of and interest in the activity 
of painting (i.e., intrinsic motivation) could be in the foreground. Engaging in goal pursuit for 
tangible, external rewards has been shown to undermine intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999).  
At first glance, the definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation overlap those of 
process and outcome focus. Intrinsic motivation entails a focus on the process, extrinsic 
motivation on the consequences of attaining a certain outcome. The opposite, however, is not 
true: Both process and outcome focus can be either extrinsically or intrinsically motivated. For 
example, a person might focus on the outcome of goal pursuit (e.g., a beautiful painting) for an 
intrinsically motivated goal (e.g., aesthetic enjoyment) that was set autonomously and will have no 
further consequences such as praise or tangible rewards. Similarly, a person might focus on the 
process of goal pursuit (e.g., painting) because she/he is externally motivated to do so (e.g., 
through teachers’ praise for her/his talent and perseverance). 
Linking outcome and process focus to the concept of performance and mastery orientation 
The literature on performance and mastery orientation is also relevant to the concept of 
process and outcome goal focus. Dweck (e.g., Dweck & Leggett, 1988) defined “performance 
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goal orientation” as a focus on how well one is doing (particularly as compared to others) and 
“mastery goal orientation” as a focus on learning and mastering a skill. She traced these two types 
of goal orientation back to beliefs about skills as fixed (i.e., an entity) or malleable (i.e., 
incremental), respectively. In the first case (entity theory), performance is seen as an indicator of 
underlying ability and provides feedback about an unchanging trait. In the latter case (incremental 
theory), feedback is a means of improving one’s skill level. A number of studies in educational 
settings have shown that setting mastery goals promotes interest in and enjoyment of goal 
pursuit, but that performance goals are associated with a higher level of performance (e.g., 
Harackiewicz et al., 2000; see Dweck & Molden, 2005, for a recent review). In studies of 
organizational behavior, however, VandeWalle and colleagues have shown a positive link 
between mastery goals (in this context often labelled “learning” goals) and the successful 
acquisition of new skills, feedback seeking, and performance (e.g., VandeWalle, 2001; 
VandeWalle et al., 1999).  
Seijts and Latham (2005) posited that the adaptiveness of mastery/ learning and 
performance orientation depends on whether the means and strategies of goal pursuit have 
already been learned and mastered: If they have not, learning goals should enhance performance 
because attention is focused on the means of goal pursuit while focusing on performance might 
actually distract and hinder successful goal-pursuit. In a similar vein, and using the terminology of 
process and outcome focus, Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1997, 1999) point out that, when 
learning to master a new task, people are more likely to adopt a process focus, defined by these 
authors as a focus on the acquisition of (strategic) skills (i.e., mastering the various elements and 
steps of a complex skill such as writing or dart throwing) or, in other words, on the means for 
achieving a given outcome. Outcome focus, in contrast, presupposes mastery of the different 
elements of which a complex skill is comprised and denotes a focus on the actual outcome (i.e., 
performance level). In line with Seijts and Latham (2005), Zimmerman and Kitsantas (1997, 
1999) found that a focus on the acquisition of skills and means (i.e., process focus) is beneficial 
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when learning a new skill whereas outcome focus enhances performance when the means need 
to be implemented as an integrated whole in the service of goal attainment.  
In short, there are specific manifestations of outcome and process goal focus that have 
received considerable attention in educational and organizational settings. Currently, however, 
relatively little is known about the relevance of process and outcome goal focus in other domains. 
In addition, to our knowledge, no research has ever investigated the possibility of age-related 
differences in adults with respect to process and outcome goal focus. The present study aimed to 
extend previous research in these two respects by investigating outcome and process focus in the 
context of the goal to start exercising regularly in younger as compared to older adults. 
A developmental perspective on goal focus 
We posit that two factors associated with chronological age might contribute to the 
adoption of process versus outcome goal focus. Goals related to a temporally enduring state or 
to the maintenance of performance (e.g., “I want to stay healthy”) require constant work on the 
goal and might thereby lend themselves more easily to a process focus than goals involving the 
achievement of new outcomes or benefits (e.g., “I want to be able to fit into this dress and wear 
it to the prom”). Similarly, as elaborated by construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003), 
goals that are temporally distant are more likely to invoke an outcome focus, whereas those that 
are temporally closer should lead to a stronger process focus. Preference for an outcome or 
process goal focus might thus vary depending on (a) the tendency to frame goals primarily in 
terms of acquiring new benefits versus maintaining the status quo and (b) their time perspective, 
both of which are related to age. With increasing age, time perspective decreases (Lang & 
Carstensen, 2002) and framing goals in terms of maintenance increases (Ebner et al., 2006). On 
the basis of these findings, we hypothesized that process focus would increase and outcome 
focus would decrease during adulthood.  
Alternatively, however, one could also formulate the opposite hypothesis: Given that the 
future time perspective of older adults is shorter, they might find it more important to focus on 
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tangible outcomes than on the continuous process of working towards a goal. Another argument 
for this alternative prediction comes from organizational research, which suggests that the 
adoption and adaptiveness of goal focus depends on skill level (Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 1997, 
1999), which, in turn, is often associated with age. In many domains of life, young adults are still 
in the process of acquiring the means and skills relevant for goal pursuit, such as the skills or 
knowledge needed in the professional/work domain or that needed to establish a long-term 
partnership and family. This might force young adults to focus more closely on the acquisition of 
skills or the process of goal pursuit. Middle-aged and older adults are more likely to have acquired 
most of the skills necessary to pursue their goals in both the work and the social domain and, 
thus, may be more likely to focus on the outcome of goal pursuit. Moreover, as Kanfer and 
Ackerman (2004) pointed out, skills can also be defined in terms of the balance between 
investment of resources and payoff. In the context of work-related motivational development 
during adulthood, they argued that the payoff for resource investment decreases with age, leading 
younger adults to be more focused on the process of resource investment and older adults to be 
more focused on the outcome. 
In sum, different literatures support opposing hypotheses regarding age-related 
differences in the extent of process and outcome goal focus. One purpose of the present study 
was to clarify which of these two alternative hypotheses is empirically supported in the context of 
the goal to start exercising regularly. 
Adaptiveness of process and outcome focus 
As mentioned above, in the skill-acquisition domain, the adaptiveness of goal focus has 
been proposed to vary with learning phase. Seijts and Latham (2005) posited that as long as the 
means and strategies of goal pursuit are not (yet) known or mastered, learning goals (as a 
manifestation of a process goal focus) should enhance performance because attention is focused 
on the means of goal pursuit, while focusing on performance (as a manifestation of outcome goal 
focus) might distract and thus hinder successful goal pursuit (see also Zimmerman & Kitsantas, 
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1999). But how do outcome and process focus affect goal pursuit and subjective well-being in 
other goal domains that are not related to the acquisition of new skills? One could argue that a 
strong and pervasive outcome focus fosters performance and goal achievement by providing 
clear criteria for judging whether the means are appropriate for achieving a given goal (Carver & 
Scheier, 1995). However, we propose that, in the long run, outcome focus might be detrimental 
to goal engagement and subjective well-being because outcome orientation focuses attention on 
the discrepancy between the actual and the goal state (outcome), which might result in negative 
affect and self-regard. Moreover, achieving a desired outcome often does not result in enduring 
satisfaction because there are always new (better) desired outcomes (e.g., a fancier car, a bigger 
house). Thus, outcome focus might lead to a “treadmill effect” in that satisfaction related to the 
attainment of one goal is soon offset by the need to achieve new goals (e.g., Loewenstein & 
Schkade, 1999).  
In contrast, process focus should promote more enduring engagement in goal pursuit, 
goal satisfaction, and subjective well-being when the very pursuit of a goal is positively valued. 
Process focus might offer opportunities for positive rewards throughout the entire process of 
goal pursuit and setbacks might therefore be experienced as less detrimental and frustrating 
(Locke & Latham, 2002). 
We therefore hypothesized that, independent of a person’s age, outcome focus would be 
related to lower levels of involvement and satisfaction with a goal as well as with lower optimism 
about reaching the goal, whereas process focus would be associated with higher levels of 
involvement and satisfaction with a goal as well as optimism about reaching the goal. 
Overview of the studies 
We conducted three studies to investigate the proposed age-related differences in goal 
focus in younger and older adults. Studies 1 and 2 were Internet-based studies assessing the 
preference for process versus outcome focus. Study 2 also included a “thinking exercise”, which 
focused attention either on the process or the outcome of pursuing a goal and a subsequent 
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measure of positive and negative affect, which allowed us to test for age differences in the 
consequences of goal focus. Study 3 addressed the question of age-related differences in goal 
focus in an everyday context, namely, in the context of pursuing the goal to start exercising 
regularly. We chose this context because starting to exercise regularly is a relatively frequent goal 
that is potentially relevant for both younger and older adults and thus suitable for a comparison 
of age groups (which can be difficult because younger and older adults often differ in the goals 
they pursue). Furthermore, process and outcome focus can be assessed easily by means of an 
evaluation of the participants’ reasons for exercising. Individuals might focus primarily on the 
outcomes associated with regular exercise (e.g., more defined muscles, weight loss) or they might 
focus more on the activities and means involved in the process of exercising (e.g., enjoying the 
physical activity, getting together with friends to exercise). 
Study 1: Preference for process versus outcome focus 
The main purpose of Study 1 was to test the hypothesis that there are age-related 
differences in goal focus. To our knowledge, no prior research has directly assessed goal focus. 
Therefore, in Study 1, we also aimed to develop a method of assessing goal focus. 
Method 
Sample. Participants were recruited via advertisements in Swiss Internet forums (e.g. 
seniors’ forums, University of Zurich students’ forums). Advertisements included a link to an 
online questionnaire, which was created and published using an online questionnaire tool 
(Surveymonkey; see www.surveymonkey. com). The sample consisted of 23 young adults (19-25 
years, M = 22.12, SD = 0.49; 75 % female; all students) and 20 older adults (57-78 years, M = 
65.90, SD = 6.49; 65 % female; 50 % with a college degree, 15 % retired). 
Measures. Participants first responded to basic demographic questions about their age, sex, 
and occupational status, and then to items on a measure of goal focus. This measure was 
modeled after Vallacher and Wegner’s (1989) questionnaire, which assesses level of action 
identification. More specifically, four goals (e.g., to quit smoking) were presented to participants, 
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one goal at a time. Each goal was described by ten statements, half of which described the goal in 
terms of a means of achieving it (i.e., process-related statements, e.g., throw away cigarettes, 
spend time with non-smokers), the other half in terms of outcomes (i.e., outcome-related 
statements, e.g., save money, improve health). For each goal, participants were to select five of 
the ten statements that, in their opinion, best described the goal. The dependent variable was 
participants’ process orientation as indexed by the mean number of process-related statements 
selected per goal (maximum 5) over the four goals (M = 2.12, SD = 1.12). Cronbach’s α for 
number of process-related statements selected across the four goals was .79. 
Results and discussion 
As predicted, the older adults showed greater process orientation (and, thus, less outcome 
orientation) than the younger adults did (see Figure 4). In addition, whereas the younger adults 
selected more outcome- than process-oriented goal descriptions, the older adults showed no such 
tendency. Univariate ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of age group on the mean 
number of process-related statements selected per goal (F(1, 41) = 5.41, p = .025). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Selected goal focus as a function of age (means, study 1) 
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The results of Study 1 provide initial evidence for age-related differences in preference for 
representing goals in terms of the goal-pursuit process as opposed to the outcome. Unlike older 
adults, younger adults showed a clear preference for outcome-related goal descriptions. As this is 
the first study addressing the question of age-related differences in goal focus, this finding needs  
to be replicated in order to ensure its robustness. Moreover, Study 1 did not address the question 
of the possible consequences of adopting a process or an outcome focus. Therefore, Study 2 
included indicators of affective well-being after participants had focused their attention on the 
goal-pursuit process versus the outcome. 
Study 2: Effects of goal focus on positive and negative affect 
Method 
Procedure. Participants were recruited via advertisements on various German and Swiss 
web pages and asked to follow the link to an online questionnaire. In the questionnaire, 
participants first responded to basic demographic questions concerning their age, sex, and 
occupational status, and then, on a 7-point scale, to two items concerning their general life 
satisfaction. Afterwards, they selected one of two “thinking exercises”, one focusing on the 
means (process choice), one focusing on the consequences of certain actions (outcome choice; 
see the Appendix D for English translation of German language instructions). Participants 
subsequently filled out a questionnaire on positive and negative emotions. This allowed us to 
examine whether process and outcome focus have differential emotional consequences for 
younger and older adults. As a token of our appreciation for their participation in the study, we 
raffled off 10 gift vouchers for a book or movie tickets (worth approximately $ 27). 
Sample. All participants who fell within the pre-defined age groups of young (18 to 23 years) 
or older adults (> 60 years) were included in the sample. This criterion resulted in 87 participants, 
with 47 younger adults (M = 21.49, SD = 1.64; 85 % female, 53.2 % students) and 40 older adults 
(60-88 years, M = 69.58, SD = 5.71; 43 % female, 45 % with a college degree, 72.5 % retired). 
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Measures. 
Preference for process versus outcome focus. To assess preference for process versus outcome 
focus, we asked participants to read introductions to two different “thinking exercises”: the 
introduction to Exercise A centered around ways of pursuing a goal, calling to mind that people 
pursue goals in different ways (process focus); that to Exercise B centered around the potential 
benefits of achieving a goal, calling to mind that people pursue goals for specific reasons 
(outcome focus). After reading the introductions, participants were asked to decide whether they 
wanted to do “Thinking Exercise A” (“which is about how we do the things we do”) or 
“Thinking Exercise B” (“which is about why we do the things we do”). The dependent variable 
was the selection made (Exercise A or B), which indicated the participant’s preference for 
focusing attention on the goal-pursuit process (A) or the outcome (B).  
Process versus outcome focus exercise. Participants performed the exercise they had selected. 
Those who selected the process-focus exercise were to list two successive means by which one 
could attain the goal of having a good vacation. Those who selected the outcome-focus exercise 
were to list two successive reasons one could have for having a good vacation. This exercise was 
modeled after a manipulation used by Freitas, Gollwitzer, and Trope (2004) to induce either an 
abstract or concrete mindset. 
Positive and negative affect. As a measure of current affect, the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, Tellegen, 1988) was administered. The PANAS consists of 10 
positive and 10 negative emotion adjectives. On a scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
much), participants indicated how well each of the adjectives described their current feelings. 
Scores for positive and negative affect were obtained by averaging the respective items. 
Cronbach’s α for positive affect was .86 (M = 4.54, SD = 1.01), for negative affect .81 (M = 1.89, 
SD = 0.84). Before the “thinking exercises” were presented, a single item was used to assess life 
satisfaction as an indicator of general well-being (7-point scale, M = 5.37, SD = 1.37). 
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Results and discussion 
Preference for outcome versus process focus. Replicating Study 1, a majority of the younger adults 
(29 of 47, or 61.7 %) selected the outcome-focused “thinking exercise”; this difference was 
marginally significant (χ2(1) = 2.47, p = .06). The older adults showed no preference for either 
type of exercise (50 % selected the outcome-, 50 % the process-focused exercise); this difference 
was not significant (χ2(1) = 0.27, p = .19).  
Affective consequences of goal focus. A 2 (Goal Focus: process vs. outcome focus; between-
subjects factor)   2 (Age Group: young vs. old; between-subjects factor) ANOVA was conducted 
with positive and negative affect as dependent variables. In order to control for general well-
being, life satisfaction was used as a covariate.  
To control for possible gender-related differences, sex was also included as a covariate. As 
predicted, performing the outcome-focused exercise elicited marginally lower positive affect (M 
= 4.41, SD = 0.96) than performing the process-focused exercise did (M = 4.71, SD = 1.07; F(1, 
81) = 1.82, p = .09, one-tailed). The main effect of goal focus on positive affect was qualified by a 
significant interaction with age group (F(1, 81) = 3.52, p = .03, one-tailed). Follow-up analyses 
showed that, for older adults, the process-focused exercise was followed by significantly higher 
positive affect (M = 5.07, SD = 0.72) than the outcome-focused exercise was (M = 4.32, SD = 
1.10; F(1, 38) = 6.51, p = .008). For younger adults, there was no such difference (F(1, 45) = 
0.32, p > .25).  
There was no significant main effect of goal focus on negative affect (process focus: M = 
1.78, SD = 0.80; outcome focus: M = 1.96, SD = 0.87; F(1, 81) = 0.59, p > .20, one-tailed). There 
was, however, a marginally significant interaction with age group (F(1, 84) = 2.61, p = .06). 
Follow-up analyses revealed that performing the outcome-focused exercise led to slightly higher 
negative affect in younger adults (M = 2.16, SD = 0.86) than in older adults (M = 1.67, SD = 
0.81; F(1, 38) = 1.33, p = .13). As for the process-focused exercise, there was no such difference 
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between younger (M = 1.86, SD = 0.85) and older adults (M = 1.71, SD = 0.77; F(1, 38) = 0.84, 
p = .43).  
Although failing statistical significance, the pattern of frequencies of participants choosing 
to perform an outcome- over a process-focused exercise were in the same direction as the results 
of Study 1 regarding a preference for outcome- or process-focused goal descriptions. Younger 
adults showed a clear preference for outcome focus and selected the process-focused exercise 
less frequently than older adults did. As this pattern is not statistically significant, however, 
further studies were needed to determine whether the effect of Study 1 could be replicated with 
another sample using a different operationalization of goal focus. This was one of the aims of 
Study 3.  
The main goal of Study 2 was to investigate the affective consequences of goal focus. We 
predicted that process focus would be more likely to be associated with emotional well-being 
than outcome focus would. Overall, the results confirmed our hypothesis. Focusing on the 
means of achieving a goal (process-focused “thinking exercise”) was related to higher subsequent 
positive affect than focusing on the outcomes was.15 Interestingly, as indicated by an interaction 
of age and goal focus, this effect held only for older adults, while younger adults showed no such 
differences. For younger adults, outcome focus – although more preferred – was related to 
higher subsequent negative affect. It seems, then, that younger adults do not only not profit – but 
are even harmed – by adopting their preferred outcome focus, while older adults profit by 
adopting their preferred process focus. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that younger 
                                                
5 Given that the conditions were randomly assigned, pre-existing individual differences in mood should be randomly 
distributed across the experimental groups and post-manipulation differences can be attributed to goal focus with 
some confidence. Moreover, controlling for general subjective well-being assessed before the manipulation should 
add to controlling for preexisting, trait-like individual differences in well-being that are correlated with positive and 
negative affect (in the case of this study, pre-manipulation well-being was correlated with post-manipulation positive 
affect (r = .27, p = .001), and with negative affect (r = –.38, p < .001). 
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adults experience a mismatch between their habitual (outcome) focus and the process focus 
adopted to perform a given exercise; this mismatch might counteract the positive effects of 
process focus that older adults experience. Younger adults might also more acutely experience 
the negative effects of outcome focus because their attention is usually constantly focused on the 
negative discrepancy between actual and goal state, this attention being due to their 
developmental tasks, which entail achieving certain outcomes (such as getting an educational 
degree, finding a job, selecting a partner). This interpretation is highly speculative and potential 
age-related effects on goal focus require further testing. As a further step in this direction, Study 
3 included the effects of goal focus on affective well-being and on goal-relevant variables such as 
perceived distance from the goal. 
Study 3: Goal focus in the context of a real-life goal 
The main purpose of Study 3 was to replicate and extend the results of the first two studies 
in the context of a personal goal that younger and older adults pursue in everyday life. As the 
target goal, we chose starting to exercise regularly because this is a relatively frequent goal of 
potential relevance for both younger and older adults. Holding goal content constant across age 
groups makes comparisons of goal focus across age groups easier than comparing goals that might 
differ in many other respects besides goal focus. Another reason for choosing the goal to begin 
exercising regularly was that outcome and process focus can be operationalized by evaluating the 
reasons for exercising (e.g., wanting to lose weight or reduce flabbiness as outcomes of exercising 
vs. enjoying the physical activity or getting together with friends for exercising as process-related 
aspects of exercising). Study 3 involved two measurement points approximately four months 
apart. This design allowed us to investigate the effect of goal focus on change in specific goal 
dimensions. We chose the interval of four months because a substantial number of beginners 
quit exercising after a few weeks or months (Wagner, 1999). Therefore, the first few months after 
starting to pursue the goal of exercising regularly should be particularly informative as regards 
individual differences influencing one’s adherence to the pursuit of this goal. 
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Method 
Procedure. The study consisted of two assessment sessions with an average interim of 4.2 
months (SD = 0.48). At each session, participants completed a set of questionnaires in small 
groups. At T1, participants were informed about the procedure of the study and signed an 
informed consent form. They then filled out a short demographic questionnaire and rated the 
goal of starting to exercise regularly on a number of dimensions. At T2, participants again rated 
their exercise goals and, in addition, reported how intensively they had exercised since T1 and 
whether they had given up pursuing the goal. At both assessment sessions, participants were also 
presented with a number of additional instruments that are not relevant here. At the end of each 
session, participants were debriefed, thanked, and received reimbursement (approximately $20). 
Sample. Participants were from a larger sample recruited from 28 sports facilities in Berlin, 
namely, from 14 fitness centers, three sports clubs, three university sports programs, and eight 
other public institutions offering sports classes with trainers (e.g., seniors’ centers). The 
requirements for initial recruitment were that the person: (a) was about to begin or had recently 
begun a sports activity at one of the above sports facilities; (b) had not regularly engaged in that 
sports activity for at least nine months; and (c) was either between 19 and 35 years or over 55 
years of age. About one third of the initial sample was recruited through posters and brochures 
distributed in the cooperating sports facilities (with information on the study, participation 
requirements, and contact persons). The majority of the initial sample was recruited in person at 
the end of exercise classes and at registration sites of university sport programs. Recruitment 
took five months, from September 1999 to January 2000. In the analyses reported in this paper, 
we have included only those participants of the initial sample that were comparable in age to the 
participants in Studies 1 and 2. Thus, 55 younger (19-25 years, M = 22.4, SD = 1.5) and 46 older 
(55–78 years, M = 63.8, SD = 5.1) adults were included. Of this sample 75% was female. As for 
highest level of education completed, 10.9% of the participants had graduated from junior high 
school (8th grade); 22.8% from secondary 
Part IV 
 108 
school level I (10th grade), and 57.4% from senior high school (12th or 13th grade), and 8.9% of 
the sample held a university degree. 
Instruments. 
Personal Goals (T1). At T1, participants used a 7-point scale to rate their goal of starting to 
exercise regularly on the following dimensions: (1) perceived distance to goal (M = 75.05, SD = 
1.45); (2) perceived attainability (M = 5.64, SD = 1.02); (3) goal involvement (M = 4.15, SD = 
0.75); (4) goal importance (M = 5.05, SD = 1.29); and (5) goal satisfaction (M = 5.24, SD = 1.27). 
Goal Focus (T1). Process and outcome goal focus were operationalized using two subscales 
derived from a scale by Silberstein, Striegel-Moor, Timko, and Rodin (1988) for assessing motives 
to exercise. Process focus was assessed by three items measuring enjoyment using a 5-point 
response scale (exercising in order to meet new people, to socialize with friends, to have fun; 
Cronbach’s α = .68; M = 3.48, SD = 0.88). Outcome focus was indexed by averaging across 
seven items assessing attractiveness, tone, and weight control (exercising in order to slim down, lose 
weight, improve one’s appearance, redistribute weight, become more sexually 
desirable/attractive; Cronbach’s α = .78; M = 2.98, SD = 0.92). Process and outcome focus were 
uncorrelated (r = .07, ns), indicating that, using this operationalization, process and outcome 
focus constitute independent constructs rather than opposite poles of a single dimension. 
Goal Pursuit (T2). At T2, participants again rated their exercise goal on the five dimensions 
mentioned above: (1) perceived distance to goal (M = 75.22, SD = 1.5); (2) perceived attainability 
(M = 5.64, SD = 1.02); (3) goal involvement (M = 4.15, SD = 0.75); (4) goal importance (M = 
5.05, SD = 1.29); and (5) goal satisfaction (M = 5.24, SD = 1.23). In addition, as indicators of 
goal pursuit, participants rated their exercise adherence using a 6-point scale by estimating (1) 
how frequently (M = 2.75, SD = 1.1) and (2) how regularly (M = 3.49, SD = 1.3) they had 
exercised since T1. 
Positive and negative affect. As an indicator of global subjective wellbeing, we used Steyer, et 
al.’s (1997) multidimensional affect-rating scale. This scale is comprised of a total of 24 adjectives 
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assessing positive mood, ease, and alertness as dimensions with positive valence, and negative mood, 
restlessness, and fatigue as dimensions with negative valence, whereby each dimension is indexed by 
four adjectives. At T2, participants indicated how often they had experienced each emotion 
during the previous four months – i.e., since T1 – on a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (very 
seldom) to 5 (very often). Subscale scores were calculated by summing the responses to the items of 
each of the six subscales. An aggregate score for positive affect was then computed by averaging 
the scores of the three subscales with positive valence (M = 13.8, SD = 2.5, Cronbach’s   = .91); 
an aggregate score for negative affect was computed by averaging the scores of the three 
subscales with negative valence (M = 10.4, SD = 2.8, Cronbach’s   =.89). 
Results 
In this section, we will first address age-related differences in goal focus and subsequently 
turn to testing the hypotheses regarding the adaptiveness of goal focus in terms of global 
subjective well-being and change in perceived goal attainability, distance, importance, 
involvement, and satisfaction, as well as self-reported goal pursuit (here, exercise adherence).  
Age-related differences in goal focus. Using a 2 (Goal Focus: process vs. outcome; within-subject 
factor)   2 (Age Group: young vs. old; between-subjects factor) ANOVA revealed the predicted 
significant interaction of age and goal focus (F(1, 97) = 5.74, p = .02). As can be seen in Figure 5, 
younger adults reported higher outcome focus (t(99) = 2.84, p = .01). However, the two age 
groups did not differ significantly in process focus (t(99) = 70.57, p =.57), for the goal to start 
exercising regularly. Probing further into the within-age-group differences in goal focus, follow-
up analyses revealed that, whereas younger adults did not show a significant difference between 
process and outcome focus (t(54) = 1.32, p > .19), older adults do report a significantly higher 
process than outcome focus (t(45) = 5.29, p < .001). 
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Figure 7: Goal focus as a function of age (means, 95 %-confidence intervals, Study 3) 
Adaptiveness of goal focus. Before testing the influence of goal focus on the outcome variables 
included in the present study, we tested for age-related differences. There was a non-significant 
tendency for older adults to report more positive emotions (Myoung = 13.5, SD = 2.19, Mold = 14.1, 
SD = 2.75; t(98) = 1.26, p =.21), and no age differences in self-reported negative affect (Myoung = 
10.6, SD = 2.5; Mold = 10.1, SD = 3.2; t(98) = 0.96, p = .34). Younger and older adults differed 
with respect to goal importance and involvement at T1 (all t(99) > 0.61, p ≤ .001), with older 
adults showing higher values. There were no age differences regarding distance, attainability, and 
satisfaction with goal at T1 (all t(99) < 0.28, p > .34). At T2, however, older adults showed higher 
scores on all of the goal variables (all t(98) > 2.7, p ≤ .008). Older and younger adults also 
differed with respect to self-reported frequency and regularity of goal pursuit (here, exercise 
frequency and regularity). As compared to the younger adults, older adults reported that they 
exercised somewhat more frequently (Myoung = 2.56, SD = 0.9, Mold = 2.98, SD = 1.2; t(98) = –
2.0, p < .05), and more regularly (Myoung = 3.09, SD = 1.32, Mold = 3.99, SD = 1.1), t(98) = –3.67, 
p < .001). To take these age-related differences into account, we included age by goal focus 
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interactions when predicting the adaptiveness of goal focus as indexed by positive and negative 
affect, goal variables, and subjective exercise frequency and regularity (see below). 
Mirroring the results from Study 2, goal focus proved to be related to positive affect at 
T2 (see Table 7 for a summary of the regression analysis results). As expected, process focus at 
T1 was associated with positive affect at T2, whereas outcome focus at T1 was not. In Study 3, 
unlike Study 2, time-lagged predictions also showed that process focus was negatively related to 
negative affect. Again, outcome focus did not predict negative affect. There was no indication of 
an interaction of goal focus with age in predicting positive affect (Fchange(2, 93) = 0.80, p = .45), or 
negative affect (Fchange(2, 93) = 1.38, p = .26). These results are consistent with the assumption 
that process focus contributes to feeling good (and not bad), while outcome focus is not 
associated with subjective well-being.  
 
Table 7: Process but not outcome focus as T1 predicts positive and negative affect at T2 (results of regression 
analyses) 
Criterion T2 Predictors T1 ß R2 (model) 
Positive Affect Outcome orientation –.06  
 Process orientation .29** .08** 
Negative Affect Outcome orientation .02  
 Process orientation –.21 .04* 
Notes: Regression models were run including sex and education as control variables, neither variable significantly 
contributed to the prediction of affect. *p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
In order to take individual differences in the goal variables at T1 into account, we 
examined how goal focus affects the change in the various goal variables. More specifically, to test 
the hypothesis that outcome focus is negatively related to measures of goal attainability, distance, 
importance, involvement, and satisfaction, a series of multiple regression analyses were 
conducted, regressing a goal measure of T2 on the respective goal measure at T1 as a first step, 
and then entering outcome and process focus as the second step, in order to obtain an estimate 
of the influence of goal focus on the change of goal measures over a period of four months. 
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Table 8 presents a summary of the results of the regression analyses. In support of our 
hypotheses, goal focus was significantly related to all of the goal dimensions; after controlling for 
goal dimensions at T1 (all R2 change ≥ .03, all Fchange(2, 95) ≥ 2.17, all ps ≤ .06). As expected, process 
focus was positively related to change in all of the goal ratings. Specifically, process focus was 
associated with a decrease in perceived distance to the goal and increases in attainability, 
involvement, and satisfaction. Only partially confirming our hypotheses, outcome focus was 
unrelated to change in distance to the goal and attainability. Consistent with expectations, 
however, outcome focus was related to decreases in goal involvement and satisfaction. The 
relationship of goal focus was not moderated by age. 
There were no significant interactions of age with goal focus (all R2 change ≥ .03, all Fchange(2, 
91) < 2.23, all ps > .11). Regression analysis was also used to test whether goal focus at T1 was 
related to self-rated goal pursuit at T2 (again, controlling for sex and education). Results show, 
again as expected, that self-reported exercise frequency at T2 was predicted by process focus at 
T1 (ß = 1.10, p < .01), but not by outcome focus at T1 (ß = –0.40, p = .27). There was a 
significant interaction of age and process focus (ß = –0.73, p < .01), but not for age and outcome 
focus (ß = 0.34, p = .14). For the last step of entering the interaction terms, Fchange was significant 
(Fchange(2, 93) = 5.88, p = .01). Self-reported regularity at T2 was also predicted by process focus at 
T1 (ß = 0.97, p = .05), but not by outcome focus at T1 (ß = –0.66, p = .15). There was a 
tendency for an interaction of age with process focus (ß = –0.52, p = .08), but not for outcome 
focus (ß = 0.46, p = .12). For the last step of entering the interaction terms, Fchange was only 
marginally significant (Fchange(2, 93) = 2.75, p =.07).  
The beneficial effects of process focus on measures of goal pursuit, then, are to some 
degree dependent on age. Follow-up regression analyses conducted separately for younger and 
older adults showed that, contrary to our hypotheses, process focus was only beneficial for 
younger adults regarding exercise frequency, again controlling for education and sex (ß = 0.39, p 
< .01, Fchange(2, 52) = 4.95, p = .01), but did not significantly predict exercise frequency in older 
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adults after controlling for sex and education (Fchange(2, 41) = 2.18, p = .13). The same pattern 
emerged for self-reported exercise regularity. Younger adults reported exercising more regularly 
when adopting a process focus, after controlling for education and sex (ß = 0.28, p < .05, Fchange(2, 
52) = 3.3, p < .05), whereas process focus failed to significantly predict how regularly older adults 
exercise (Fchange(2, 42) = 1.27, p = .29).  
 
Table 8: Longitudinal predictions of positive goal dimensions at T2 (controlling for T1) by process and outcome goal 
focus (T1): Results of regression analyses 
Criterion T2 Predictors T1  ß R2 (model) 
Distance to goal Distance to goal T1 
Outcome orientation 
Process orientation 
–.15 
–.06 
–.31** 
 
 
.15** 
Attainability Attainability T1 
Outcome orientation 
Process orientation 
.51** 
–.05 
.18* 
 
 
.35** 
Satisfaction Satisfaction T1 
Outcome orientation 
Process orientation 
.28** 
–.22* 
.21* 
 
 
.21** 
Involvement Involvement T1 
Outcome orientation 
Process orientation 
.40** 
–.18* 
.19* 
 
 
.23** 
Importance Importance T1 
Outcome orientation 
Process orientation 
.46** 
–.06 
.18* 
 
 
.28** 
Note: *p < .05; **p < .01. 
 
Taken together, the results of this study show the expected age-related differences in goal 
focus: While older adults were more likely to be process focused in pursuing their exercise-related 
goal, younger adults focused more on the outcome. Regardless of age, process focus contributed 
longitudinally to positive goal evaluations such as goal satisfaction or subjective distance to the 
goal. Fitting into this pattern of results, process focus was associated with higher positive and 
lower negative emotions for both age groups. However, a look at outcomes more closely related 
Part IV 
 114 
to actual goal performance revealed that it was particularly the younger age group that profited 
from a process focus on their exercise-related goal. Younger but not older adults reported higher 
exercise frequency and regularity when adopting a process focus. 
General Discussion 
The present paper presents, for the first time, converging evidence of age-related 
differences in process and outcome goal focus from three studies using different 
operationalizations of goal focus. Study 1 investigated preference for goal focus in the 
description of goals either in terms of their means (process focus) or their consequences 
(outcome focus). Study 2 assessed goal focus as the selection of one of two exercises (“thinking 
exercises”) that focus attention on either the means involved (process) or the related higher-order 
goals (outcomes). Finally, Study 3 used personal reasons for exercising to operationalize process 
and outcome focus. Across these different types of operationalizations, the pattern of results – 
although not statistically significant in Study 2 – suggests that younger adults show a preference 
for outcome over process goal focus and a lower process focus than older adults. For instance, in 
Study 3 younger adults reported a stronger focus on the outcome of their exercise goal (e.g., 
increased attractiveness) than older adults. Moreover, older adults reported a stronger focus on 
the process of goal pursuit (e.g., enjoying exercising) than on the outcome. This finding speaks 
against the hypothesis that older adults prefer to focus on tangible outcomes rather than on the 
continuous process of pursuing a goal. Note, that in the present study, the goal – starting to 
exercise regularly – was the same for younger and older adults. It is a goal that both age groups 
can achieve. Therefore, the age differences in goal focus found in the Study 3 cannot be 
attributed to differences in goals. 
Studies 2 and 3 addressed the question of whether outcome and process focus are 
differentially associated with goal-relevant outcomes. Both studies required online participation. 
Online studies are convenient for participants as they do not need to leave their home and come 
to the laboratory in the university to participate. For older adults, this might mean that even 
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people who are somewhat limited in their mobility due to health-related reasons or feel nervous 
about coming to a university, can easily participate in a study. These factors might increase the 
heterogeneity of the sample compared to a traditional study taking place in a laboratory. At the 
same time, however, one could argue that using the Internet is not as common among older 
adults leading to increased sample selectivity. In fact, when investigating the age-distribution of 
samples of online studies, older adults are clearly underrepresented (Reips, 2001). Regarding 
other characteristics such as IQ distribution, however, online samples seem to be highly 
representative (Reips, 2001). It seems, then, that advantages and disadvantages of online versus 
laboratory testing might cancel each other out. As is typical for laboratory studies too, the online 
studies reported here used convenience samples and generalizability is based on replications and 
the use of different methodology rather than representative samples.  
Study 2 provided initial evidence that process focus is related to positive affect, a finding 
that was replicated in Study 3. Contrary to Study 3, which did not reveal age-differential effects of 
goal focus on affect, Study 2 suggests that older adults might profit more from a process focus 
while younger adults might even be harmed when adopting an outcome focus. The two studies 
differ with respect to the relevance of the goal (not personally important in Study 2 vs. high 
personal importance in Study 3) as well as the time frame of these goals (minutes in Study 2, 
months in Study 3). Therefore, differences between these two studies might indicate the role of 
the kind of goal being pursued with a specific goal focus.  
Going beyond affective consequences of goal focus, Study 3 showed that, regardless of 
age, process focus was associated with a decrease in the distance to the goal over time, increased 
attainability, importance, and satisfaction as well as higher goal involvement over a period of four 
months. Process focus was also positively related to measures of goal pursuit (self-reported 
exercise frequency and regularity). In contrast, outcome focus was not or even negatively related 
to measures of positive evaluation of the goal and goal pursuit. This pattern of results suggests 
that, at least in the context of the goal to start exercising regularly, process focus is more adaptive 
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for various measures of subjective goal satisfaction and for goal pursuit. Interestingly, the positive 
effect of goal focus was not affected by age regarding subjective evaluations. Younger as well as 
older adults rated their goal to exercise regularly more favourably when adopting a process focus. 
Contrary to our hypotheses, however, younger adults profited more than older adults from a 
process focus with respect to measures of actual goal pursuit. Interestingly, then, in the context 
of exercise, younger adults are less likely to focus on the process although they profit particularly 
from such a focus for increasing goal-relevant behavior (viz., exercising frequently and regularly). 
It might be the case that stepping outside the box of their more typical way of pursuing goals, 
namely by focusing on the outcome, motivates younger adults more strongly to actually do 
something for their goals than it does older adults, who are more likely to go about their goals by 
focusing on the process. This is merely speculative at this point and warrants further testing.  
There are basically two complementary explanations for the age-related differences in 
goal focus. First, older adults may have learned through repeated experience that reaching goals, 
though important, leads to a hedonic treadmill that can only be counteracted by focusing on the 
process of goal pursuit instead of the consequences related to reaching one’s goal. Second, 
having reached or surpassed one’s personal asymptotic level in functioning, reaching new 
outcomes might become more and more difficult with increasing age. Focusing on the process 
instead of the outcome of a goal might help buffer against disappointment when not reaching the 
goal. In fact, attractiveness might be just one of these domains. Age differences might be less 
pronounced or even absent when considering a domain where younger and older adults do not 
differ regarding having reached the asymptote (see Ebner et al., 2006, for a similar approach for 
gain versus maintenance/loss orientation in goals). Further studies are needed to identify which 
of the factors associated with age-related differences contribute to an age-differential goal focus. 
Given that older adults are more likely to adopt a process than an outcome focus, this might 
contribute to continued positive involvement with goals and general well-being. Future studies 
need to address the question of generalizability of goal pursuit to other life domains. 
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One of the shortcomings of Study 3 is the indirect operationalization of goal focus via 
motives to exercise. One might argue that the specific motives we used for operationalizing 
process and outcome focus are themselves age-related. Wanting to work on losing or distributing 
weight might be a “young” motive for exercising, wanting to enjoy the work-out or doing 
something with friends could be seen as an “old” goal. We believe, however, that there is nothing 
inherently young in wanting to lose weight and nothing per se old in wanting to enjoy what one is 
doing. If these motives seem “young” or “old” to us, this might be the case because there is 
some socially shared expectation that younger adults are more outcome-focused in their goal 
pursuit than older adults, whom we might expect to be more process-oriented. To the best of our 
knowledge, there is currently no data available addressing the question of age-related expectations 
about goal focus. Moreover, the pattern of results regarding the preference for goal focus and the 
affective consequences converges with the results of Studies 1 and 2 using very different 
operationalizations of goal focus.  
In fact, one of the strengths of the present studies is that they involve different measures 
of goal focus, attesting to the robustness of findings across different modes of assessment and 
samples. While Studies 1 and 2 did not concern the participants’ personal goals, Study 3 involved 
a mini-longitudinal design in a real-life setting that was freely chosen by both age groups.  
To our knowledge, the present studies are the first to demonstrate age-related differences 
in process and outcome focus. As focusing on the process of goal pursuit seems to be more 
beneficial motivationally and emotionally, the stronger process focus in old age may be among 
the processes contributing to successful aging. 
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Abstract 
The present study investigated whether self-regulation improves across adulthood, especially 
regarding the mastery of setbacks and failure in an important health-related behavior, namely, 
staying on a low-calorie diet when overweight. N = 126 overweight women (19-77 years, M = 
47.2) filled out weekly questionnaires on the outcomes of behavioral, emotional, and cognitive 
self-regulation during a dieting program; outcomes included deviations from the diet, weight loss, 
affect, and rumination. Confirming hypotheses, multilevel analyses revealed that - even after 
controlling for prior dieting attempts - age was associated with better self-reported self-regulation 
(i.e., fewer deviations from the diet, lower disinhibition and rumination after failure, higher 
affective well-being), but not with more weight loss. Results suggest that self-regulation improves 
with age and shows positive effects on subjective indicators of successfully coping with setbacks, 
but does not directly influence the target-outcome weight loss. 
Keywords: Self-regulation, dieting, failure, rumination, health behavior  
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Introduction 
The successful pursuit of personal goals poses a multitude of challenges to self-
regulation (Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996). Consider, for example, a woman who needs to lose 
weight and therefore goes on a low-calorie diet. She has to inhibit her eating habits and withstand 
the temptations of the immediate reward of eating fatty and sweet foods. Even if she is 
successful in doing so, her progress towards her desired weight may be slow, especially if she is 
following recommendations for healthy and steady weight loss (National Institutes of Health, 
2003). The slow rate of progress towards her goal (Carver & Scheier, 1990) and the continuous 
behavioral inhibition (Herman & Polivy, 2004) might result in negative affect, which has to be 
regulated. Moreover, it is highly likely that, from time to time, she will fail to resist the temptation 
to eat food that is not on the diet plan. In turn, these failures might have a negative impact on 
her affective well-being because they threaten the goal of losing weight (Pomerantz et al., 2000). 
She also might feel that it reflects badly on her self-regulation skills, which might lead to 
rumination about dieting (Hart & Chiovari, 1998). Moreover, to recover from the lapse and 
proceed with the diet, she might feel the urge to compensate for the transgression and to stop 
ruminating, which requires additional self-regulation. How do people master the self-regulatory 
demands posed by complex health-related behaviors such as dieting? Do people learn self-
regulation skills over time so that they get better as they age? 
Self-regulation and aging 
Controlling thoughts, managing emotions, and overcoming unwanted behavioral 
impulses (such as eating tasty high-calorie food) all require self-regulation, that is, the capacity to 
alter one’s cognitive, emotional, or behavioral responses in the service of long-term goals (e.g., 
(losing weight; Baumeister et al., 2007). As people pursue long-term goals that require self-
regulation during adolescence and adulthood, they should acquire knowledge about and practice 
in self-regulation, that is, in staying on track when effort and persistence are required to pursue a 
difficult goal and overcome setbacks and obstacles on the way (Freund, Nikitin, & Ritter, 2009; 
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Wrosch & Freund, 2001). A second factor that might contribute to an improvement in self-
regulation across adulthood is the increase in the motivational orientation towards counteracting 
losses in the service of maintaining functioning across adulthood (Freund & Ebner, 2005). In a 
series of experiments, Freund (2006b) showed that, compared to younger adults, older adults are 
behaviorally more persistent when pursuing the goal to get back to a prior level of performance 
after encountering a loss. Similarly, Ebner et al. (2006) found that older adults report a higher 
level of orientation towards the maintenance of functioning and the prevention of losses than 
younger adults do, and that this goal orientation is related to higher affective well-being. 
Therefore, in the pursuit of goals, older adults might be more used to and practiced in dealing 
with setbacks and losses and thus not get as upset by them. As Freund’s (2006) results suggest, 
older adults seem to be more persistent in dealing with losses than younger adults. This might 
help them to maintain or restart health-related behaviors such as dieting even when weight loss 
stagnates or after having failed to adhere to the diet. 
Prior research is consistent with the assumption that self-regulation improves through 
practice. In a study by Muraven, Baumeister, and Tice (1999), college students exercised self-
regulation in one of three different domains. Over the course of two weeks, they either had to (1) 
monitor and improve their posture, (2) regulate their mood, or (3) monitor and record what they 
ate. As an independent measure of self-regulation, the authors tested hand-grip strength. In line 
with the hypothesized training of general-purpose self-regulatory skills through practice, 
participants’ hand-grip strength improved regardless of the specific training. Specifically, after 
depleting self-regulation through a thought-suppression exercise, people who had participated in 
any of the three training groups improved their subsequent hand-grip performance. Thus, prior 
exercise of self-regulation might have diminished the fatiguing of self-regulation, as expressed in 
the grip exercise. 
To our knowledge, there is no research on practice effects or age-related differences in 
the inhibition of unwanted impulses in the long-term pursuit of personal goals such as dieting. 
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Baumeister and Heatherton (1996), however, propose that a practice effect might explain that 
most people who try to give up smoking, reduce their caloric intake, or refrain from drugs, are 
successful in the long run (Schachter, 1982). Although this interpretation is plausible, the results 
could also simply reflect a purely stochastic effect, namely, that the overall probability of being 
successful necessarily increases with the number of attempts. In other words, there is a higher a 
priori chance of succeeding after multiple attempts (Schachter, 1982). Therefore, as a more 
stringent test of the practice effect, in the present research, we control for the number of prior 
dieting attempts when testing age-related effects on self-regulation in dieting.  
In contrast to the lack of research on changes in behavioral self-regulation in the context 
of goal pursuit, a vast amount of research on executive functioning suggests that older adults 
show restrictions in their ability to inhibit dominant but unwanted responses, such as reading a 
color-word instead of naming its color in a Stroop task (e.g., Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999; for a 
review, see Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002) and task-set switching (e.g., Kray & Lindenberger, 
2000). Results like these are often explained by the “frontal aging hypothesis” which suggests that 
those cognitive functions that are primarily localized in the prefrontal cortex are particularly 
affected by normal aging (e.g., Tisserand & Jolles, 2003; Treitz, Heyder, & Daum, 2007). 
Hofmann et al. (2009) have shown that it is exactly these kinds of cognitive functions (attention, 
inhibition) that contribute significantly to the impulse control of eating behavior. Accordingly, 
one might expect an age-related decline in the control of eating impulses. Note, however, that 
results on age-related changes in executive control usually stem from laboratory studies and 
investigate very basic behaviors that can easily be assessed using reaction time paradigms. Tasks 
typically used in the laboratory are mostly chosen for indexing inhibition in the clearest possible 
way rather than capturing the complexity of motivated behavior in the context of long-term goal 
pursuit. Attesting to the importance of motivational factors, studies show that performance 
differences between young and older adults decline when tasks are meaningful to older adults 
(e.g., Germain & Hess, 2007; Hess, Rosenberg, & Waters, 2000). Thus, the pursuit of highly 
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important goals might not be severely affected by age-related cognitive decline. In fact, there is 
some research showing that older adults’ increased competence in setting and pursuing personal 
goals might counteract the described resource losses (e.g., Bauer & McAdams, 2004; Freund et 
al., 2009; Riediger & Freund, 2006, 2008; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001). 
In a similar vein, there is a substantial number of studies providing evidence for age-
related improvements in emotion regulation. Older adults report more self-control over their 
emotions (Gross, Carstensen, Tsai, Götestam Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997; Lawton, Klebvan, 
Rajagopal, & Dean, 1992; Phillips, Henry, Hosie, & Milne, 2006). When negative affect is 
experimentally induced and adults are instructed to regulate their emotional experience or 
expression, they seem to outperform younger adults (Phillips, Henry, Hosie, & Milne, 2008; but 
see Kunzmann, Kupperbusch, & Levenson, 2005; Magai, Consedine, Krivoshekova, Kudadjie-
Gyamfi, & McPherson, 2006). Older adults also appear to experience negative emotions less 
frequently than but positive emotions just as often as younger adults, leading to an overall 
positive emotional balance (Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Charles, 
Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Kunzmann, 2008). There is also some evidence that a high level of 
arousal might be experienced negatively in older adults (Grühn & Scheibe, 2008; Keil & Freund, 
2009), which might motivate older adults to seek out less arousing positive emotions (Labouvie-
Vief & Marquez, 2004). Some researchers have proposed that positive changes in emotion 
regulation might reflect an increased psychological maturity in coping with stressful events (e.g., 
Folkman, Lazarus, Pimley, & Novacek, 1987; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001; Vaillant, 1977). In line 
with this assumption, Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields (2009) showed that regulating negative affect 
has lower costs for older than for younger adults as it impairs their performance in a working 
memory task less. Both maturity and an increased effectiveness in emotion regulation might 
reflect practice effects as older adults have typically encountered frequent occasions to exercise 
the management of negative emotional states over the lifespan.  
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Regarding age-related changes in cognitive self-regulation, namely the regulation of 
thought, there are currently two opposing perspectives: Some researchers suggest that there is 
age-related decline in the suppression of task-irrelevant thoughts (e.g., Arbuckle & Pushkar Gold, 
1993), while others propose that older adults experience fewer task-unrelated thought intrusions 
(Giambra, 1989) and report less ruminative thought than younger adults (Erskine, Kvavilashvili, 
Conway, & Myers, 2007). To our knowledge, there is no research investigating age-related 
differences in thought suppression in the context of pursuing long-term goals in everyday life. 
Assuming that people practice the monitoring of thoughts   including the suppression of 
unwanted, negative thoughts related to the pursuit of their goals   throughout adulthood, this 
aspect of self-regulation might also improve with age. Across adulthood, people might learn that 
getting upset about not achieving a goal as quickly as desired or that ruminating about setbacks is 
inefficient or even counterproductive and might have acquired strategies for focusing their 
attention on other aspects of the task that are more helpful for the maintenance of goal-relevant 
behavior and emotion regulation.  
In sum, then, four lines of research suggest that self-regulation might increase across 
adulthood, namely: (1) research on the practice effects of self-regulation, (2) research on 
increased motivation to counteract losses with age, (3) research on age-related increases in 
emotion regulation, and (4) research on accumulated experiences with the pursuit of long-term 
goals across adulthood. Therefore, our central hypothesis states that older adults exhibit better 
self-regulation skills than younger adults. These differences of self-regulation between younger 
and older adults should be evident in the self-regulation of behavior, emotion, and thought. 
Applying this hypothesis to a health-related behavior that requires high levels of self-regulation 
for extended periods of time as well as good skills in managing failure, namely dieting when 
overweight, we expect that older adults report fewer deviations from the diet and more 
compensation after lapses during dieting (instead of disinhibited eating in the sense of a “what 
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the hell” effect; Cochran & Tesser, 1996; Polivy & Herman, 1985). Consequently, during the diet, 
older adults should lose more weight than younger adults. When it comes to the regulation of 
emotions, older adults should report higher positive and less negative affect than younger adults 
during the course of dieting and especially less intense negative affective consequences after 
failure to adhere to the dietary requirements. Finally, older adults should report less rumination 
after lapses. If people are able to practice general self-regulation skills and apply them to different 
functional or life domains, positive age effects should be maintained even after controlling for 
prior dieting attempts.  
Method 
Dieting lends itself particularly well to the investigation of age-related differences in self-
regulation: First, there are adults of all ages who pursue the goal of losing weight. Although the 
specific motives for weight loss might differ between younger and older adults (O’Brien et al., 
2007), the strength of the motivation should be equal. Furthermore, reducing one’s weight seems 
to be a very difficult goal challenging different components of self-regulation over a long time. 
As its pursuit is often hampered by setbacks (Mann et al., 2007), dieting offers a way of 
investigating aspects of self-regulation pertaining to the mastery of difficulties and failure 
experiences during goal pursuit. Moreover, by measuring participants’ weight prior to and after 
the diet, it is possible to objectify the success of self-regulation. Finally, as the World Health 
Organization (2000) has declared that overweight and obesity have reached epidemic proportions 
globally and as overweight and obesity are followed by severe social, psychological, and health 
consequences (for a review, see Stroebe, 2008), we consider fostering and understanding self-
regulation during the pursuit of a weight-loss goal to be a valuable field of application for our 
research.  
Participants 
Overweight and obese women were invited to participate in a study on weight loss via 
advertisements in local newspapers. 126 women with a Body Mass Index (BMI; kg/m2; weight 
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and height self-reported) of 25 or over, the criterion for overweight as defined by the World 
Health Organization (2000), participated in the study. They were between 19 and 77 years (M = 
47.2, SD = 15.9), had an initial weight of 57 to 129 kg (M = 84.9, SD = 13.8), a BMI of 25 to 46 
kg/m2 (M = 31.6, SD = 5.0), reported having been overweight for 1 to 43 years (M = 13.8, SD = 
9.3), and intended to lose at least 2 kg. Forty-nine (39%) of them had completed the highest 
school track in Switzerland (Gymnasium).  
Procedure 
 Before starting the diet, participants came to a group meeting for an instruction session. 
These sessions took place in groups of 2 to 25 women. In the beginning, participants’ weight and 
height were measured. Afterwards, they received a book that explained the “Brigitte” diet in 
detail (Gerlach et al., 2007)1. This particular diet was chosen because an independent German 
consumer organization (“Stiftung Warentest,” 2005) recommended it as a healthy, balanced diet 
with a high probability of successful weight loss and subsequent stabilization. Participants were 
instructed to start dieting on the first Monday after the instruction sessions, which took place on 
Fridays and Saturdays. They agreed to adhere to the diet for six weeks. During the six weeks, 
every Saturday participants were to fill out a questionnaire, administered via Internet 
(www.limesurvey.org), about the preceding week. As a reminder, participants received e-mails 
with a link to the questionnaire every Saturday. To obtain an objective measure of weight loss, 
one week after the official end of the diet (i.e., about 7.5 weeks after the instruction session), 
participants were weighed. Finally, they received 70 Swiss francs (about $60) and the diet book 
for participating in the study. 
Measures 
The following predictors of self-regulatory outcomes were assessed once. 
Age. Chronological age was assessed with other sociodemographic variables in the first 
instruction session. 
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Prior dieting attempts. To assess this control variable, a single item asked participants to 
indicate how many dieting attempts they had made during the last two years. We restricted the 
time frame to the last two years as we did not expect participants with long histories of 
overweight to be able to make realistic estimates. Furthermore, we did not want this predictor to 
be highly correlated with chronological age while still reflecting a base rate indicating the 
probability of being successful in the long run. After the exclusion of an outlier who indicated 
100 attempts, the range of reported previous attempts was 0-20 (M = 2.3, SD = 3.1). 
The weekly web-based questionnaire measured the following outcomes of behavioral, 
emotional, and cognitive self-regulation. If not noted otherwise, rating scales ranged from 0 = not 
at all to 6 = very much. Descriptive statistics for all dependent variable measures as well as 
Cronbach’s alphas are displayed in Table 9. 
Deviations from diet. We assessed deviations from the diet with the single item “How much 
did you deviate from the dietary requirements during the last week?” 
Disinhibition after failure. We assessed disinhibition versus compensation after failure on a 
bipolar scale with six self-developed items (see Appendix B). As a dependent measure we 
calculated the average score for disinhibition over the six items. Higher scores on the scale 
indicate a tendency to show disinhibited eating after dieting lapses, whereas lower scores indicate 
compensation. 
Weight loss. Weight was measured objectively before and after the diet. Participants also 
indicated their current weight in the weekly questionnaires, so we were able to compute the 
difference between the previous week’s and the current weight as an indicator of weekly weight 
loss (in kg).  
The outcomes of emotion regulation were measured as follows.  
Positive and negative affect. Affective well-being was measured with a 12-item short version 
of the Multidimensional Mood Questionnaire (Steyer et al., 1997). It measures affective states on 
the dimensions mood, arousal, and vigilance, with four adjectives each. Participants indicated 
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how much they had felt these affects during the previous week (e.g., “content,” “rested,” “composed”). 
We computed two separate mean scores indicating the previous week’s average positive and 
negative affect for each measurement occasion encompassing only the positive or the negative 
items, respectively.  
Rumination after failure. Rumination after failure was measured with a 6-item questionnaire 
that was self-developed in accordance with Kuhl (1990). We calculated the average score for 
rumination over the six items. Higher scores on this dependent variable indicate a stronger 
tendency to ruminate about deviations from the dietary requirements (see Appendix A). 
Statistical analyses 
Due to the nested structure of the data (i.e., six measurement points at level 1 nested 
within N = 126 persons at level 2), multilevel regression was used for analyzing the data (linear 
mixed model procedure with SPSS 16). Restricted maximum likelihood parameter estimates 
(fixed intercept and slopes) were obtained by fitting multilevel regression models with first-order 
autoregressive residual covariance structures. This procedure seemed appropriate as residual 
variances were significantly correlated in all multilevel analyses (all ps ≤ .005). These correlations 
decreased the more temporally distant the assessed variables were from each other. 
The interpretation of the multilevel fixed effects shown is equivalent to that of parameter 
estimates in ordinary least squares regression. Due to the nature of our hypotheses, multilevel 
models included only fixed effects on the prediction of participants’ weekly reports of deviations 
from the diet, disinhibition, positive and negative affect, rumination after failure, and weight loss 
(level 1) by age and number of prior dieting attempts (level 2). We did not expect changes in self-
regulation over the short dieting period of six weeks. Therefore, we did not estimate the effect of 
time on outcomes of self-regulation. To avoid multicollinearity, predictors that were also 
included in interaction terms (age, deviations from diet, disinhibition) were grand-mean centered 
prior to analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Presented degrees of freedom are Satterthwaite-
approximated and rounded (SPSS, 2005). 
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Results 
Self-regulation of behavior  
As expected, age was negatively associated with deviations from the diet and disinhibition 
after failure as were number of previous dieting attempts (see Table 10). Contrary to expectation,  
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for dependent variable measures (aggregated over N = 126 participants and a maximum 
of six measurement occasions) 
 Min – Max M SD Cronbach’s alpha  
Deviations from diet 0.00 – 6.00 2.28 1.73 -  
Disinhibition 0.00 – 6.00 2.66 1.29 > .64  
Weekly weight loss in kga –10.00 – 9.80 0.64 1.20 -  
Positive affect 0.67 – 6.00 4.22 1.17 > .74  
Negative affect 0.00 – 5.67 1.41 1.28 > .86  
Rumination 0.00 – 5.33 2.58 1.26 > .68  
Note: aNegative values indicate weight gain. 
 
however, neither age nor number of previous dieting attempts had an effect on actual weight 
loss. This pattern of results was unexpected and somewhat paradoxical: Although, and as 
predicted, older adults show fewer deviations from the diet, they do not lose more weight. To 
follow up this finding by exploring age-related differences in the effects of reported deviations 
from the diet and actual weight, an additional multilevel analysis was conducted. It revealed a 
marginally significant interaction effect of Age × Deviations from the diet on weekly weight loss 
(Estimate = .003, SE = .00, p = .06; the model also included fixed effects of intercept, age, 
deviations, and number of previous dieting attempts on weekly weight loss). To compare the 
relation between deviations from the diet and actual weight loss in younger and older adults, we 
built two age groups through median split (n = 64 younger adults: 19-45 years, M = 33.6, SD = 
7.5; n = 62 older adults: 47-77 years, M = 61.3, SD = 7.6). Follow-up regression analyses revealed 
that, in younger adults, deviations from the diet accounted for 9% of the variance in actual 
weekly weight loss (p < .001), but only for 3% in older adults (p < .01). As these results indicate, 
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reported deviations were more closely related to actual weight loss in younger than in older 
adults.   
Table 10: Selected results from multilevel regression models: Estimates of fixed effects predicting deviations from 
diet, disinhibition, and weekly weight loss (N = 126, max. six assessments) 
 Deviations Disinhibition Weight loss 
Parameter Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p 
Intercept 3.46 
(.25) 
10.76 
(158) 
.000 3.55 
(.25) 
14.39  
(154) 
.000 .51 
(.15) 
3.35 
(210) 
.001 
Number of 
previous dieting 
attempts (2 yrs) 
.02 
(.01) 
1.65 
(143) 
.101 –.02 
(.01) 
–2.66  
(140) 
.009 .00 
(.01) 
.22 
(291) 
.830 
Age –.03 
(.01) 
–3.98 
(157) 
.000 –.02 
(.01) 
–3.98  
(157) 
.001 .00 
(.00) 
.80 
(207) 
.424 
Note. Bold values represent significant parameter estimates that are in line with the hypotheses. The predictor “age” 
was grand-mean centered before the analysis. The full models included two levels, namely, assessments nested within 
persons. Level 1 comprised assessments: Dependent Variable = ß0j + rij. Level 2 comprised persons: ß0j = γ00 + 
γ01Number of previous dieting attemptsij + γ02Ageij + u0j. 
 
Repeating the same analysis with disinhibition as a possible moderator did not reveal an 
interaction effect for Age × Disinhibition (Estimate = .00, SE = .00, p = .69; the model also 
included fixed effects of intercept, age, disinhibition, and number of previous dieting attempts on 
weekly weight loss as well as random effects for the intercept and residual). This indicates that, 
although deviations and disinhibition were correlated (r = .38, p < .001), they might have 
different functions for weight loss. This will be addressed in more detail in the discussion section.  
Self-regulation of affect  
 As shown in Tables 11 and 12, deviations from the diet affected both positive and 
negative affect in the expected directions. When controlling for the impact of number of 
previous dieting attempts, age was positively related to positive affect and negatively related to 
negative affect during the diet. There were no significant interaction effects of Age × Deviations 
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from diet on affect. Older and younger adults, then, did not differ in their affective reactions to 
deviations.  
Table 11: Selected results from multilevel regression models: Estimates of fixed effects predicting weekly positive 
affect, negative affect, and rumination (N = 126, max. six assessments) 
 Positive affect Negative affect Rumination 
Parameter Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p 
Intercept 4.14 
(.07) 
60.52 
(160) 
.000 1.47 
(.07) 
19.86 
(160) 
.000 2.70 
(.09) 
30.63 
(130) 
.000 
Number of 
previous dieting 
attempts (2 yrs) 
.02 
(.02) 
2.38 
(144) 
.019 –.01 
(.01) 
–1.57 
(145) 
.119 –.02 
(.01) 
–2.23 
(119) 
.028 
Age .02 
(.00) 
3.87 
(163) 
.000 –.02 
(.00) 
–3.91 
(163) 
.000 –.02 
(.01) 
–3.79 
(133) 
.000 
Deviations from 
diet 
–.07 
(.03) 
–2.29 
(558) 
.022 .07 
(.03) 
2.02 
(555) 
.044 .04 
(.02) 
1.70 
(520) 
.097 
Age×Deviations 
from diet 
.00 
(.00) 
–.79 
(543) 
.433 .00 
(.00) 
.14 
(537) 
.092 .00 
(.00) 
1.96 
(536) 
.051 
Note. Bold values represent significant parameter estimates that are in line with the hypotheses. The predictors “age” 
and “deviations from diet” were grand-mean centered before the analyses. The full models included two levels, 
namely, assessments nested within persons. Level 1 comprised assessments: Dependent Variable = ß0j + 
ß1jDeviations from diet + rij. Level 2 comprised persons: ß0j = γ00 + γ01Agej + γ 02Number of previous dieting 
attemptsij + u0j and ß1j = γ10 + γ11Agej + u1j. 
 
When repeating the analyses with disinhibition instead of deviations from the diet as a 
predictor, the pattern of results remained largely the same. Again, age was significantly positively 
associated with affective well-being, while the amount of disinhibition negatively affected 
affective well-being during the diet. Older and younger adults did not differ in their affective 
reactions to disinhibition.  
Self-regulation of thought  
 After controlling for the impact of number of previous dieting attempts, age was 
significantly negatively related to rumination after failure in both multilevel models including 
either deviations from the diet or disinhibition after failure as predictors. There was neither an  
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Table 12: Selected results from multilevel regression models: Estimates of fixed effects predicting weekly positive 
affect, negative affect, and rumination (N = 126, max. six assessments) 
 Positive affect Negative affect Rumination 
Parameter Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p Estimate 
(SE) 
t 
(approx df) 
p 
Intercept 4.16 
(.07) 
63.26 
(157) 
.000 1.46 
(.07) 
20.29 
(158) 
.000 2.66 
(.08) 
32.93 
(127) 
.000 
Number of 
previous dieting 
attempts (2 yrs) 
.01 
(.01) 
1.55 
(149) 
.122 –.01 
(.01) 
–.98 
(150) 
.328 .00 
(.01) 
–1.68 
(121) 
.097 
Age .02 
(.00) 
3.89 
(161) 
.000 –.02 
(.00) 
–3.90 
(162) 
.000 –.02 
(.00) 
–3.49 
(130) 
.001 
Disinhibition –.14 
(.04) 
–3.50 
(547) 
.000 .13 
(.04) 
2.98  
(544) 
.003 .22 
(.03) 
6.61 
(533) 
.000 
Age×Disin-     
hibition 
.00 
(.00) 
–1.37 
(556) 
.173 .00 
(.00) 
.30  
(553) 
.762 .00 
(.00) 
.80 
(525) 
.423 
Note. Bold values represent significant parameter estimates that are in line with the hypotheses. The predictors “age” 
and “disinhibition” were grand-mean centered before the analyses. The full models included two levels, namely, 
assessments nested within persons. Level 1 comprised assessments: Dependent Variable = ß0j + ß1jDisinhibitionj + 
rij. Level 2 comprised persons: ß0j = γ00 + γ01Agej + γ02 Number of previous dieting attemptsij + u0j and ß1j = γ10 + 
γ11Agej + u1j.  
 
interaction effect of Age × Deviations nor of Age × Disinhibition on how much rumination was 
reported (see Tables 11 and 12). Thus, there were no age differences in the self-regulation of 
thought after deviations from the diet or behavioral disinhibition.  
Discussion 
The present study supports the central hypothesis of this study: Older adults reported 
less deviations from the diet, less disinhibited eating after lapses, more positive affect, less 
negative affect, and less rumination after failure to adhere to the dietary requirements. We 
interpret this pattern of findings as an age-related increase in self-regulation regarding their eating 
behavior, affect, and thought during a low-calorie diet. The age-related difference in self-
regulation capacity could be due to accumulated experiences with a multitude of situations that 
challenge an individual’s self-regulation. As a consequence, practice effects might occur 
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(Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996) that could accumulate over the lifespan (Freund et al., 2009; 
Wrosch & Freund, 2001). Older adults may have learned strategies that help them to master 
difficult situations during goal pursuit. They may have learned to not attend to stimuli that 
impede the pursuit of their goals, for example, tasty food that does not meet the dietary demands 
(Hofmann et al., 2009; Peake, Hebl, & Mischel, 2002; Rodriguez, Mischel, & Shoda, 1989). Even 
if attentional control is likely to decline with age, older adults might be able to down-regulate 
their immediate affective reaction to stimuli like tempting food and inhibit unwanted responses 
such as eating fattening foods (Hofmann et al., 2009; Logan, 1997; Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999). 
Accordingly, they might experience themselves as successful during goal pursuit and report 
higher affective well-being. Older adults also reported less disinhibited eating after lapses and 
suffered less from rumination about their failure to adhere to the diet. This is in line with the idea 
that older adults are especially motivated to master setbacks and losses (Ebner et al., 2006; 
Freund, 2006b).  
Contrary to expectations, the improved self-regulation did not translate into more 
weight loss in older adults, although they reported higher behavioral control over eating behavior. 
This poses a problem for the present study as one could argue that older adults simply forget or 
ignore their dietary transgressions and hence feel happy without making actual progress towards 
their aspired weight loss. Regarding the affective experience, one could argue that, compared to 
younger adults, there is a disconnect between affect and goal attainment in older adults as they 
experience less negative affect in reactions to failure than younger adults. Goal theories maintain 
that negative affect is a necessary and adaptive reaction to setbacks because it provides feedback 
that the means employed to reach one’s goal are either not appropriate or insufficient, thereby 
fostering reorientation and the investment of more effort into goal pursuit (Carver & Scheier, 
1990; Martin et al., 1993). We argue, however, that the positive function of negative affect might 
be counteracted or even reversed in the case of failures in such long-term goals as dieting that 
require maintained efforts not to fall back into old habits, to resist temptation, and to deal with 
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fluctuations in the desired outcome (here, the aspired weight). Most people who embark on such 
a difficult endeavor deviate from their prescribed, new set of behaviors every now and then, and 
might experience less and less persistent progress towards their goal than they might have hoped 
for. In fact, the vast majority of participants (i.e., 122 out of 126 women) reported to have 
deviated from the diet over the course of study participation.  
Experiencing negative affect again and again in response to these lapses from the diet 
could undermine goal engagement. In fact, several studies have shown that emotional arousal is a 
common reason to disrupt dietary restraint (e.g., Baucom & Aiken, 1981; Herman, Polivy, Lank, 
& Heatherton, 1987; McKenna, 1972). According to Herman and Polivy (1975), negative affect 
might undermine the diet as coping with one’s mood might become more important than dietary 
success, thus taking attention and effort away from sticking to one’s diet. Moreover, 
unfortunately, eating is one way of coping with distress in restrained eaters – even if the distress 
might be caused by dietary failure itself. Referring back to the study by Scheibe and Blanchard-
Fields (2009), older adults appear to be more efficient emotion regulators of negative affect. 
These increased emotion-regulation skills might also have lead to lower levels of negative affect 
after failure in our study. According to Scheibe and Blanchard-Fields (2009), regulating affect is 
not as resource-demanding for older adults, which might enable them to pursue the concurrent 
goals of emotion regulation after failure and weight loss at the same time. Note also that the 
maintenance of a positive sense of competence and self in the face of failure to achieve one’s 
goals is at the heart of Heckhausen and colleagues’ motivational theory of life-span development 
(e.g., Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Heckhausen, Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010). As Heckhausen and 
colleagues stress, this might be particularly true in older adulthood.  
With the data of the present study, we cannot rule out the possibility that there is a 
disconnect between affect and goal attainment in older adults. This seems unlikely, however, as 
the association of goal attainment in other life domains such as starting to exercise regularly and 
affective well-being is just as high in older as in younger adulthood (Riediger & Freund, 2004). 
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Alternatively, there might be a disconnect between affect and goal pursuit. Older adults might not 
react as strongly as younger adults to the “emotional challenges” of the diet. Note, however, that 
emotional reactivity is just as high in older as it is in younger adulthood provided the event is 
self-involving (Kunzmann & Grühn, 2005). We assume that this is the case in the current study 
as older adults rated their weight loss goal as no less important than younger adults. Age was not 
negatively related to the importance of goal attainment (r = .10, p = .28). Moreover, age was 
unrelated to the intensity of anticipated positive affect from goal attainment (r = .06, p = .54). 
Finally, another alternative explanation could be that older adults rank higher the importance of 
emotion regulation than other – even personally important – goals such as losing weight.  
Unfortunately, in the current study no information was attained on the importance of emotion 
regulation. Further studies are needed to rule out this alternative explanation.  
The current study poses another interesting question: Why were older adults not more 
successful regarding actual weight loss? We submit that the reason might be one of a shifting 
caloric demand across adulthood, putting older adults in a more difficult position when it comes 
to weight loss. As the resting energy expenditure declines over the lifespan (Bosy-Westphal et al., 
2003), it is more difficult for older adults than for younger adults to lose weight. The maximum 
caloric intake of 1200 kcal/day was assigned to all dieters irrespective of age. Even though they 
adhered more strictly to this goal than younger adults did, the caloric intake relative to the resting 
energy expenditure might have been higher for older than for younger adults, leading to less 
weight loss. This interpretation is supported by the result that reported deviations from the diet 
were more closely related to actual weight loss in younger than in older adults. The increasing gap 
between self-reported self-regulation and actual weight loss, then, might be due to changes in 
resting energy expenditure over the lifespan. In other words, even if keeping more strictly to the 
prescriptions of the diet, older adults might be less successful because, on average, they burn 
fewer calories than younger adults do. In fact, that age was not negatively correlated to actual 
weight loss could even be interpreted as indicating better self-regulation of eating during the diet. 
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This suggestion, however, is highly speculative. Further empirical studies including the 
assessment of resting energy expenditure in younger and older adults are needed to test this 
possible explanation.  
Another unexpected finding concerns disinhibition, which did not emerge as a 
moderator of the relationship between age and weight loss. Despite its high face validity as an 
indicator of self-regulation, disinhibition was not strongly related to weight loss in general 
(Estimate = –.11, SE = .04, p < .01). To rule out that this is a reliability or validity issue of the 
present measure of disinhibition, we conducted further analyses exploring whether disinhibition 
predicts a prominent indicator of self-regulation included in the present study, namely, self-
efficacy. Attesting to its predictive power, disinhibition was significantly negatively related to the 
change in self-efficacy over the course of the six weeks of diet (Estimate = –.28, SE = .05, p < 
.001; 12-item measure by Schwarzer & Renner, 2000; Cronbach’s alphas at baseline and after the 
diet = .88 and .83, respectively). Interestingly, self-efficacy after dieting was positively correlated 
with weight loss (r = .48, p < .001). Disinhibition, then, seems to undermine one’s beliefs that 
one can successfully pursue a diet and thereby indirectly affect weight loss. 
Because the number of prior dieting attempts stochastically increases the likelihood of 
dieting success in the long run, we controlled for the number of previous dieting attempts. 
Number of previous dieting attempts only had an impact on disinhibition, positive affect, and 
negative affect (in multilevel models with deviations from the diet as predictor). This result 
speaks against a consistent practice effect of self-regulation skills in dieting. Another 
interpretation is that such task-specific skills might not be encompassing enough to help with the 
great variety of difficult situations that have to be mastered when going on a low-calorie diet. 
Limitations and suggestions for research  
Generally, the reported age effects are small (all significant Estimates = |.03-.02|). Note, 
however, that unlike many other age-comparative studies, we included a wide range of 58 adult 
years by examining participants from 19 to 77 years. This means that, for example, the difference 
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in self-reported deviations between the youngest and the oldest participant is 58*.03 = 1.74, 
corresponding to one SD of this measure. This is, in fact, a substantial difference. Note also that 
the common use of extreme group comparisons, such as when comparing young and older 
adults, leads to an overestimation of standardized effect sizes (Preacher, Rucker, MacCullum & 
Nicewander, 2005). 
Although we attempted to cover the entire adult life span, the oldest participant in our 
sample was only 77 years old. Hence, results cannot be applied to the oldest old. It might very 
well be that in the fourth age, self-regulation becomes seriously threatened by cognitive decline 
(e.g., inhibition). Furthermore, as study participation required women to be mobile enough to 
come to our laboratory and to be able to use a computer in order to read e-mails and answer a 
web-based survey, the sample is likely to be positively selected. Further research needs to extend 
the results by including a more heterogeneous sample with regard to health and education and 
the oldest old. 
Another limitation refers to the age-correlative design. In such designs, age effects are 
confounded with cohort effects (Baltes, 1968; Schaie, 1965). At present, there is no empirical data 
on cohort effects in self-regulation. There is no apparent reason, however, to assume that older 
cohorts have better self-regulation skills. On the contrary, external regulation of individual 
behavior through institutional structures seems to have weakened over historical time, thus 
necessitating more self-regulation (Freund et al., 2009). Such a weakening might favor the 
acquisition of self-regulation skills in younger cohorts and would have worked against finding the 
age-related effects in the present study.  
As discussed above, there is a gap between self-reported deviations from the diet and 
actual weight loss. This gap might be explained by changes in resting energy expenditure over the 
lifespan. However, without objective data on energy expenditure or eating behavior, it is 
impossible to refute the alternative explanation that older adults might have reported fewer 
deviations than actually took place. Deficits in remembering the number of transgressions or an 
Part V 
 138 
unwillingness to report them might contribute to such biased self-reports. To clarify this issue, it 
would be necessary and most interesting to include objective, behavioral data on energy 
expenditure and actual eating behavior in future studies. One possibility would be to combine a 
longitudinal self-report study on dieting with behavioral observations of dieters being confronted 
with tempting food. To rule out the possibility that older adults' higher affective well-being 
during the diet results from a disconnect between goal pursuit and affect, research would benefit 
from more event-based data on affective reactions to setbacks and on the importance of affect 
regulation as compared to the importance of the weight loss goals.  
Conclusion 
In sum, our study supports previous findings on age-related improvements in self-
regulation during the pursuit of personal goals (e.g., Riediger & Freund, 2006, 2008) such as 
weight loss. The reported improvement in the regulation of eating behavior, affect, and thought 
suggests that although laboratory research oftentimes shows decrements in executive control 
among older adults, complex behavior in the context of long-term goals is not necessarily 
impeded. Rather than that, older adults might be able to at least partly counteract such cognitive 
losses with an improved self-regulatory capacity. Accordingly, our findings contribute to the 
research showing that motivation is a domain of functioning in which gains are possible across 
adulthood.  
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OVERALL DISCUSSION 
 The present thesis has addressed three major topics: the adaptiveness of process and 
outcome goal focus (Parts I and II), the life-span development of goal focus (Parts III and IV), 
and the life-span development of self-regulation (Part V). Firstly, I would like to briefly 
summarize and integrate the most important findings (see also Table 13). Thereafter, I shall 
discuss the findings in regards to their theoretical implications and make suggestions for future 
research directions. Finally, I will propose practical implications of the findings and draw the final 
conclusions. 
Summary and integration of the main findings 
As reported in Part I, focusing on the process of dieting was directly and positively 
associated with self-regulation during a low-calorie diet and goal attainment. This was measured 
by weight loss. Additionally, process focus was indirectly related to higher subjective well-being 
and more successful weight loss via its positive association with self-regulation.  
 In Study 1 of Part II a process focus was positively related to both subjective well-being 
and to the intention of substituting means instead of outcomes after failure. Nevertheless, the 
intention to substitute means did not mediate the positive association of process focus and 
subjective well-being. Study 2 exemplified that in the context of dieting, process-related 
attributions were positively related to subjective well-being, the tendency to substitute means 
(compensation vs. disinhibition) after failure, and goal attainment, which was measured by weight 
loss. However, the results of Study 2 were not completely compatible with our hypotheses 
because either only attributions of success, or the combination of high attributions of both failure 
and success exhibited an impact on disinhibition, subjective well-being, and weight loss. 
Nevertheless, if process focus had an effect, it was always positive. 
Part III reviewed the concept of goal focus from a life-span developmental perspective. 
We discussed why personal goals remain important across the entire adult life span, even though 
they may change in content and in their orientation from promoting gains to preventing losses. 
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We hypothesized that it is a result of the changing goal orientation, the resource losses, and the 
shortening of future time perspective associated with older age that the representation of goals in 
older age changes from outcome to process focus.  
Part IV provided multi-method empirical evidence for our hypothesized age-differences 
in goal focus. Overall, younger adults were more outcome-focused than older adults (Studies 1 
and 2), who in turn, were more process-focused (Study 3). Additionally, our research suggests 
that process focus was beneficial and outcome focus maladaptive for affective well-being (Study 
2, 3). Process focus made a positive effect on many goal variables, such as participants’ perceived 
distance to their exercising goal, goal attainability, goal satisfaction, goal involvement, and goal 
importance. Outcome focus was either not influential or negatively associated with goal 
satisfaction and goal involvement. Surprisingly, a process focus supported only younger adults’ 
goal-directed behavior (Study 3). 
Finally, Part V investigated age differences in self-regulation during a low-calorie diet. As 
predicted, older women reported more successful self-regulation of behavior, affect, and thought 
during goal pursuit than younger women. More specifically, they reported less deviations from 
the diet and less disinhibited eating behavior, less rumination about lapses, and feelings of higher 
subjective well-being during goal pursuit. Nevertheless, older women did not lose more weight. 
This may be due to their lower level of resting energy expenditure.  
As a result of these findings, the following four conclusions may be drawn: First, process 
focus was often positively associated with self-regulation, goal attainment and subjective well-
being. Second, if outcome focus was correlated with self-regulation, goal attainment and 
subjective well-being, then the correlation was negative. Third, if age was related to goal focus, 
then it appeared to be associated with a shift from outcome to process focus across the adult life 
span. Fourth, age had a positive effect on self-regulation and subjective well-being during the 
pursuit of a weight loss goal.  
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Table 13: Summary of results 
Hypothesis IV/Predictor DV/Criterion Hypothesis confirmed? 
Part I, Context: Weight loss goal 
A strong process focus is positively 
related to affective well-being. 
Relative process 
focus  
Positive affect   
Negative affect 
Only indirect via self-
regulation  
A stronger process focus is positively 
related to self-regulation. 
Relative process 
focus 
Rumination 
Disinhibition 
Deviations from diet 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
A stronger process focus is positively 
related to goal attainment. 
Relative process 
focus 
Weight loss Yes 
Part II, Study 1, Context: Idiosyncratic 
A strong process focus is positively 
related to subjective well-being. 
Relative process 
focus 
Positive affect 
Life satisfaction 
Yes 
Yes 
A strong process focus is positively 
related to means instead of outcome 
substitution after failure. 
Relative process 
focus 
Means vs. outcome 
substitution 
Yes 
Means vs. outcome substitution after 
failure mediates the positive relation 
between process focus and subjective 
well-being. 
Relative process 
focus            
Means vs. 
outcome 
substitution 
(Mediator) 
Positive affect 
Life satisfaction 
No 
No 
Part II, Study 2, Context: Weight loss goal 
Strong process-related attributions of 
failure are positively related to 
affective well-being. 
Relative process-
related attributions 
of failure  
Positive affect 
 
Only in combination with 
strong process-related 
attributions of success 
Strong process-related attributions of 
failure are positively related to means 
instead of outcome substitution after 
failure. 
Relative process-
related attributions 
of failure  
Disinhibition vs. 
Compensation 
No 
Strong process-related attributions of 
failure are positively related to goal 
attainment. 
Relative process-
related attributions 
of failure (and 
success) 
Weight loss Only in combination with 
strong process-related 
attributions of success 
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Continuation of Table 13: Summary of results 
Hypotheses IV/Predictor DV/Criterion Hypothesis confirmed? 
Part IV, Study 1, Context: Various goals 
Younger adults focus on the 
outcome.  
Yes 
Older adults focus on the process. 
Age group (young 
vs. old) 
Process focus and 
outcome focus 
No tendency for either 
focus 
Part IV, Study 2, Context: Thinking exercise (vacation goal) 
Younger adults focus on the 
outcome.  
Older adults focus on the process. 
Age group (young 
vs. old) 
Process focus and 
outcome focus 
Yes 
 
No tendency for either 
focus 
Process focus increases positive 
affect.  
Outcome focus increases negative 
affect. 
Process focus and 
outcome focus 
Positive affect 
Negative affect 
Only in older adults 
 
 
Only in younger adults 
Part IV, Study 3, Context: Exercising goal 
Younger adults focus on the 
outcome.  
Age group (young 
vs. old) 
Process focus and 
outcome focus 
No tendency for either 
focus 
Older adults focus on the process. 
  
Yes 
Process focus predicts an increase in 
affective well-being and subjective 
indicators of successful goal pursuit.  
Process focus and 
outcome focus 
Yes 
Yes 
 
Outcome focus predicts a decrease in 
affective well-being and subjective 
indicators of successful goal pursuit. 
 
Positive affect 
Negative affect 
Various goal variables: 
distance to goal, 
attainability, satisfaction, 
involvement, 
importance 
Partly 
Process focus is beneficial for goal 
attainment. 
Exercise frequency 
Exercise regularity 
Only for younger adults       
Only for younger adults 
Outcome focus is maladaptive for 
goal attainment. 
Process focus and 
outcome focus 
Exercise frequency 
Exercise regularity 
No 
No 
Part V, Context: Weight loss goal 
Self-regulation during goal pursuit 
improves across adulthood. 
Age Deviations 
Disinhibition 
Rumination 
Positive/negative affect                        
Weight loss 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
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Mechanisms of the adaptiveness of process focus 
In the present thesis, different operationalizations of goal focus were used. Outcome 
focus was operationalized via individuals’ attributions of success and failure to the outcome (Part 
II, Study 2), by asking how much individuals think about the positive effects of outcome 
attainment (Part I, Part II, Study 1, Part III, Studies 1, 2), and by assessing how much goal 
pursuit was driven by a person’s commitment to its desired outcomes (Part III, Study 3). Process 
focus was operationalized via individuals’ attributions of success and failure to the means (Part II, 
Study 2), by asking how much individuals think about what they can do to pursue their goals 
(Part I, Part II, Study 1, Part III, Studies 1, 2), and by assessing how much goal pursuit was 
driven by a person’s commitment to its means (Part III, Study 3). These alternative 
operationalizations have provided converging evidence for the adaptiveness of process focus for 
self-regulation as compared to outcome focus and captured different mechanisms. The various 
operationalizations that we incorporated in this work have functioned to capture different 
mechanisms of goal pursuit. They also highlight the necessity of deeper investigation into the 
mechanisms, which, in turn, render each aspect of process focus and outcome focus as adaptive 
or maladaptive, respectively. 
Discrepancies between states or actions 
 First, I would like to emphasize that an outcome focus is detrimental: it draws an 
individual’s attention to the discrepancy between the actual and the desired outcome state but not 
to discrepancies in actions, for example, the representation of what still needs to be done and 
which means need to be implemented in order to attain the goal. The detrimental effect of an 
outcome focus mechanism has best been captured in studies that operationalized process focus 
as how much individuals consider what they can do to pursue their goals and outcome focus as 
how much individuals consider the desired end state (Part I; Part II, Study 1; Part III, Studies 1 
and 2). The operationalization via attributions of success and failure that referred to the process 
and to the outcome have clearly alluded to perceived discrepancies between the actual and the 
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desired state (outcome-related attributions) as compared to perceived discrepancies in actions 
(process-related attributions; Part II, Study 2). How could the perception of discrepancies 
between states be less adaptive than the perceived discrepancies between actions? 
 Many theories of motivation assume that people are motivated to pursue their goals simply 
because they perceive a discrepancy between their actual state and the desired outcome state. 
Discrepancy theories of motivation predict that in order to reduce this discrepancy people will 
take the necessary actions. For example, Carver and Scheier’s cybernetic control model (e.g., 
1981, 1990, 1998) posits that people monitor their rate of discrepancy reduction towards the 
desired end state. If goal progress is below a criterion that refers to an acceptable or desired rate 
of behavioral discrepancy reduction, then, negative affect arises; consequently, actions are taken 
to reduce the negative affect and to speed up discrepancy reduction. If goal progress exceeds the 
criterion, then, positive affect arises and motivation to pursue further action decreases.6 Other 
discrepancy theorists of motivation have also concluded that perceiving the discrepancy between 
the actual state and the desired state as salient results in an increase in an individual’s motivation 
to pursue a goal (e.g., Higgins, 1987; Hull, 1934; Lewin, 1938, 1951; Locke & Latham, 1990; 
Miller et al., 1960).  
 If creating a discrepancy towards a desired outcome and placing greater value on the 
outcome state increases motivation, then how can an outcome focus be maladaptive? I posit that 
in addition to being comprised of the perception of a discrepancy between the actual and the 
desired outcome state, and by a high desirability of the outcome state, successful goal-directed 
behavior also requires the cognitive representation of a discrepancy on the level of means. That 
is, a discrepancy between what has been previously done in order to pursue the goal and what 
still needs to be done in the future to reach the goal. Accordingly, possessing a process focus and 
                                                
6 This might hold in particular in a multiple goal context, when people have to allocate their resources between 
different goals at a time (Fishbach & Dhar, 2003; Fishbach, 2009). 
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focusing on means that can and need to be used in order to pursue the goal should be more 
beneficial than using an outcome focus. 
 The claim that it is not beneficial to focus on the discrepancy between the actual state and 
the goal end state without also pondering representations of the means to overcome the 
discrepancy is in agreement with the results presented in the thesis. It is also in line with Kuhl’s 
theory of action vs. state orientation (1985). This theory distinguishes between two regulatory 
states during goal pursuit: First, in an action orientation state people focus on a fully developed 
action structure. This action structure includes both the discrepancy between a present state and 
a desired future state and the action alternatives, which may transform the present state into the 
future state. In contrast, a state orientation is characterized by thoughts about some particular state 
that may be the present state, a past state, a future state, or even absentmindedness. Therefore, a 
state orientation entails incomplete representations of the intentional action structure; it does not 
include a representation of actions that can lead from the current state to the desired outcome 
state. If only a discrepancy between states is represented and this discrepancy is not traced back 
to the need for specific behaviors to reduce it, then effective goal pursuit may be impeded (see 
Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994). 
Fantasizing about outcome attainment 
 In this thesis outcome focus has on average not been operationalized directly as the 
perception of a discrepancy between the actual and the outcome state. Nevertheless, this work 
has captured how much people reflect upon what it would be like for them if the discrepancy 
between the actual state and the goal end state were to be reduced (Part I; Part II, Study 1; Part 
III, Studies 1, 2). This operationalization captures a second mechanism that might render an 
outcome focus maladaptive, namely, fantasizing about future outcome goal achievements. As 
research pertaining to fantasy suggests (Oettingen & Hagenah, 2005; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002; 
Oettingen & Thorpe, 2006), people who fantasize about how great achieving a desired outcome 
will exhibit low motivation to actually engage in goal pursuit. This may be a result of their 
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fantasies serving as substitutions for actual goal attainment. Hence, imagining outcome 
attainment may, in actuality, impede the “call to action” needed to reduce discrepancy. This line 
of reasoning is also supported by research pertaining to the maladaptive effects of outcome focus 
in mental simulations (Pham and Taylor, 1999). Moreover, Goodhart (1986) has also reported the 
negative effects resulting from positive task-related thoughts or images on actual performance in 
an anagram task (in contrast to negative task-related thoughts). However, such negative effects 
were only observed in people who had not been asked to judge their past performance prior to 
solving the task and who in turn did not make inferences about the expectancy of outcome 
attainment. Obviously, merely thinking about how great outcome attainment could possibly be 
has positive effects on subsequent affect but such fantasy does not lead to instrumental behavior. 
However, outcome thinking might lead to instrumental behavior if it involves considering not 
only the outcome value but also outcome expectancy. If expectancy of outcome attainment is 
pondered, then people might be influenced to also start thinking about the road to success. 
Accordingly, people may make preparations for possible future setbacks and obstacles. In sum,  
thinking about outcome attainment may lead to effortful action and successful performance 
when it is based on expectancy judgments. In contrast, positive fantasies about future outcome 
attainments could impede effortful action and successful performance (Oettingen & Hagenah, 
2005; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002; Oettingen & Thorpe, 2006). 
Delay of gratification and intrinsic vs. extrinsic motivation 
In Study 3 of Part IV, process focus has been operationalized by using a third type of 
methodology, namely, assessing how much individuals value the means of goal pursuit and are 
committed to them (e.g., having fun during exercising), as compared to the outcomes of goal 
attainment (e.g., weight loss). Our results evidenced that valuing the means and seeking 
enjoyment during the process of goal pursuit exhibited more positive effects on goal involvement 
and actual goal pursuit than by merely placing primary value on the future outcomes of goal 
attainment. This result converges with research on extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation (Deci & 
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Ryan, 1985; Kruglanski, 1975; Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996). If people are extrinsically 
motivated, then the reward for which they are aiming is contingent upon successful completion 
of the actions necessary for goal attainment. If people are intrinsically motivated, then the reward 
is an inherent part of engaging in the goal-directed action. As previously mentioned, being 
intrinsically motivated oftentimes leads to voluntary involvement, more interest in the goal, and 
higher persistence in a task (Deci et al., 1999; Krapp, 2005, Lepper, 1981). 
 Additionally, individuals who are able to value the process do not have to delay 
gratification (Mischel et al., 1996; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989). In contrast, if the 
outcome is valued higher than the process, then gratification occurs only when the outcome is 
achieved. Until this takes place, one must be able to delay gratification. Since goal pursuit usually 
extends over longer periods than the effects of outcome attainment (Frederick & Loewenstein, 
1999), being able to appreciate the path towards the eventual goal attainment should save an 
individual from short-term temptations that are in conflict with the long-term gratification 
involved in outcome attainment.  
 An outcome focus might be maladaptive because of the following three reasons: First, 
perceiving a discrepancy between the present and the desired outcome state alone may not result 
in instrumental behavior. This may be the case if it is not accompanied by both the perception of 
discrepancy on the level of means and a contemplation of how to overcome state discrepancies. 
Second, an outcome focus might also be maladaptive because it can lead to fantasizing about goal 
attainment; however, this can serve as a substitution, which hinders people from putting real 
effort into goal pursuit (Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Third, undoubtedly, being committed to the 
outcome without valuing the means requires the delay of gratification whereas being able to value 
the process more than outcome can result in the aforementioned beneficial effects of intrinsic 
motivation, for it does not require the delay of gratification. As a consequence, pursuing goals 
with a process focus in mind should require less self-regulation than pursuing goals with an 
outcome focus. 
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Determinants of the adaptiveness of process versus outcome focus 
Thus far, we have discussed various mechanisms that might render a process focus more 
beneficial than an outcome focus. Nevertheless, the maladaptiveness of outcome focus or the 
adaptiveness of  process focus may be determined by alternative factors. This leads us to the 
following inquiry: Which moderators or context variables influence the adaptiveness of either 
focus?  
Time orientation 
Until now, we have characterized outcome focus as a focus on the goal-related outcomes 
that one wishes to attain in the future. However, it is possible for an individual to also focus on 
outcomes or subgoals that have already been attained in the past. Contrastingly, rather than 
thinking about the discrepancy of the actual and the desired state, it is possible for one to pay 
attention to what has previously been accomplished, i.e., the discrepancy between a past state and 
the current state that has already been overcome. Does one’s time orientation produce 
differences pertaining to the effect that outcome focus produces on self-regulation? I propose 
that it is receiving feedback regarding what has already been attained (e.g., “You have reached 50 
% of your exercise goal.”), as opposed to receiving feedback on the distance to achieving a 
desired end state (e.g., “You are 50 % away from your exercise goal.”) that results in a greater 
reduction in motivation. According to Amir and Ariely (2008), reaching a subgoal may generate a 
sense of achievement and be followed by a period of complacency. This sense of achievement in 
the face of a subgoal acquisition would not be generated in alternative conditions, in which the 
distance to the end state is the main focus of one’s attention.  
Similarly, when people attend to processes of goal pursuit, they are also able to choose to 
focus either on the remaining actions or, on the already completed actions. Koo and Fishbach 
(2010) propose the following: Focusing on the remaining actions increases one’s motivation to 
reach a more advanced level whereas placing one’s focus on already completed (vs. remaining) 
actions increases the satisfaction derived from the current position. Based on their previous 
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research, Fishbach and colleagues (Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006; Koo & Fishbach, 2008) 
argue that placing an emphasis on the remaining actions that are needed helps individuals to 
direct their attention towards making progress, for this leads to a desire to “move up in the goal 
ladder.” In contrast, placing an emphasis on already completed actions influences individuals to 
focus on their commitment to the current goal because they infer commitment from their past 
investment of effort, and as a consequence desire to repeat the present goal level. Therefore, 
focusing on actions awaiting completion may lead to higher performance than focusing on 
previously completed actions.  
Action phase 
The results of this thesis have attested to the adaptiveness of process focus during the 
pursuit of personal goals. Nevertheless, a process focus might not be most adaptive for goal setting. 
In order to choose the correct goal, it is necessary to compare both the desirability and 
attainability of one goals end result with another goal’s end result. Accordingly, when setting 
goals, having an outcome focus might be more beneficial (see also Gollwitzer, 1996; Gollwitzer, 
et al., 1990). 
Rigidity of goal focus 
Our results suggest that process thinking seems to foster self-regulation, yet this relation 
might not be linear. Having a very strong or rigid process focus might not be adaptive. This is 
reflected in the following proverb: “Not seeing the forest for the trees”, which means focusing 
on the single steps of goal pursuit whilst forgoing the “big picture.” This can influence 
individuals to lose track of where they are heading and lead them to pursue goals, which might 
not even be desirable or attainable anymore. In contrast, re-evaluating the desirability and the 
attainability of a goal’s outcome at various intervals could ensure that the chosen path still points 
in the correct direction. Even though concrete means or subgoals might be a strong guide for 
actions, in contrast to an outcome focus, they might lack the ability to provide an individual with 
a sense of purpose, meaning or direction in life (see also Little, 1989; Klinger, 1977). 
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In addition, a rigid process focus might put people in danger of failing to meet deadlines 
for achieving their desired outcome. For example, a person might fail to recognize that the day of 
an exam is fast approaching because he or she is completely absorbed in activities, such as, 
planning the best way to prepare, collecting material, and reviewing various learning strategies.  
Task aversiveness 
Thinking about means without keeping “the prize” in mind might reduce motivation when 
the means of goal pursuit are highly aversive. During situations, in which procrastination occurs, 
it might be useful to consider aversive means primarily as means to an end (Blunt & Pychyl, 
2000).  
The structure of the goal system 
Interestingly, if process attributions of failure foster means substitution after failure, their 
adaptiveness might only exist as long as the goal system offers the possibility to substitute a 
current means. Hence, it is only in situations, in which equifinality is implied in the means-
outcome-interconnection that it becomes possible for an individual to benefit from focusing on 
the means level. Otherwise, focusing on the level of outcomes and then determining other 
desirable and more attainable outcomes becomes necessary (see also Wrosch et al., 2003; Wrosch 
et al., 2007).  
Future research directions 
A difference score for relative process focus. In Parts I and II, we have operationalized goal focus 
as the relative focus on the process as compared to the outcome. We have calculated a difference 
score indicating an individuals’ relative process focus. Accordingly, we level out the main effects 
of outcome and process focus as separate variables to investigate the effects of a discrepancy in 
goal focus. From a theoretical viewpoint, we consider this to be the most straightforward 
approach to the data. We have expected that process and outcome focus are positively related. 
Theoretically, activation spreads within a goal system, both top-down from the outcomes to the 
means, as well as bottom-up from the means to the outcomes (Shah & Kruglanski, 2002; 2003). 
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Hence, thinking about means should to some degree co-activate thinking about outcomes and 
vice versa. Our data confirms this expectation: In the dieting study presented in Parts I and II, 
outcome and process focus were positively correlated with r = .73 (p < .001), process and 
outcome attributions of failure were correlated with r = .61 (p < .001), and process and outcome 
attributions of success were correlated with r = .60 (p < .001). In Study 1 of Part II, outcome and 
process focus were correlated with r = .56 (p < .001). We expect the overall level of activation of 
means and outcomes to primarily reflect the importance of the target goal at a given time. As a 
consequence, individuals who score high on both their outcome and their process focus may be 
successful in self-regulating their goal-directed behavior just because their goal is very important 
to them. In contrast, individuals who score low on both their outcome and their process focus 
may not be successful in self-regulating their goal-directed behavior just because their goal is not 
very important to them at all. Accordingly, instead of looking at these relatively uninteresting 
high process/high outcome focus and low process/low outcome focus combinations, we wanted 
to concentrate primarily on the high process/low outcome focus and the low process/high 
outcome focus combinations by calculating a score for an individual’s relative process focus. Our 
question was: To which degree is having a stronger process than outcome focus beneficial for 
self-regulation and subjective well-being? 
 Difference scores have been criticized for being less reliable than their component scores 
(e.g., Johns, 1981; Lord, 1958; but see Ragosa & Willet, 1983). Accordingly, even though using 
the difference score is well justified from a theoretical perspective, we may consider other 
methodological approaches in the future. Peter, Churchill, and Brown (1993) have proposed two 
alternatives to the use of difference scores. First, they recommend to use a direct comparison 
operationalization of the proposed difference score construct. For example, Tse and Wilton 
(1988, p. 206) asked participants to rate how closely a product did come to their expectation 
instead of using a difference score between the participants’ expected and actual satisfaction with 
the product. Howeover, we think that individuals usually do not think about the extent to which 
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they focus on the process more than on the outcome. Consequently, asking them to mentally 
consider an arithmetic difference between the two foci themselves could produce an artifical and 
even more unreliable measure. Second, Peter et al. recommend the reframing of research 
questions to avoid using difference scores. This recommendation might be a more useful 
approach to our data. For example, it might be interesting to investigate the extent to which a 
process focus adds incrementally to the prediction of self-regulation by outcome focus. This way, 
we could partial out the correlation of process and outcome focus by using hierarchical 
regression analyses and adding outcome focus and process focus stepwise as separate predictors.  
However, as a final note on this topic, we would like to maintain that the difference 
scores we used as indicators for goal focus seem to be reliable over time (Cronbach’s alpha for 
relative process focus in the dieting study = .71; for relative process-related attributions of failure 
= .78, for relative process-related attributions of success = .85). Hence, they might not suffer 
from reliability issues to a huge extent. 
Social-cognitive paradigms. It is imperative to emphasize that particular portions of this thesis 
(Parts I and II) are based on correlational designs that investigated the associations between goal 
focus, self-regulation, and subjective well-being. Accordingly, we cannot simply infer causal 
effects. However, as already mentioned, previous research suggests that if individuals are in a 
positive mood, receive success feedback, and perceive goal pursuit as easy, then they tend to 
adopt an outcome or generally more abstract focus (Basso, Schefft, Ris, & Dember, 1996; Gasper 
& Clore, 2002; Ketelaar & Clore, unpublished, cited after Clore et al., 2001; Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989; Wegner & Vallacher, 1986). In contrast, when goal pursuit is perceived as difficult, negative 
feedback is given, and negative affect arises, then people tend to switch their focus from an 
outcome to a process focus. Nevertheless, more experimental studies are needed in order to 
replicate these findings, which could lend further support to the hypothesis that process, not 
outcome focus leads to both instrumental self-regulatory behavior and higher subjective well-
being during goal pursuit.  
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Future experimental research should apply social-cognitive paradigms that capture 
different stages of information processing. Besides the work presented in this thesis, we have 
already started the search for appropriate paradigms that can manipulate or capture participants’ 
goal focus and its cognitive, behavioral and affective consequences. For example, we have used a 
paradigm that captured how much participants attended to means- versus outcome-related 
information before they were to decide between two different trainings of cognitive ability. We 
have also used paradigms to capture the cognitive accessibility of means versus outcomes: In an 
incidental memory paradigm, participants had to recall actions they previously had categorized as 
either means to a goal or desired outcomes of a goal (for a discussion of incidental memory 
performance as a measure of cognitive accessibility, see Anderson & Bower, 1972). Moreover, we 
have used a fluency measure as an indicator of goal focus, when asking participants to generate 
either means or desired outcomes of their personal goals and counting the number of means- 
versus outcome-related responses. To target the higher behavioral level of social-cognitive 
information processing, we have also combined priming paradigms with forced-choice 
attribution and decision making tasks. In a very elaborate study, we investigated the 
consequences of age and goal focus after failure in the goal to improve one’s social competence. 
Goal focus was primed by asking young (n = 43, 20-29 years, M = 22.1, SD = 2.2), middle-aged 
(n = 11, 45-55 years, M = 51.0, SD = 3.2) and old participants (n = 11, 65-80 years, M = 72.3, SD 
= 5.1) to name either means (process focus) or desired outcomes (outcome focus) of improving 
one’s social competence. In a pilot study, this manipulation had significant effects on goal focus 
as measured with the questionnaire also used in Study 1 of Part IV (F(1,86) = 4.89, p = .03). 
After the manipulation, participants started a training of social competence, in which two 
outcomes (improving social speed and social accuracy) could be attained by two means (training 
methods) each. During the pursuit of the first outcome with the first training method, failure was 
induced. Attribution of failure was assessed by letting the participants decide on the reason for 
their failure, whether a) the method was not useful for improving social accuracy (attribution to 
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the means) or b) improving social accuracy is a difficult goal to pursue (attribution to the 
outcome). To assess behavioral reactions, participants decided to either continue pursuing the 
same goal with another means (means substitution) or to pursue another goal instead (outcome 
substitution). Positive affect (Steyer et al., 1997) was assessed to test the hypothesis that the 
substitution of means is less detrimental to well being than outcome substitution and the 
disengagement from the target outcome. The results showed that two goal focus measures (the 
goal focus questionnaire and a more specific, domain-related measure) were not reliable for the 
measurement of a change in goal focus, rather an unwanted interaction of the questionnaire 
version with the goal focus manipulation has been found (F(1,58) = 4.67, p < .05).  
 So far, the experimental manipulations and measures of goal focus have not yielded 
reliable results. Nevertheless, we view the results presented in this thesis as encouraging. This 
dissertation thesis may establish the basis for a future experimental research program dedicated 
to investigating the effects of goal focus on self-regulation. 
Process and outcome focus across the life span 
Until now, the common view regarding action or goal representations has implied that 
people usually focus more on the outcomes of their behavior than on the processes (Vallacher & 
Wegner, 1989). However, the present thesis provides evidence that this position entails an 
oversimplification, which is due to research involving only young research participants. Parts III 
and IV attest that older adults are more process- than outcome-focused.  
The adaptiveness of process focus across the life span 
Interestingly, the evidence produced by this thesis suggests that younger adults’ focus on 
outcomes proved to be maladaptive. In contrast, a process focus was generally more adaptive 
when people pursued goals, such as, losing weight or starting a regular exercise program. In Study 
3 of Part IV, younger adults benefitted more than older adults from possessing a process focus. 
Thus, the following question, from a functional perspective, emerges: Why would younger adults 
adopt a goal focus that is not beneficial?  
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As previously argued, the developmental tasks of young adults are especially outcome-
oriented, e.g., younger adults can aim to finish university with a certain degree, find a job, find a 
partner, or build a house. Before being able to pursue these goals, younger adults are faced with 
many important life decisions. They have to decide which course of studies they would like to 
pursue, in which field they would like to work, or which town they would like to live in. The 
outcomes that they consider as desirable and attainable will shape their subsequent lives. 
Accordingly, setting “correct” goals is essential in young adulthood. During goal setting, people 
focus on the outcomes of possible goals, their positive and negative consequences on the short- 
and the long-term, as well as the likelihood of the goal being attained in the future (Gollwitzer, 
1990; Gollwitzer et al., 1990). Hence, younger adults stronger outcome focus may not only result 
from the developmental tasks ahead of them but could also be adaptive when choosing the 
particular outcomes that fulfill these tasks in the best possible way. Typically, older adults do not 
have to make such important life decisions anymore, and they seem to continue on the life paths 
that they have selected in the past. Perhaps, a process focus is most adaptive in the pursuit of 
goals. Contrastingly, when setting goals, an outcome focus might be more important. 
Finally, I would like to stress that the present research does not only examine age-
differences in goal focus, but it also points to the importance of not relying on student samples 
when trying to make inferences on the population. The idea that within-person processes can be 
studied in samples of students (Johnson, 2010) cannot be accepted, unless researchers can be sure 
that individual characteristics such as age do not interact with the variables being studied. As we 
have shown in Part IV, both goal foci have differential consequences in younger, as opposed to 
older adults.  
Future research directions 
In Part III, the effects of age on goal focus and the mechanisms that might drive the shift 
from outcome to process focus in old age have been discussed. Several mechanisms that explain 
this shift in goal focus have been proposed, namely, resource restrictions, a restricted future life 
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perspective, and changing goal orientation from one of promoting gains to one of preventing 
losses (or from change to stability). Insofar, the present work has provided a firm theoretical 
basis for investigating these mechanisms in more detail; it has not provided empirical support for 
these mechanisms. This shortcoming could be addressed in future research as follows:  
First, the effects of future time perspective on goal focus could be investigated by 
manipulating future time perspective (e.g., Fredrickson & Carstensen, 1990; Fung, Carstensen, & 
Lutz, 1999). If future time perspective is one of the driving forces behind the shift from outcome 
to process focus in old age, then a process focus should also be more predominant in younger 
adults with a short future time perspective whereas an outcome focus should be predominant in 
older adults with a more extended future time perspective. Second, the role of resource 
availability should be investigated. Would younger adults also be more process-focused when 
they perceive their personal resources as constrained? The evidence from a study by Vallacher et 
al. (1989) already points in this direction, though facing a task with high technical difficulty may 
not have the same effects on goal focus as the subjective perception of low personal resources. 
Another area for further exploration is goal orientation towards promoting gains versus 
compensating losses and how goal orientation might be manipulated, e.g., by having participants 
pursue goals that are framed in the respective goal orientation (e.g., Freund, 2006b). 
Self-regulation across the life span 
The present thesis has adopted a life-span approach to the study of self-regulation. It has 
shown that older adults are more process-focused than younger adults and that this goal focus is 
generally beneficial for self-regulation during the pursuit of personal goals. Aside from the 
beneficial effects of age on goal focus and subsequent self-regulation, it suggests that self-
regulation might be a domain, in which gains in old age are still possible. This result is in line with 
one of the central tenets of life-span developmental psychology, that is, the tenet of 
multidirectionality (Baltes, 1987): Although functional losses in old age might be inevitable in 
some domains, such as, physical health or fluid intelligence (Baltes, 1997; Salthouse, 1991; Schaie, 
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1995), self-regulation appears to improve into the third age. In the section that follows, I shall 
discuss why self-regulation is so important for successful development in general and especially 
in old age. 
The importance of self-regulation for developmental regulation 
Models of developmental regulation strongly emphasize the personal agency (Baltes & 
Baltes, 1986; Baltes et al., 1998; Brandstädter, 1998; Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981) and the 
context-sensitive flexibility (e.g., Heckhausen, 1999; Brandstädter & Renner, 1990) by which 
people adapt to changes in their life-course opportunities. The model of selective optimization 
with compensation (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Freund, 2007; Freund & Baltes, 1998), the dual-
process model of assimilative and accommodative coping (Brandstädter, 2006; Brandstädter & 
Renner, 1990), as well as the life-span theory of control (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; more 
recently advanced as the motivational theory of life-span development: Heckhausen et al., 2010) 
all share the assumption that people adapt to changes in opportunity structures and resource 
constraints presented during their life-course. Individuals do this by anticipating opportunities, 
implementing strategies of goal engagement, disengaging from goals that have become too costly, 
and by replacing them with other, more attainable goals. These three models primarily focus on 
developmental goals that are relatively abstract and long-term goals such as “becoming a lawyer” 
or “having a family” (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1998).  
To reiterate, the pursuit of long-term goals requires self-regulation, that is, the capacity to 
control one’s thoughts, to manage one’s emotions, to overcome one’s unwanted impulses, to fix 
one’s attention to the goals that should guide one’s behavior, and to make choices (Baumeister et 
al., 2007). Accordingly, self-regulation and developmental regulation are closely intertwined by 
the setting and pursuit of personal goals. Goal-directed behavior, such as, the compensation of 
lapses, the optimization of goal pursuit, or the loss-based selection of other goals (Baltes & 
Baltes, 1990; Freund & Baltes, 1998) all draw on the capacity to self-regulate (Baumeister et al., 
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2007). In other words, self-regulation is a prerequisite for goal pursuit in the service of 
developmental regulation (see also Wrosch & Freund, 2001).  
 Why might self-regulation be especially important in old age? As Freund et al. (2009) 
have stated developmental regulation has an external component outside of the “self.” In 
addition to being controlled by the agentic self, developmental regulation is also controlled by the 
external world’s social norms and expectations. When external control is high, the agentic self 
does not have to (or cannot) play its leading role in development. In childhood, adolescence, 
young and middle adulthood, external regulation may have a strong impact on how people set 
and pursue personal goals via social norms and expectations. For example, organizational 
structures reinforce successful goal attainment with external incentive structures, such as, 
promotions, salary increases, or appreciation by supervisors. In young adulthood social norms 
and expectations strongly guide the selection and pursuit of goals. Conversely, there is a stronger 
emphasis on involvement in rather poorly defined life domains after retirement. In domains, such 
as, leisure and social relations, there exist fewer social expectations pertaining to the kind of goals 
an adult should attain, as well as little external reinforcement (or punishment) by external 
incentive structures. As external control decreases in old age, older adults have to play a more 
active role, in order to compensate for the lack of social structures and norms after retirement; 
self-regulation becomes especially important for successful developmental regulation in old age 
(see also Wrosch & Freund, 2001; Freund et al., 2009).   
 Self-regulatory processes may be especially important in old age because they help older 
adults to adapt to age-related resource losses (e.g., functional declines or chronic diseases; Baltes, 
1987; Brock, Guralnick, & Brody, 1990; Wrosch & Freund, 2001). Resilience in old age can be 
achieved when the effects of resource losses are counteracted by the use of self-regulatory 
processes. This can result in the protection of an individual’s subjective well-being or the 
perception of internal control (Lachman, 1986; Ryff, 1989; Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Freund & 
Baltes, 1998; Wrosch et al., 2000). 
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Mediators of the effect of age on self-regulation  
Self-regulation in old age is not only very important. As Part V has shown, but it also 
works very well, even better than it does in younger adulthood. This empirical evidence forms a 
strong argument that older adults’ possess the ability to compensate for the loss of external 
control that is seen in late adulthood. Mechanisms that may lead to the improvement of self-
regulation in old age have already been discussed in Part V. It is imperative to explore these 
mechanisms in more detail and to propose additional variables that mediate the effects of age on 
self-regulation.  
Executive functions. One possible mediating mechanism for the effects of age on self-
regulation, which has already been addressed in Part V, is inhibitory control. We have inferred 
from previous research dedicated to executive functions that the ability to inhibit responses 
declines in old age (Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). However, the attainment of long-term goals 
should depend more on an individual’s motivation for goal pursuit and other context-dependent 
moderators than on task performance in a test of executive functions. Hence, self-regulation 
during long-term goal pursuit should not be entirely predictable by using measurements obtained 
from tests of  inhibitory executive functions. A recent study by Hofmann et al. (2009) attests that 
measures of attention control and inhibitory control do not correlate with self-regulating eating 
behavior (r = –.02 and .06, respectively). However, affect regulation has proven to be a crucial 
factor that suppresses the negative effects of inhibitory control on self-regulation to withstand 
the temptation presented by delicious food (see also Nederkoorn, Houben, Hofmann, Roefs, & 
Jansen, 2010). Older adults are very successful in regulating their affect (e.g., Gross et al., 1997; 
Phillips et al., 2006; Scheibe & Blanchard-Fields, 2009). Accordingly, if they are motivated to do 
so, then they might be able to compensate for their decline in executive functions. Hence, affect 
regulation should not only be considered as a component of self-regulation (Baumeister et al., 
2007) that is relatively unaffected (or even improved) by age; it should also be considered as a 
moderator of the effects of inhibitory control on self-regulation.  
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Self-regulation also includes deliberative strategic efforts that are initially devised to avoid 
situations, in which a person must rely on his or her inhibitory capacity to avoid tempting 
situations, e.g., by planning grocery shopping more intensely. By using this strategy, older adults 
may compensate for the decline in their executive functions. The use of such compensatory 
strategies could moderate the effects of executive functions on self-regulation in old age. 
In summary, future studies should address the role of executive functions in a more 
systematic fashion, e.g., by investigating how well results from tests of executive functioning 
predict self-regulation during long-term goal pursuit. Specifically, moderators that influence the 
contributions of executive functions on self-regulation need to be identified, in order to shed 
light on the mechanisms older adults use for compensating losses in their executive functioning. 
Practice. As discussed in Part V, practice effects of self-regulation might also mediate the 
positive influence of age on self-regulation (Muraven et al., 1999). Research on executive 
functions also suggests that inhibition can be trained in older people (Dahlin, Nyberg, Backman, 
& Neely, 2008). Unfortunately, we cannot directly test the contribution made by practice effects. 
In Part V, we assessed prior dieting attempts within the last two years, in order to obtain a 
measure that is uncorrelated with age. However, this measure may reflect short-lived practice 
effects. Indeed, the study produced evidence that dieting attempts within the last two years were 
positively related to rumination after lapses, disinhibition after lapses, and positive affect during 
the diet. 
Goal orientation. An individual needs to be motivated to set and pursue a goal that requires 
self-regulation. As suggested by Ebner et al. (2006), personal goal orientation to either promote 
gains, or balance losses plays an important role for setting personal goals. As Freund (2006b) 
discovered, there are age-differences in engagement during goal pursuit. These age differences 
depend on whether gains can be achieved, or if compensatory processes to counteract losses are 
required. We have argued that older adults’ stronger motivation to counteract losses is one 
mechanism that promotes successful compensation and self-regulation after lapses (Ebner et al., 
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2006; Freund, 2006b). In a similar way then, should (younger adults’) motivation to achieve gains 
promote self-regulation when possible gains loom. Accordingly, younger adults might be 
especially motivated to self-regulate their thought, affect, and behavior when goal pursuit requires 
primarily optimization processes whereas older adults might be especially motivated to self-
regulate their thought, affect, and behavior when goal pursuit requires compensatory processes 
(Freund, 2006b). 
Goal focus. Parts I through IV suggest, that process goal focus may also mediate the 
positive age effect on self-regulation during goal pursuit. As reported in Parts III and IV, older 
adults are more process-focused than younger adults.  
Future time perspective. Does the age-related shortening of future time perspective have an 
effect on self-regulation across the adult lifespan? Undoubtedly, delay of gratification is essential 
for self-regulation and requires the mental representation of a future, in which one can become 
gratified (Mischel et al., 1996; Mischel et al., 1989; Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999). This leads me to the 
following question: Could a short future time perspective in old age impair self-regulation during 
goal pursuit? 
This is doubtful because of the following reasons: It is unlikely that older adults, unless 
they are severely ill, have a future time perspective that is so short that it does not allow for the 
pursuit of personal goals. Across adulthood goals might change in their content (Carstensen et 
al., 1999), but older adults do pursue personal, long-term goals (Freund & Riediger, 2006) that 
often require the delay of gratification. Older adults might intentionally set and pursue goals that 
help to increase their future time perspective, that is, in the domains of health and physical 
functioning. Hence, the shortening of future time perspective in old age may increase the 
motivation to delay gratification for the sake of such goals. Due to the enormous increase of life 
expectancy during the past 160 years (Oeppen & Vaupel, 2002), the third and fourth age provide 
much more time for the pursuit of long-term goals that requires self-regulation (Freund et al., 
2009).  
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Future research directions 
Field studies have high ecological validity for the study of self-regulation. Nevertheless, 
this methodology lacks the controllability of experimental research. Thus, it is important to 
combine experimental research with longitudinal field studies in domains that are relevant to 
older adults. However, this poses a methodological challenge because it requires the comparison 
of behavioral, affective, and cognitive self-regulation between younger and older adults during 
goal pursuit under the premise that goals change across the adult life span. In order to generalize 
our results from the dieting study to the general population, it would be necessary to identify 
more goal domains that allow for the comparison of younger, middle-aged, and older adults. 
Investigating other health- or leisure-related goals (e.g., exercising) that are pursued by younger, 
middle-aged, and older adults might prove useful for this purpose. Measurement invariance is the 
extent to which items or tests have the same meaning across groups of examinees (Horn & 
McArdle, 2002), and should also be considered when choosing techniques for the assessment of 
self-regulatory processes. Finally, as already discussed in Part V, longitudinal studies should 
exclude the confounding of age and cohort effects on self-regulation.  
Practical implications 
This thesis contributes to basic research on self-regulation during goal pursuit. It entails 
two findings with strong practical implications: First, when people pursue personal goals they 
benefit from focusing on the means of goal pursuit rather than on the outcomes. Second, self-
regulation seems to be improved with practice (see also Muraven et al., 1999). How can these 
findings be practically applied? 
 If a process focus is more adaptive for goal pursuit, then institutions that accompany 
people who are pursuing goals should make use of this result. For example, weight loss programs 
should try to influence dieters to think about the means of dieting rather than imagining how 
great being slimmer would be. However, no such useful manipulations of goal focus for dieting 
programs have yet been developed; nonetheless, this might be a useful task for the future. 
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Evidence from an educational research perspective suggests that students’ process focus can be 
strengthened by relatively simple mental simulations (Pham & Taylor, 1999), and that such 
mental simulations of the processes involved in goal pursuit have a positive impact on 
performance. Furthermore, feedback that is given during goal pursuit should evaluate the means 
of goal pursuit rather than only identifying the subgoals that already have been attained (see also 
Amir & Ariely, 2008). As presented in Part II, attributions of both success and failure to the 
means of goal pursuit foster goal attainment. Organizations and educational institutions should 
consider this empirical evidence in the future, in order to improve the performance of those who 
receive feedback. 
If self-regulation can be enhanced by practice, then this has strong implications. For 
example, people who have repeatedly attempted to quit smoking, lose weight, or maintain an 
exercise regime should be encouraged (individually or institutionally) to not give up on such goals 
because with each attempt the likelihood of eventually being successful increases. Raising public 
awareness that self-regulation is malleable rather than a fixed trait could have a positive impact. If 
self-regulation can be improved by practice, then doing so might be a better strategy than 
imposing strong external regulation. For example, parents with children who have self-regulation 
problems at school should, in addition to imposing strict rules, external monitoring, and 
reinforcement strategies on their children, provide their children with encouragement to practice 
self-regulation in other domains. Playing sports, joining a youth club, or playing an instrument 
might help children and adolescents to improve their self-regulatory capacity. For example, 
children might learn to be persistent, to attend their lessons,  or to participate in meetings 
regularly, even though they may wish to do other things. In this way, the practice effects of self-
regulation could be transferred from these aforementioned alternative domains to the school 
domain (Muraven et al., 1999).  
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Conclusion 
The empirical evidence resulting from this thesis provides the following main messages: 
First, a focus on the means or processes rather than on the outcomes of personal goals is 
beneficial during goal pursuit since it is related to better self-regulation and higher subjective 
well-being. More specifically, focusing on the processes involved in goal pursuit might be 
beneficial for self-regulation when people make attributions for failure and success. Second, there 
is a shift from outcome to the more beneficial process focus across the life span. Third, self-
regulation during goal pursuit seems to generally improve in old age. The transition to process 
focus and the improvement of self-regulation in old age can foster successful aging because both 
mechanisms can help adults to compensate for age-related resource restrictions. 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Um erfolgreich persönliche Ziele zu verfolgen und nach Misserfolgen und Rückschlägen 
nicht aufzugeben, müssen Menschen ihr Verhalten, ihre Gedanken und ihre Emotionen 
regulieren (Baumeister et al., 2007). Das Ziel, durch eine Diät an Gewicht zu verlieren, erfordert 
z.B. kalorienreichen Versuchungen zu widerstehen, nicht zu sehr darüber zu grübeln, wenn dies 
einmal nicht gelingt, und negative Stimmung aufzuhellen, wenn sich der Diäterfolg nur langsam 
einstellen will. Diese Dissertation untersucht, wie der Zielfokus, also das Nachdenken über die 
Mittel der Zielverfolgung (Prozessfokus) oder die mit der Zielerreichung angestrebten Ergebnisse 
(Ergebnisfokus; Freund et al., 2010), Alter und Selbstregulation zusammenhängen. Die Arbeit stützt 
sich dabei auf die Annahme, dass Prozesse der Selbstregulation davon beeinflusst werden, wie 
Ziele, also angestrebte Ergebnisse und Mittel zu ihrer Verfolgung (Kruglanski, 1996), kognitiv 
repräsentiert werden („Motivation-als-Kognition-Paradigma“, Kruglanski et al., 2002).  
Teile I und II untersuchen die Hypothese, dass ein Prozessfokus im Gegensatz zu einem 
Ergebnisfokus mit erfolgreicher Selbstregulation beim Verfolgen persönlicher Ziele einhergeht. 
Dazu wurden in Teil I 126 Studienteilnehmerinnen während einer sechswöchigen Diät 
wiederholt gefragt, wie stark sie über die Mittel und die Ergebnisse der Diät nachdachten 
(Prozess- versus Ergebnisfokus). Hypothesenkonform zeigte sich, dass ein stärkerer Prozess- als 
Ergebnisfokus mit besserer Selbstregulation einherging, nämlich weniger Abweichungen von den 
Diätvorgaben, sowie weniger Rumination über Misserfolge und weniger disinhibitertem 
Essverhalten. Ein stärkerer Prozessfokus war ausserdem positiv mit der Gewichtsabnahme 
während der sechswöchigen Diät korreliert.  
Teil II umfasst zwei Studien. In einer Fragebogenstudie mit 129 Teilnehmenden wurde 
die Hypothese bestätigt, dass ein stärkerer Prozessfokus beim Nachdenken über persönliche 
Ziele positiv mit subjektivem Wohlbefinden zusammenhängt. Stärker auf die Mittel als auf die 
Ergebnisse zu fokussieren, hing ausserdem positiv mit der Absicht zusammen, nach einem 
Misserfolg eher die (nicht erfolgreichen) Mittel zur Zielverfolgung zu ersetzen als sich zugunsten 
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anderer (eher erreichbarer) Ziele vom ursprünglichen Ziel zu lösen. Diese Absicht wiederum 
korrelierte positiv mit dem subjektivem Wohlbefinden. In Studie 2, der oben bereits genannten 
Diätstudie, zeigten sich ausserdem signifikante Zusammenhänge zwischen der Tendenz, Erfolge 
und Misserfolge eher auf der Ebene der Prozesse des Diäthaltens (z.B. die Änderung des 
Essverhaltens) zu lokalisieren als auf der Ebene der angestrebten Ergebnisse (z.B. besseres 
Aussehen), und erfolgreicher Selbstregulation und Gewichtsabnahme. Teil I und II unterstützen 
somit die Annahme, dass es sich bei der Verfolgung langfristiger Ziele und insbesondere nach 
Misserfolgen für Selbstregulation und Zielerreichung auszahlt, stärker darüber nachzudenken, wie 
ein Ziel erreicht werden kann als darüber, wozu man es erreichen möchte.  
 Die Teile III, IV und V der Dissertation betrachten Zielfokus und Selbstregulation im 
Kontext ihrer Entwicklung über die Lebensspanne im Erwachsenenalter. Teil III befasst sich 
allgemein damit, wie Erwachsene durch das Setzen und Verfolgen von Zielen ihre persönliche 
Entwicklung gestalten. Die handlungstheoretische Spezifizierung des Modells der Selektion, 
Optimierung und Kompensation (Freund & Baltes, 2000; Freund et al., 1999; Freund, 2006a) 
dient als theoretischer Rahmen. Es wird ausserdem vorhergesagt, dass es im Alter aufgrund der 
Verkürzung der Zukunftszeitperpektive, durch Ressourceneinschränkungen und durch die 
verstärkte Zielorientierung, Verluste zu vermeiden anstatt Gewinne zu erzielen (Ebner et al., 
2006; Freund, 2006b), zu einer Zunahme des Prozessfokus und einer Abnahme des 
Ergebnisfokus kommen soll.  
In Teil IV werden drei Studien vorgestellt. Sie zeigen unter Anderem, dass, wie 
angenommen, ältere im Vergleich zu jüngeren Erwachsenen stärker auf Prozesse statt auf 
Ergebnisse der Zielverfolgung fokussieren (Studie 1, N = 43), dass ein Prozessfokus mit 
höherem affektiven Wohlbefinden einhergeht (Studie 2, N = 89), und sich dieser Prozessfokus 
positiv auf eine Reihe von Zielvariablen (wie die Zielzufriedenheit) und auf den tatsächlichen 
Erfolg bei der Verfolgung eines sportlichen Ziels auswirkt (Studie 3, N = 101). 
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Teil V der Dissertation untersucht schliesslich die Hypothese, dass ein höheres Alter 
insgesamt mit einer besseren Selbstregulation einhergeht. Begründet wird dies damit, dass sich 
über die Lebensspanne Übungseffekte aus jahrelanger Erfahrung in der Verfolgung langfristiger 
Ziele akkumulieren. Ausserdem gibt es Befunde aus der Forschung zu Emotionsregulation (z. B. 
Gross et al., 1997) und Gedankenunterdrückung (z. B. Giambra, 1989), die auf positive Effekte 
des Alters auf die Selbstregulation hinweisen. Dem entgegen stehen allerdings zahlreiche Studien 
aus der psychologischen Forschung zur Entwicklung exekutiver Funktionen, die eine 
altersbedingte Verschlechterung der Fähigkeit unerwünschtes Verhalten zu inhibieren, gefunden 
haben (Verhaeghen & Cerella, 2002). Daten aus der Diätstudie bestätigen, dass ältere Frauen über 
eine bessere Selbstregulation ihrer Emotionen, ihrer Gedanken und ihres Verhaltens verfügen. 
Diese ging jedoch nicht mit höherem Gewichtsverlust einher, was aber durch die altersbedingte 
Abnahme des Energiegrundumsatzes erklärt werden kann (Bosy-Westphal et al., 2003).  
 Zum Schluss integriert eine umfassende Diskussion die verschiedenen Teile der Arbeit 
und diskutiert noch einmal ausführlich mögliche Mechanismen und Faktoren, die das Ausmass 
der Adaptivität des Prozessfokus bzw. der Maladaptivität des Ergebnisfokus beeinflussen 
könnten. Wieso ein offensichtlich funktionaler Prozessfokus nicht auch im jüngeren 
Erwachsenenalter vorherrscht, wird ebenfalls erläutert. Schliesslich wird die Wichtigkeit von 
Selbstregulation für eine erfolgreiche Entwicklungsregulation insbesondere im höheren Alter 
betont und hergeleitet, welche Mediatoren bei der Verbesserung der Selbstregulation im Alter 
eine Rolle spielen könnten. Am Ende werden praktische Implikationen der Forschungsergebnisse 
abgeleitet.
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Self-developed questionnaire to assess dieting-related rumination after 
failure (in accordance with Kuhl, 1990) 
Please indicate how strongly you agree with the following statements regarding the past week: 
1. Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, I could not concentrate very well on other 
things. 
2. *Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, I did not think about it afterwards. 
3. Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, it took me a long time to accept it. 
4. Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, it came to mind repeatedly for quite a 
while afterwards. 
5. Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, I quickly accepted it. 
6. Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, I did not get over it very quickly. 
(Note: Scale range 0 = not at all to 6 = very much, reversely coded items are marked with an asterisk) 
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Appendix B: Self-developed questionnaire to assess disinhibition after failure 
Please indicate how strongly you agree with the following statements regarding the past week. 
1. *Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, I ate less afterwards. 
2. Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, I sometimes ate quite a lot afterwards. 
3. *Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, I compensated for it by eating less 
afterwards.  
4. Whenever I violated the dietary requirements, it did not matter anyway and I gave up 
dieting for that day. 
5. *Whenever I could not resist temptation, I ate fewer calories sometime later. 
6. Whenever I could not resist temptation, I stopped dieting for that day. 
(Note: Scale range 0 = not at all to 6 = very much, reversely coded items are marked with an asterisk) 
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Appendix C: Self-developed questionnaire to assess means substitution (MS) vs. outcome 
substitution (OS) after failure 
1. *When things don’t go as well as they used to, 
a) … I look for other ways of achieving my goal. (MS). 
b) … I prefer to turn towards other goals. (OS) 
2. *When I can’t do something important the way I used to, 
a) … I look for a new goal. (OS) 
b) … I look for other ways of doing it. (MS) 
3. *If I can’t accomplish something as well as I used to, 
a) … I try to accomplish it another way first. (MS) 
b) … I try to accomplish other things first. (OS) 
4. When I have difficulties achieving a goal,  
a) … I look for other ways and means to achieve it. (MS) 
b) … I prefer to turn towards more realistic goals. (OS) 
5. When I experience setbacks,  
a) … I don’t give up my goal: There are still other ways to pursue it. (MS) 
b) … I prefer to give up my goal: There are enough other desirable goals to pursue. 
(OS) 
(Note: Items marked with an asterisk were formulated according to Baltes, Baltes, Freund, & 
Lang, 1999) 
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Appendix D: Introduction to the two “thinking exercises”  
 
Thinking exercise A (process focus): 
“We all pursue our goals in certain ways. We can examine our behaviour and its connection with 
general life goals. This is what we want to demonstrate to you with the following example: Most 
people pursue the goal of being physically active. How? Exercising regularly. How? Joining a 
sports club. As you can see, there are different ways in which we can try to attain our goals. 
Thinking exercise A focuses your attention on how one pursues goals.” 
 
Thinking exercise B (outcome focus): 
“For everything we do, there is always a reason why we do it. We can often trace our behaviour 
back to general life goals. This is what we want to demonstrate to you with the following 
example: Most people pursue the goal of getting some exercise. Why? To improve their health. 
Why? To just feel good in general. As you can see, there are different reasons why we behave in 
certain ways. Thinking exercise B focuses your attention on why we pursue certain goals.” 
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